04/18/2024
Case Caption | Case No. | Topics and Issues | Author | Decided | WebCite |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cleveland v. Neal | 112630 | Domestic violence; sufficiency; manifest weight; body-camera footage; Confrontation Clause. The city presented evidence that, if believed, demonstrated that appellant caused physical harm to her mother during a fight at her mother’s house. Therefore, appellant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant’s conviction is also not against the sufficiency of the evidence because the trier of fact was in the best position to consider the inconsistencies between appellant’s and her mother’s testimony regarding the fight. Finally, the court’s decision to admit into evidence the body-camera footage of a responding police officer did not violate appellant’s confrontation-clause rights because the body-camera footage depicted her mother’s encounter with police as the victim and she testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination. | Forbes | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1467 |
| State v. Montanez | 112679 | Pro se litigants; motion for resentencing; failure to file transcript; presume regularity. Trial court’s denial of motion for resentencing is affirmed. Pro se defendant failed to file a transcript of the resentencing hearing, and we must presume regularity of the proceedings below. | Forbes | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1468 |
| State v. James | 112741 | Abuse of discretion; evidentiary rulings; sufficiency of evidence; weight of evidence; speedy trial; ineffective assistance of counsel; jury instruction; consecutive sentences. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting certain evidence. The state immediately alerted the defense to newly discovered evidence as soon as it became known to the state. It was established that the state’s failure to provide it earlier was not a willful violation of Crim.R. 16. The source of the newly discovered evidence was not a surprise to appellant; the person who provided the evidence was named in discovery and the evidence was statements made by appellant. Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the evidence was prejudicial to him. Other evidence admitted by the trial court was relevant to demonstrate appellant’s self-interest in the case and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudice. The testimony of the sole eyewitness to the shooting was sufficient to support the murder conviction. The testimony was sufficient to support the aggravated robbery convictions; the fact that nothing was taken from the victims was not dispositive because the governing statute provides that an attempt to commit a theft offense is sufficient. The convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The jury’s credibility determination was not incredible. The video evidence was properly authenticated, and the witness testimony established a proper chain of custody. Appellant’s speedy trial rights were not violated. The delay in this case was overwhelmingly attributed to appellant’s constant change of counsel, requests for continuances, and numerous motions. Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The testimony appellant complains that his counsel failed to object to was not hearsay. The evidence for which appellant contends there was no authentication or chain of custody was properly authenticated and a chain of custody was established. The record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. The robberies and fatal shooting, on which consecutive terms were imposed, were separate and distinct acts, separated by a period of time. We are not able to say that the records clearly and convincingly do not support the trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. | Ryan | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1469 |
| Crenshaw v. Mooningham | 112835 | Motion for summary judgment; de novo review; defamation; evidence; affidavit; conclusory assertions; genuine issue of material fact; intentional infliction of emotional distress; severe, debilitating emotional injury; spoliation of evidence; disruption of plaintiff’s case; vexatious litigator; R.C. 2323.52; vexatious conduct. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on appellant’s claims where appellant did not present evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact remained as to any of her claims. | Celebrezze | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1470 |
| Heigel v. MetroHealth Sys. | 112900 | Civ.R. 56; summary judgment; App.R. 16; App.R. 12; at will employment; wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; clarity element. Appellant fails to separately argue her assignments of error, but in the interest of judicial fairness, we address the assigned errors. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees when appellant was unable to show that there were genuine issues of material fact. Although there is a clear public policy favoring workplace safety, appellant was unable to identify a public policy exception to the at will employment doctrine that is applicable to her claims. | Ryan | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1471 |
| State v. Francis | 113012 | Consecutive; maximum sentence; involuntary manslaughter. Judgment affirmed. The trial court made the statutorily required findings for the imposition of consecutive sentences. We are unable to say that the record clearly and convincingly does not support the court’s findings. The trial court was not required to make any findings in imposing maximum sentences. The trial court considered the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and sentenced the defendant within the statutory range. We do not find that the defendant’s maximum sentences were clearly and convincingly unsupported by the evidence. | Ryan | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1472 |
| State v. Smith | 113035 | Search warrant; sufficiency; possession of controlled substances; criminal tools; medical marijuana; fruit of the search; manifest weight; possession; immediately within reach; marijuana dispensary; direct physical control; constructive possession; knowingly exercises dominion. Judgment reversed and convictions vacated. The appellant’s convictions for drug possession and criminal tools were not supported by sufficient evidence. The state failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant had constructive possession of drugs or criminal tools where the state offered no evidence that the appellant had dominion or control over the area of the home where the illegal quantity of marijuana was found in the home she shared with her spouse, who held a medical marijuana license. | Groves | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1473 |
| State v. Hempstead | 113051 | Sentence; jail-time credit; specification; firearm; mandatory; contrary to law; prison term; resentencing. The sentence imposed on defendant for involuntary manslaughter with a firearm specification was contrary to law because the trial court had improperly applied jail-time credit to defendant’s mandatory firearm-specification sentence. | E.T. Gallagher | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1474 |
| Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Cleveland | 113116 | Political-subdivision immunity; negligence; res ipsa loquitur; defense; R.C. Chapter 2744; R.C. 2744.03(A)(5). Plaintiff established prima facie case of negligence through doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where defendant was the last contractor to have access at the site where the damage occurred. Decisions by city employees about where to excavate an area to repair a water line is not the kind of decision to which political-subdivision immunity attaches. | E.T. Gallagher | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1475 |
| State v. Green | 113152 | Res judicata; Crim.R. 32.1; ineffective assistance of counsel. - Res judicata bars appellant’s Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw his guilty plea premised on ineffective assistance of counsel because he could have brought his claims in a direct appeal or in his delayed appeal. | Keough | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1476 |
| Cleveland v. Oliver | 113330 | Driving under the influence; C.C.O. 433.01(a); administrative license suspension; initial appearance; R.C. 4511.191(D)(2); R.C. 4511.196(A). Trial court did not err in denying motion to dismiss underlying criminal charges when defendant’s initial appearance was not held within five-day time frame specified in R.C. 4511.191(D)(2) and 4511.196(A). The purpose for requiring initial appearance to be held within five days was to provide defendant with the opportunity to appeal the administrative license suspension, and trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss as it related to the administrative license suspension. | E.A. Gallagher | 4/18/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1477 |
| State ex rel. Crenshaw v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections | 113588 | Mandamus; Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss; R.C. 733.49; Cleveland City Charter Sections 70 and 77; declaratory judgment; prohibitory injunction; election vs. appointment of Cleveland law director; Loc.App.R. 45(C) – filing fee or poverty affidavit. The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator possesses a clear legal right to the requested relief; (2) the respondent possesses a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief; and (3) there exists no other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Herein, we find that the relator has failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a conflict actually exists between R.C. 733.49 and Sections 70 and 77 of the Cleveland City Charter with regard to the appointment versus the election of the Cleveland law director. Of greater significance is the fact that the relator seeks a declaratory judgment that R.C. 733.49 supersedes the Cleveland City Charter, which requires the election of the Cleveland law director and prevents the appointment of the Cleveland law director. A complaint couched in the form of mandamus does not state a cause of action in mandamus when the clear substance of the allegations demonstrates an action for declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction. A declaratory judgment action that is cloaked in mandamus is subject to dismissal, because the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment actions. Finally, the relator has failed to pay the filing fee to initiate this action or file an affidavit of indigence as required by Loc.App.R. 45(C). Failure to pay the filing fee or provide an affidavit of indigence constitutes grounds for dismissal. | Per Curiam | 4/12/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1478 |
| State ex rel. Rance v. Corrigan | 113680 | Writ of procedendo; proceed to judgment; summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; moot; R.C. 2969.25(C). A request for writ of procedendo was rendered moot when during the pendency of the complaint, the respondent entered judgment in the underlying action. Therefore, the respondent’s motion for summary judgment was granted. | Laster Mays | 4/12/2024 | 2024-Ohio-1479 |