Petitioner National Rifle Association (NRA) sued respondent Maria Vullo—former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services (DFS)—alleging that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated parties to punish or suppress the NRA’s gun-promotion advocacy. The Second Circuit held that Vullo’s alleged actions constituted permissible government speech and legitimate law enforcement. The Court granted certiorari to address whether the NRA’s complaint states a First Amendment claim.

   The NRA’s “well-pleaded factual allegations,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–679, are taken as true at this motion-to-dismiss stage. DFS regulates insurance companies and financial services institutions doing business in New York, and has the power to initiate investigations and civil enforcement actions, as well as to refer matters for criminal prosecution. The NRA contracted with DFS-regulated entities—affiliates of Lockton Companies, LLC (Lockton)—to administer insurance polices the NRA offered as a benefit to its members, which Chubb Limited (Chubb) and Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd’s) would then underwrite. In 2017, Vullo began investigating one of these affinity insurance policies—Carry Guard—on a tip passed along from a gun-control advocacy group. The investigation revealed that Carry Guard insured gun owners from intentional criminal acts in violation of New York law, and that the NRA promoted Carry Guard without the required insurance producer license. Lockton and Chubb subsequently suspended Carry Guard. Vullo then expanded her investigation into the NRA’s other affinity insurance programs.

   On February 27, 2018, Vullo met with senior executives at Lloyd’s, expressed her views in favor of gun control, and told the Lloyd’s executives “that DFS was less interested in pursuing” infractions unrelated to any NRA business “so long as Lloyd’s ceased providing insurance to gun groups, especially the NRA.” App. to Pet. for Cert. at 199–200, ¶21. Vullo and Lloyd’s struck a deal: Lloyd’s “would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business,” and “in exchange, DFS would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates which served the NRA.” Id., at 223, ¶69.

   On April 19, 2018, Vullo issued letters entitled, “Guidance on Risk Management Relating to the NRA and Similar Gun Promotion Organizations.” Id., at 246–251 (Guidance Letters). In the Guidance Letters, Vullo “encourage[d]” DFS-regulated entities to: (1) “continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; (2) “review any relationships they have with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations”; and (3) “take prompt actions to manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.” Id., at 248, 251. Vullo and Governor Cuomo also issued a joint press release echoing many of the letters’ statements, and “ ‘urg[ing] all insurance companies and banks doing business in New York’ ” to join those “ ‘that have already discontinued their arrangements with the NRA.’ ” Id., at 244. DFS subsequently entered into separate consent decrees with Lockton, Chubb, and Lloyd’s, in which the insurers admitted violations of New York’s insurance law, agreed not to provide any NRA-endorsed insurance programs (even if lawful), and agreed to pay multimillion dollar fines.

Held: The NRA plausibly alleged that respondent violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy. Pp. 8–20.

  (a) At the heart of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is the recognition that viewpoint discrimination is uniquely harmful to a free and democratic society. When government officials are “engaging in their own expressive conduct,” though, “the Free Speech Clause has no application.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467. “When a government entity embarks on a course of action, it necessarily takes a particular viewpoint and rejects others,” and thus does not need to “maintain viewpoint-neutrality when its officers and employees speak about that venture.” Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. 218, 234. While a government official can share her views freely and criticize particular beliefs in the hopes of persuading others, she may not use the power of her office to punish or suppress disfavored expression.

  In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, this Court explored the distinction between permissible attempts to persuade and impermissible attempts to coerce. The Court explained that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from relying on the “threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve the suppression” of disfavored speech. Id., at 67. Although the defendant in Bantam Books, a state commission that blacklisted certain publications, lacked the “power to apply formal legal sanctions,” the coerced party “reasonably understood” the commission to threaten adverse action, and thus its “compliance with the [c]ommission’s directives was not voluntary.” Id., at 66–68. To reach this conclusion, the Court considered things like: the commission’s authority; the commission’s communications; and the coerced party’s reaction to the communications. Id., at 68. The Courts of Appeals have since considered similar factors to determine whether a challenged communication is reasonably understood to be a coercive threat. Ultimately, Bantam Books stands for the principle that a government official cannot directly or indirectly coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfavored speech on her behalf. Pp. 8–11.

  (b) To state a claim that the government violated the First Amendment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff must plausibly allege conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to convey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or suppress speech. See Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 67–68. Here, the NRA plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing DFS-regulated entities into disassociating with the NRA in order to punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.

  As DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and enforcement authority over all insurance companies and financial service institutions doing business in New York. She could initiate investigations, refer cases for prosecution, notice civil charges, and enter into consent decrees. Vullo’s communications with the DFS-regulated entities, particularly with Lloyd’s, must be considered against the backdrop of Vullo’s authority. Vullo made clear she wanted Lloyd’s to disassociate from all gun groups, although there was no indication that such groups had unlawful insurance policies similar to the NRA’s. Vullo also told the Lloyd’s executives she would “focus” her enforcement actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 223, ¶69. The message was loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid liability for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s campaign against gun groups” by terminating its business relationships with them. Ibid. As the reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms, Vullo’s alleged communications—whether seen as a threat or as an inducement—were reasonably understood as coercive. Other allegations concerning the Guidance Letters and accompanying press release, viewed in context of their issuance, reinforce the NRA’s First Amendment claim. Pp. 12–15.

  (c) The Second Circuit concluded that Vullo’s alleged communications were “examples of permissible government speech” and “legitimate enforcement action.” 49 F. 4th 700, 717–719. The Second Circuit could only reach this conclusion, however, by taking the complaint’s allegations in isolation and failing to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor.

  Vullo’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. The conceded illegality of the NRA-endorsed insurance programs does not insulate Vullo from First Amendment scrutiny under Bantam Books. Nor does her argument that her actions targeted “nonexpressive” business relationships change the fact that the NRA alleges her actions were aimed at punishing or suppressing speech. Finally, Vullo claims that the NRA’s position, if accepted, would stifle government speech and hamper legitimate enforcement efforts, but the Court’s conclusion simply reaffirms the general principle that where, as here, the complaint plausibly alleges coercive threats aimed at punishing or suppressing disfavored speech, the plaintiff states a First Amendment claim. Pp. 15–18.

  (d) The NRA’s allegations, if true, highlight the constitutional concerns with the kind of strategy that Vullo purportedly adopted. Although the NRA was not the directly regulated party here, Vullo allegedly used the power of her office to target gun promotion by going after the NRA’s business partners. Nothing in this case immunizes the NRA from regulation nor prevents government officials from condemning disfavored views. The takeaway is that the First Amendment prohibits government officials from wielding their power selectively to punish or suppress speech, directly or (as alleged here) through private intermediaries. P. 19.

49 F. 4th 700, vacated and remanded.

 Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Gorsuch, J., and Jackson, J., each filed a concurring opinion.

Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated first-degree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted premeditated murder of Robert’s grandmother Katherine Gumina. Arizona law at the time required the trial court to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Robert’s and Tisha’s murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13–703(F)(8); he was motivated by “pecuniary” gain, §13–703(F)(5); and the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” §13–703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circumstance with respect to Tisha’s murder: she was a young child, §13–703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these mitigating circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire record” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented.” 185 Ariz. 471, 492, 917 P. 2d 200, 221.

  Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that defense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jones’s claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones could not show prejudice because the additional information he presented “ ‘barely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge.’ ” Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit reversed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence presented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U. S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas relief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evidence and concluded that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative mitigation evidence” as “enough to overcome . . . weight[y] . . . aggravating circumstances.” Id., at 1155.

Held: The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of Strickland was in error. Pp. 7–16.

 (a) To succeed on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Jones must show that counsel provided a “deficient” performance that “prejudiced” him. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 687. Jones can show prejudice only if “there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s] errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id., at 695. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. That requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 189 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether a prisoner satisfies this standard, a court must “consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury”—both mitigating and aggravating. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 695.

 The Ninth Circuit departed from these well-established rules in at least three ways. First, it failed adequately to take into account the weighty aggravating circumstances. Second, it applied a strange Circuit rule that prohibits a court in a Strickland case from assessing the relative strength of expert witness testimony. Third, it held that the District Court erred by attaching diminished persuasive value to Jones’s mental health conditions. See 52 F. 4th, at 1129. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, permits a sentencer to find mitigating evidence unpersuasive.

 Jones argues that a habeas petitioner is entitled to relief whenever he or she “presents substantial evidence of the kind that a reasonable sentencer might deem relevant to the defendant’s moral culpability.” Brief for Respondent 14. This rule is squarely at odds with the established understanding of prejudice under Strickland, which requires a “reasonable probability” of a different result. Where aggravating factors greatly outweigh mitigating evidence, there may be no “reasonable probability” of a different result. Pp. 7–9.

 (b) Turning to the issue of prejudice in this case, the mitigating evidence Jones presented at the federal evidentiary hearing “would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the sentencing judge,” and it is insufficient to show prejudice. Strickland, 466 U. S., at 700. Pp. 9–13.

  (1) Jones presented evidence that, he claims, shows he suffers from various mental illnesses. But Arizona courts had already heard testimony that Jones “suffers from a major mental illness,” likely a “form of Bipolar Affective Disorder.” 4 Record 1070; 10 id., at 2567. And they declined to give this evidence much weight because Jones did not “establish a causal connection between his alleged mental illness and his conduct on the night of the murders.” 185 Ariz., at 492, 917 P. 2d, at 221. Jones’s new evidence did not fix that problem because Jones’s experts provided no real link between Jones’s disorders and the murders. Pp. 9–10.

  (2) Next, Jones introduced evidence that he suffers from cognitive impairment caused by physical trauma that he suffered during his mother’s pregnancy, at birth, and later in life. But Arizona courts had already heard extensive evidence about Jones’s head trauma and cognitive impairment and did not find this evidence sufficient to warrant leniency. Ibid. The little evidence Jones added at his evidentiary hearing at most corroborates the testimony that the Arizona courts already credited, and it would thus provide little benefit. Pp. 11.

  (3) In federal court, Jones also alleged sexual abuse by his grandfather and physical abuse by his second stepfather. But this evidence would not help either. Again, the Arizona courts had heard about many other instances of childhood abuse but concluded they did not warrant leniency, primarily because the abuse appeared unconnected to the murders. 185 Ariz., at 490–491, 917 P. 2d, at 219–220; 9 Record 2465. The new allegations are likewise not causally connected and, at any rate, are uncorroborated. Arizona courts would give such self-reported and uncorroborated evidence “little . . . mitigating weight.” State v. Sharp, 193 Ariz. 414, 425, 973 P. 2d 1171, 1182. Pp. 12–13.

  (4) Finally, Jones produced evidence of substance abuse, but his history of substance abuse was “well-documented” at the time of sentencing, and the Arizona Supreme Court gave this fact “some mitigating weight,” 185 Ariz., at 491, 917 P. 2d, at 220. There is no reasonable chance Arizona courts would reach a different result on essentially the same evidence. P. 13.

 (c) The weakness of Jones’s mitigating evidence contrasts sharply with the strength of the aggravating circumstances. These circumstances—multiple homicides, cruelty, pecuniary motivation, and murder of a child—are given great weight in Arizona. The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one or more of these aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigation evidence—even evidence that was “not insubstantial.” State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 185, 140 P. 3d 950, 968. Conversely, Jones and his amici identify no cases in which the Arizona Supreme Court has vacated the judgment of death in a case involving multiple murders—let alone all of the aggravating circumstances present here. The absence of such a case strongly suggests that Jones has no reasonable probability of escaping the death penalty. Pp. 13–14.

 (d) Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion, “the Strickland prejudice analysis conducted by the Supreme Court” in other cases, 52 F. 4th, at 1131, does not support resentencing here. In those cases, defense counsel introduced little, if any, mitigating evidence at the original sentencing, and the aggravating circumstances were weaker. By contrast, Jones started with much more mitigation evidence, and the aggravating circumstances present here are weightier. Had the Ninth Circuit engaged in the analysis required by Strickland, it would have affirmed the decision of the District Court denying habeas relief. Pp. 14–16.

52 F. 4th 1104, reversed and remanded.

 Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Kagan, J., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

The United States maintains a dual system of banking. Banks with federal charters—called national banks—are subject primarily to federal oversight and regulation. Banks with state charters are subject to additional state oversight and regulation. As relevant here, the National Bank Act expressly grants national banks the power to administer home mortgage loans. 12 U. S. C. §371(a). When national banks make home mortgage loans, they often offer escrow accounts designed to protect both the bank and the borrower. Escrow accounts ensure the availability of funds to pay the insurance premium and property taxes on the borrower’s behalf. Escrow accounts operated by national banks are extensively regulated by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974. RESPA was designed to protect borrowers from “certain abusive practices” that were being carried on by national banks. §2601(a). But RESPA does not mandate that national banks pay interest to borrowers on the balances of their escrow accounts. New York state law is different. It provides that a bank “shall” pay borrowers “interest” on the balance held in an escrow account maintained in connection with a mortgage on certain real estate. N. Y. Gen. Oblig. Law Ann. §5–601.

   In this case, petitioner Alex Cantero and petitioners Saul Hymes and Ilana Harwayne-Gidansky obtained home mortgage loans from Bank of America, a national bank chartered under the National Bank Act. Both contracts required the borrowers to make monthly deposits into escrow accounts. Bank of America did not pay interest on the balances held in either escrow account, but informed the borrowers that the New York interest-on-escrow law was preempted by the National Bank Act. The borrowers brought putative class-action suits in Federal District Court. The District Court concluded that nothing in the National Bank Act or other federal law preempted the New York law. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that because the New York law “would exert control over” national banks’ power “to create and fund escrow accounts,” the law was preempted.

Held: The Second Circuit failed to analyze whether New York’s interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with Dodd-Frank and Barnett Bank. Pp. 5–14.

 (a) Congress has instructed courts how to analyze federal preemption of state laws regulating national banks in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Dodd-Frank ruled out field preemption. Instead, Dodd-Frank provides that the National Bank Act preempts a state law “only if” the state law (i) discriminates against national banks as compared to state banks; or (ii) “prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” as determined “in accordance with the legal standard for preemption” in the Court’s decision in Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U. S. 25. §§25b(b)(1)(A), (B). Because the New York law does not discriminate against national banks, the preemption question must be analyzed under Dodd-Frank’s “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption standard “in accordance with” Barnett Bank. Pp. 5–12.

  (1) In Barnett Bank, a dispute arose because a national bank wanted to sell insurance in a Florida small town, but the State prohibited most banks from selling insurance. The Court held the Florida law preempted because it significantly interfered with the national bank’s ability to sell insurance—a federally authorized power. Importantly, Barnett Bank made clear that a non-discriminatory state banking law can be preempted even if it is possible for the national bank to comply with both federal and state law. 517 U. S., at 31. The Court reasoned that “normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted.” Id., at 33. But the Court added that its ruling did not “deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.” Ibid. Pp. 6–7.

  (2) Barnett Bank did not purport to establish a clear line to demarcate when a state law “significantly interfere[s]” with a national bank’s ability to exercise its powers. 517 U. S., at 33. Instead, the Court analyzed its precedents on that issue, looking to prior cases where the state law was preempted and where the state law was not preempted. Given Dodd-Frank’s direction to identify significant interference “in accordance with” Barnett Bank, courts addressing preemption questions in this context must do the same and likewise take account of those prior decisions. §25b(b)(1)(B). The paradigmatic example of significant interference identified by Barnett Bank occurred in Franklin National Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 347 U. S. 373, where a New York law prohibiting most banks “from using the word ‘saving’ or ‘savings’ in their advertising or business” was held preempted because it interfered with the national bank’s statutory power “to receive savings deposits.” Id., at 374, 378–379. The Court in Franklin found the New York law preempted—even though it did not bar national banks from receiving (or even advertising) savings deposits—because the New York law interfered with the banks’ ability to advertise “using the commonly understood description which Congress has specifically selected.” Id., at 378. Barnett Bank also pointed to a second example of significant interference—Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141—where the state law similarly limited a federally authorized power. For purposes of applying Dodd-Frank’s preemption standard, Franklin, Fidelity, and Barnett Bank together illustrate the kinds of state laws that significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank power and thus are preempted. Pp. 7–9.

  (3) The primary example of a case identified in Barnett Bank where state law was not preempted is Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233. There, a Kentucky law required banks to turn over abandoned deposits to the State. The Anderson Court held that the Kentucky law did not interfere with national banks’ federal power to collect deposits because that power includes the inseparable “obligation to pay” deposits to those “entitled to demand payment.” Id., at 248–249. Anderson distinguished a similar California law at issue in First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366, where the Court had found the state law to be preempted, and its reasons for differentiating the California law help demonstrate when a state law regulating national banks crosses the line from permissible to preempted. In contrast to the Kentucky law in Anderson, the California law in First National Bank of San Jose allowed the State to claim dormant deposits without proof of abandonment. The Court noted that California’s law could therefore cause customers to “hesitate” before depositing funds at the bank—and thus interfere with the “efficiency” of the national bank in receiving deposits. 262 U. S., at 369–370. Barnett Bank also cited two other examples of state laws that were not preempted, both of which regulated banks in “their daily course of business.” See National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353; McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347. Pp. 9–11.

 (b) The Court’s precedents applying Barnett Bank furnish content to the significant-interference test—and therefore also to Dodd-Frank’s preemption standard incorporating Barnett Bank. A court applying that standard must make a practical assessment of the nature and degree of the interference caused by a state law. If the state law’s interference with national bank powers is more akin to the interference in cases like Franklin, Fidelity, First National Bank of San Jose, and Barnett Bank, then the state law is preempted. But if the state law’s interference with national bank powers is more akin to the interference in cases like Anderson, National Bank, and McClellan, then the state law is not preempted. In this case, the Second Circuit did not conduct the kind of nuanced comparative analysis required by Barnett Bank, but instead distilled a categorical test that would preempt virtually all state laws that regulate national banks. Congress expressly incorporated Barnett Bank into Dodd-Frank, and Barnett Bank did not draw a bright preemption line. The Court of Appeals must conduct a preemption analysis in a manner consistent with that standard. Pp. 12–14.

49 F. 4th 121, vacated and remanded.

 Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.