The National Firearms Act of 1934 defines a “machinegun” as “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U. S. C. §5845(b). With a machinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even continuously, by engaging the trigger only once. This capability distinguishes a machinegun from a semiautomatic firearm. With a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter can fire only one time by engaging the trigger. Using a technique called bump firing, shooters can fire semiautomatic firearms at rates approaching those of some machineguns. A shooter who bump fires a rifle uses the firearm’s recoil to help rapidly manipulate the trigger. Although bump firing does not require any additional equipment, a “bump stock” is an accessory designed to make the technique easier. A bump stock does not alter the basic mechanics of bump firing, and the trigger still must be released and reengaged to fire each additional shot.

   For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) consistently took the position that semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were not machineguns under §5845(b). ATF abruptly changed course when a gunman using semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks fired hundreds of rounds into a crowd in Las Vegas, Nevada, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more. ATF subsequently proposed a rule that would repudiate its previous guidance and amend its regulations to “clarify” that bump stocks are machineguns. 83 Fed. Reg. 13442. ATF’s Rule ordered owners of bump stocks either to destroy or surrender them to ATF to avoid criminal prosecution.

   Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF under protest, then filed suit to challenge the Rule under the Administrative Procedure Act. As relevant, Cargill alleged that ATF lacked statutory authority to promulgate the Rule because bump stocks are not “machinegun[s]” as defined in §5845(b). After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for ATF. The Fifth Circuit initially affirmed, but reversed after rehearing en banc. A majority agreed that §5845(b) is ambiguous as to whether a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock fits the statutory definition of a machinegun and resolved that ambiguity in Cargill’s favor.

Held: ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies a bump stock as a “machinegun” under §5845(b). Pp. 6–19.

  (a) A semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not a “machinegun” as defined by §5845(b) because: (1) it cannot fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger” and (2) even if it could, it would not do so “automatically.” ATF therefore exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies bump stocks as machineguns. P. 6.

  (b) A semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock does not fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” The phrase “function of the trigger” refers to the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism. No one disputes that a semiautomatic rifle without a bump stock is not a machinegun because a shooter must release and reset the trigger between every shot. And, any subsequent shot fired after the trigger has been released and reset is the result of a separate and distinct “function of the trigger.” Nothing changes when a semiautomatic rifle is equipped with a bump stock. Between every shot, the shooter must release pressure from the trigger and allow it to reset before reengaging the trigger for another shot. A bump stock merely reduces the amount of time that elapses between separate “functions” of the trigger.

  ATF argues that a shooter using a bump stock must pull the trigger only one time to initiate a bump-firing sequence of multiple shots. This initial trigger pull sets off a sequence—fire, recoil, bump, fire—that allows the weapon to continue firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter. This argument rests on the mistaken premise that there is a difference between the shooter flexing his finger to pull the trigger and pushing the firearm forward to bump the trigger against his stationary trigger. Moreover, ATF’s position is logically inconsistent because its reasoning would also mean that a semiautomatic rifle without a bump stock is capable of firing more than one shot by a “single function of the trigger.” Yet, ATF agrees that is not the case. ATF’s argument is thus at odds with itself. Pp. 7–14.

  (c) Even if a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock could fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger,” it would not do so “automatically.” Section 5845(b) specifies the precise action that must “automatically” cause a weapon to fire “more than one shot”—a “single function of the trigger.” If something more than a “single function of the trigger” is required to fire multiple shots, the weapon does not satisfy the statutory definition. Firing multiple shots using a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock requires more than a single function of the trigger. A shooter must maintain forward pressure on the rifle’s front grip with his nontrigger hand. Without this ongoing manual input, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock will not fire multiple shots.

  ATF counters that machineguns also require continuous manual input from a shooter: The shooter must both engage the trigger and keep it pressed down to continue shooting. ATF argues there is no meaningful difference between holding down the trigger of a traditional machinegun and maintaining forward pressure on the front grip of a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock. This argument ignores that Congress defined a machinegun by what happens “automatically” “by a single function of the trigger.” Simply pressing and holding the trigger down on a fully automatic rifle is not manual input in addition to a trigger’s function. By contrast, pushing forward on the front grip of a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not part of functioning the trigger.

  Moreover, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock is indistinguishable from the Ithaca Model 37 shotgun, a weapon the ATF concedes cannot fire multiple shots “automatically.” ATF responds that a shooter is less physically involved with operating a bump-stock equipped rifle than operating the Model 37. It explains that once a shooter pulls the rifle’s trigger a single time, the bump stock harnesses the firearm’s recoil energy in a continuous back-and-forth cycle that allows the shooter to attain continuous firing. But, even if one aspect of a weapon’s operation could be seen as “automatic,” that would not mean the weapon “shoots . . . automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b) (emphasis added). Pp. 14–17.

  (d) Abandoning the text, ATF attempts to shore up its position by relying on the presumption against ineffectiveness. That presumption weighs against interpretations of a statute that would “rende[r] the law in a great measure nugatory, and enable offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy manner.” The Emily, 9 Wheat. 381, 389. In ATF’s view, Congress “restricted machineguns because they eliminate the manual movements that a shooter would otherwise need to make in order to fire continuously” at a high rate of fire, as bump stocks do. Brief for Petitioners 40. So, ATF reasons, concluding that bump stocks are lawful “simply because the [trigger] moves back and forth . . . would exalt artifice above reality and enable evasion of the federal machinegun ban.” Id., at 41–42. The presumption against ineffectiveness cannot do the work that ATF asks of it. Interpreting §5845(b) to exclude semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks comes nowhere close to making the statute useless. Pp. 17–19.

57 F. 4th 447, affirmed.

 Thomas, J. delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan and Jackson, JJ., joined.

Two Terms ago, in Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 596 U. S. 464, the Court held that a statute violated the Bankruptcy Clause’s uniformity requirement because it permitted different fees for Chapter 11 debtors depending on the district where their case was filed. In this case, the Court is asked to determine the appropriate remedy for that constitutional violation. As noted in Siegel, there are three options: (1) refund fees for the thousands of debtors charged higher fees in districts administered by the U. S. Trustee Program, (2) retroactively extract higher fees from the small number of debtors charged lower fees in districts administered by the Bankruptcy Administrator Program, or (3) require only prospective fee parity. See id., at 480.

  As in Siegel, this case arises from a case filed in a U. S. Trustee district. In 2016, 76 legal entities filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the District of Kansas. In 2018, under the amended fee statute the Court later found unconstitutional in Siegel, the debtors began paying higher fees than they would have if their case had been filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district. In 2020, the debtors challenged the constitutionality of those fees. The Bankruptcy Court found no constitutional violation, but the Tenth Circuit, anticipating Siegel, reversed. To remedy the constitutional violation, the Tenth Circuit ordered a refund of the debtors’ quarterly fees to the extent they exceeded the lower fees paid in the Bankruptcy Administrator districts. This Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case in light of Siegel, and the Tenth Circuit reinstated its original opinion without alteration.

Held: Prospective parity is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel. Pp. 5–16.

 (a) Across remedial contexts, “the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16. Three aspects of the Court’s holding in Siegel are relevant here. First, the violation identified was nonuniformity, not high fees. Second, the fee disparity was short lived, lasting only from 2018 to 2021. Third, the disparity was small: 98% of the relevant class of debtors still paid uniform fees. Pp. 5–7.

 (b) To determine the appropriate remedy for this short-lived and small disparity, the Court asks “what the legislature would have willed had it been apprised of the constitutional infirmity.” Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U. S. 47, 74. In cases involving unequal treatment, the Court focuses on two considerations: Congress’s “intensity of commitment” to the more broadly applicable rule, and “the degree of potential disruption to the statutory scheme that would occur” if the Court were to extend the exception. Id., at 75. Here, faced with the short-lived and small fee disparity created by the constitutional violation identified in Siegel, Congress would have wanted prospective parity, not a refund or retrospective raising of fees.

 To start, Congress has demonstrated intense commitment to the more broadly applicable rule, higher fees in U. S. Trustee districts. That commitment stems from Congress’s desire for the U. S. Trustee program to “be funded in its entirety by user fees.” Siegel, 596 U. S., at 469. In light of this desire, it is not surprising that, in the 2017 fee statute at issue in Siegel, Congress chose to address a funding shortfall for the U. S. Trustee program by raising fees on the largest Chapter 11 debtors. In 2021, when Congress amended the fee statute to require uniform fees, it kept fees at an elevated level “to further the long-standing goal of Congress of ensuring that the bankruptcy system is self-funded.” §2(b), 134 Stat. 5086.

 Now consider the disruption that would follow from extending the exception, lower fees in Bankruptcy Administrator districts. Retrospectively lowering fees for all relevant debtors in U. S. Trustee districts would cost approximately $326 million. Thus, in mandating a refund, this Court would transform a program Congress designed to be self-funding into an enormous bill for taxpayers. On top of that, respondents’ proposed refund would almost certainly exacerbate the existing fee disparity.

 The only remaining question, then, is whether Congress would have wanted to retrospectively impose higher fees on debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts. The best evidence that Congress would not want such a remedy is that Congress itself chose not to pursue that course when amending the fee statute in 2021. Congress’s choice makes sense. Retrospectively raising fees in Bankruptcy Administrator districts would do nothing to achieve Congress’s goal of keeping the U. S. Trustee program self-funding. What is more, there are serious practical challenges to a retrospective imposition of higher fees, including the logistical problems with locating all the former debtors or their successors who would owe the higher fees. Pp. 7–14.

 (c) Relying on a series of cases involving unconstitutional state taxes, respondents and the dissent claim that due process requires overriding Congress’s clear intent. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation, 496 U. S. 18; Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U. S. 86. These cases, respondents contend, stand for the proposition that unless an “exclusive” predeprivation remedy is both “clear and certain,” Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 522 U. S. 442, 443–444 (per curiam), due process requires “meaningful backward-looking relief,” McKesson, 496 U. S., at 31. And, they claim, the predeprivation remedy here was neither exclusive nor clear and certain.

 The tax cases, assuming that they are even applicable here, do not entitle respondents to relief. In those cases, the Court held that the existence of a predeprivation hearing would be enough to satisfy the Due Process Clause. See Harper, 509 U. S., at 101. Respondents acknowledge that they had the opportunity to challenge their fees before they paid them, so due process is satisfied. Respondents misread this Court’s later decisions on bait-and-switch schemes as displacing that basic holding. To be sure, due process may sometimes constrain the Court’s remedial options. In this case, though, due process does not mandate any particular remedy. Thus, as the tax cases themselves advise, the Court must “implement what the legislature would have willed.” Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U. S. 413, 427. Pp. 13–16.

15 F. 4th 1011, reversed and remanded.

 Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas and Barrett, JJ., joined.

To initiate the removal of an alien from the United States who is either “inadmissible” under 8 U. S. C. §1182 or “deportable” under §1227, the Federal Government must provide the alien with “written notice” of the proceedings. §§1229(a)(1), (2). Two types of “written notice” are described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of §1229(a): Paragraph (1) provides that the alien be given a written “ ‘notice to appear,’ ” or NTA, which must set out, among other things, “[t]he time and place at which the proceedings will be held.” Paragraph (2) states that “in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings,” the agency must provide “a written notice” specifying “the new time or place of the proceedings” and “the consequences” of failing to attend. An alien who fails to attend a hearing despite receiving notice “shall be ordered removed in absentia” if the Government “establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence” that “the written notice” was provided and that “the alien is removable.” §1229a(b)(5)(A). Three scenarios permit the rescinding of an in absentia removal order, one of which is when an alien “demonstrates that [he] did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” of §1229(a). §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).

   In these consolidated cases (one from the Fifth Circuit, and two from the Ninth), aliens Esmelis Campos-Chaves, Varinder Singh, and Raul Daniel Mendez-Colín, each moved to rescind his in absentia order of removal on the ground that he did not receive proper notice of the removal hearing. In each case, the Government provided an initial NTA, but the NTA did not specify the time and place of the removal hearing. Eventually, the Government provided each alien with a notice of hearing under §1229(a)(2) which set out the specific time and place of the removal hearing. None of the aliens showed up for his hearing, and each was ordered removed in absentia by an Immigration Judge. Each then sought to rescind the removal order, arguing that he did not receive a proper NTA under §1229(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit considered and denied one of the petitions, but the Ninth Circuit granted the other two.

Held: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper §1229(a)(2) notice for the hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed, they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). Pp 7–16.

 (a) These cases turn on whether Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín can “demonstrat[e]” that they “did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a).” §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The Government reads that provision to permit rescission only when the alien did not receive notice of the hearing he failed to attend. Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín, on the other hand, urge a reading of the provision’s word “or” that would distribute the phrase “did not receive notice in accordance with” across “paragraph (1) or (2).” They argue that because each can “demonstrat[e]” that he “did not receive” an NTA, they each can seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders. Pp. 7–8.

 (b) The Government’s provision of a single notice under either paragraph (1) or (2) defeats rescission under §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). The word “ ‘or’ ” is “ ‘almost always disjunctive.’ ” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U. S. 79, 87. Thus, §1229a(b)(5)’s ordinary meaning is that either a paragraph (1) notice or a paragraph (2) notice can count as “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2).” Statutory contexts points in the same direction. For example, nearby §1229a(b)(5)(A) also refers to “paragraph (1) or (2)” notice. There, however, the “or” is unambiguously disjunctive, and there is no way to distribute language across the “or” that can provide an alternative meaning. Furthermore, subparagraph (A) requires the Government to establish that it provided “the written notice,” indicating that only a single notice must be provided in a single document. Niz-Chavez, 593 U. S., at 166. Pp. 8–10.

 (c) In §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” refers to the notice for the hearing the alien missed and at which he was ordered removed. Notice under paragraph (2) supersedes the NTA; when there is paragraph (2) notice, it is that notice which informs the alien when to appear, not the NTA. As previously noted, §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)’s “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” must correspond with §1229(b)(5)(A)’s “the written notice.” The only way to make sense of §1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)’s reference to a single notice is for that notice to be the one that informed the alien of the time and date of the hearing the alien missed, and at which he was ordered removed. That reading also gives the provision a “substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371. Pp. 10–12.

 (d) Campos-Chaves, Singh, and Mendez-Colín all received “notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2)” for the hearings they missed, and thus their in absentia removal orders may not be rescinded on that ground. The Government concedes that none of them received a compliant NTA. Each did, however, receive a “notice in accordance with paragraph . . . (2),” and each notice met all of the requirements for a notice under that provision. After receiving a defective NTA, each alien received a notice that provided a specific time and place for their removal proceedings. Those notices provided “new” times, and thereby “change[d]” the time and place of their removal proceedings, within the meaning of §1229(a)(2). Pp. 13–16.

No. 22–674, 54 F. 4th 314, affirmed; No. 22–884, 24 F. 4th 1315, reversed (Mendez- Colín) and vacated and remanded (Singh).

 Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined.

Notes
¹ *Together with No. 22–884, Garland v. Singh, and Garland v. Mendez-Colin (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.