Case Caption

Case No.Topics and IssuesAuthorDecided
Olmsted Twp. v. Ritchie 110107, 110108Magistrate’s decision; objection; de novo; R.C. 2929.41(B)(1); R.C. 2929.24; R.C. 2929.25; R.C. 2929.25(A)(1)(a); R.C. 2929.25(D); misdemeanor; sentence; aggregate term; modify; suspend; maximum jail term; community control; violation; matter of law. Trial court’s order modifying the defendant’s misdemeanor sentence was modified to delete language indicating additional jail time remained available for sentencing, which was erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court sentenced the defendant pursuant to R.C. 2929.24(A) and 2929.25(A)(1)(a) to a jail term of 30 days for each misdemeanor count in combination with the direct imposition of five years of community control. Because the defendant was credited with the total jail time on the sentence that was imposed, he was not subject to any further jail time. R.C. 2929.25(D) could not be read to permit the trial court to modify the sentence beyond the maximum jail term initially imposed. S. Gallagher 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-124
State v. Lenhart 110226DNA testing; outcome determinative; res judicata. Trial court properly denied defendant’s application for DNA testing where the record shows the results of such testing would not be outcome determinative.E.T. Gallagher 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-125
Hudson & Keyse L.L.C. v. Sherrills 110366Dormant judgment; motion for revivor; objection; R.C. 2325.15; R.C. 2325.18; App.R. 12; challenge to validity of the judgment; collateral attack. The trial court did not err in granting the motion to revive dormant judgment. The collateral attacks on the judgment raised by appellant in her objection were appropriate for a motion for relief from judgment but could not be considered with regard to a motion for revivor.Celebrezze 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-126
State v. Browning 110555Felony sentencing; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); findings; R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I); R.C. 2929.11; contrary to law; permissible range. We review felony sentences under the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence, or vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing if it “clearly and convincingly finds” that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Under R.C. 2929.11, a sentence imposed for a felony shall be “reasonably calculated” to achieve “three overriding purposes of felony sentencing” — (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, (2) to punish the offender, and (3) to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender — “using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” Appellant argues his two-year sentence was contrary to law because it failed to comport with the overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11. However, the two-year sentence for appellant’s conviction, a third-degree felony, was within the permissible range. In addition, the court’s judgment of conviction states that “[t]he court considered all required factors of the law” and “finds that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” Further, although the trial court was not required to make findings on the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the trial court discussed its reasoning at the sentencing hearing. As such, we refuse to find that appellant’s two-year prison sentence is contrary to law.Groves 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-127
Cleveland v. Bolger 110769Jail-time credit; medical isolation; community-control sanctions; maximum jail sentence served; R.C. 2929.24; trial court; journal entry; misdemeanor. The trial court erred when it denied defendant 20 days of jail-time credit for days spent in medical isolation within the county jail. The trial court also erred when it placed defendant on community-control sanctions after he had already served the maximum jail sentence for a misdemeanor.Kilbane 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-128
Ridge-Pleasant Valley, Inc. v. Navin 109777Civ.R. 56, summary judgment, Civ.R. 12(F), strike pleadings. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee. The trial court struck pleadings by appellant that failed to comply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, and appellant did not resubmit filings that complied with the rules though warned to do so.Laster Mays 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-130
Ohio Bar Liab. Ins. Co. v. Wallace 110038Judgment on the pleadings; Civ.R. 12(C); de novo review; insurance policy; contract interpretation; coverage; exclusion; duty to defend; claim for attorney fees; statute designed to deter frivolous conduct; IDEA; 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3). There was no coverage for appellants’ claims under the policy because the claims against appellants in the subject suits were brought under IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, which is a statute that was designed to deter frivolous conduct by attorneys engaged in litigation. The trial court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings on OBLIC’s complaint in favor of OBLIC and denying appellants’ corresponding motion. The trial court further did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of OBLIC on appellants’ counterclaim for bad faith.Celebrezze 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-131
State v. Branch 110050Maximum sentence, findings of fact, R.C. 2929.141, abuse of discretion, psychological evaluation. A trial court is not required to place findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record when imposing a maximum sentence where the trial court on the record and in its journal entry notes that it considered the required factors. The mere fact that the trial court emphasized certain facts and did not mention others, does not mean the trial court failed to consider relevant factors. Appellate court may only review the record before it. Where the record is silent as to an issue argued by appellant, the court is unable to review it. Finally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it fails to order a second psychological evaluation when the first psychological evaluation suggests appellant is malingering and appellant’s multiple pro se filings and colloquy with the court display appellant’s understanding of the proceedings and his ability to assist his attorney.Groves 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-132
In re D.P. 110729Due process; manifest weight of the evidence; permanent custody; R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 2151.414; R.C. 2151.419.Laster Mays 1/20/2022 2022-Ohio-135
State ex rel. Davis v. Gallagher 111179Mandamus, procedendo, pending motion, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), hybrid representation, duty of trial court to rule on pro se motion. Relator seeks a writ of procedendo/mandamus in order to compel the trial court to issue rulings with regard to pending pro se motions. The relator does not possess the right to representation by counsel and pro se representation, often know as hybrid representation. When a criminal defendant is represented by counsel, a trial court is prohibited from ruling on a pro se motion unless counsel joins in the pro se motion. Herein, the relator filed numerous pro se motions without the assistance or approval of counsel. Because the relator was represented by counsel, the trial court possesses no duty to issue rulings with regard to any pro se motion. The complaint for procedendo/mandamus fails to state a claim and is subject to a sua sponte dismissal.Boyle 1/14/2022 2022-Ohio-129