The Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc subject to the command that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, §9, cl. 7. For most federal agencies, Congress provides funding through annual appropriations. For the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, however, Congress provided a standing source of funding outside the ordinary annual appropriations process. Specifically, Congress authorized the Bureau to draw from the Federal Reserve System an amount that its Director deems “reasonably necessary to carry out” the Bureau’s duties, subject only to an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U. S. C. §§5497(a)(1), (2). In this case, several trade associations representing payday lenders and credit-access businesses challenged regulations issued by the Bureau pertaining to high-interest consumer loans on statutory and constitutional grounds. As relevant here, the Fifth Circuit accepted the associations’ argument that the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause.

Held: Congress’ statutory authorization allowing the Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the Bureau’s duties satisfies the Appropriations Clause. Pp. 5–19, 22.

 (a) Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes.

  (1) The Bureau’s funding is “drawn from the Treasury” and is therefore subject to the requirements of the Appropriations Clause. The issue is whether the Bureau’s funding mechanism constitutes an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” The Court concludes that the answer is yes based on the Constitution’s text, the history against which that text was enacted, and congressional practice immediately following ratification. Pp. 5–15.

   (i) The Constitution’s use of the term “appropriation” provides important insight into its meaning. The Appropriations Clause itself specifies that an appropriation must authorize withdrawals from a particular source, the “Treasury.” And, the proviso limiting Congress’ power to “raise and support Armies”—that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years”—indicates that appropriations assign funds for specific uses. Contemporary dictionary definitions support this conclusion as well. The evidence suggests that, at a minimum, appropriations were understood as a legislative means of authorizing expenditures from public funds for designated purposes. P. 7.

   (ii) Pre-founding history supports the conclusion that an identified source and purpose are all that is required for a valid appropriation. The concept of legislative appropriations grew out of the broader struggle between Parliament and the Crown for popular control of the purse in England. Parliament had little claim to direct how the Crown’s hereditary revenues were spent, but “extraordinary revenues” required parliamentary authorization because they were financed through various forms of taxation. In granting these revenues, Parliament began exercising an attendant power to specify how the Crown used the funds. The ensuing power struggle culminated in Parliament stripping away the remnants of the Crown’s hereditary revenues. Subsequently, Parliament’s usual practice was to appropriate government revenue to particular purposes and to limit the duration of its revenue grants. But, not all appropriations were time limited. Some statutes granting money gave the Crown broad discretion regarding how much to spend within an appropriated sum. Pp. 8–10.

  The appropriations practice in the Colonies and early state legislatures was much the same. Many early state constitutions vested the legislative body with power over appropriations, and state legislative bodies often opted for open-ended, discretionary appropriations. By the time of the Constitutional Convention, it was uncontroversial that the powers to raise and disburse public money would reside in the Legislative Branch. The origins of the Appropriations Clause confirm that appropriations needed to designate particular revenues for identified purposes, but beyond that limit, early legislative bodies exercised a wide range of discretion. Pp. 10–12.

   (iii) The practice of the First Congress also illustrates the source-and-purpose understanding of appropriations. Many early appropriations laws made annual lump-sum grants for the Government’s expenses. As in England, the appropriation of “sums not exceeding” a specified amount provided the Executive discretion over how much to spend up to a cap. Congress took even more flexible approaches to appropriations for several early executive agencies, allowing them to indefinitely fund themselves from revenue collected. For example, Congress adopted open-ended fee- and commission-based funding schemes for Customs Service and the Post Office. Pp. 12–15.

  (2) The Bureau’s funding statute satisfies the requirements of the Appropriations Clause. The statute authorizes the Bureau to draw public funds from a particular source—“the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System”— in an amount not exceeding an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U. S. C. §§5497(a)(1), (2)(A)–(B). And, it specifies the objects for which the Bureau can use those funds—to “pay the expenses of the Bureau in carrying out its duties and responsibilities.” §5497(c)(1). The Bureau’s funding mechanism also fits comfortably within the historical appropriations practice described above. P. 15–16.

 (b) The associations’ three principal arguments for why the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause are unpersuasive. Pp. 16–19.

  (1) The associations argue that the Bureau’s funding is not “drawn . . . in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” because the agency itself decides the amount of annual funding to draw from the Federal Reserve System. But, appropriations of “sums not exceeding” a certain amount were commonplace immediately after the founding. Congress did not violate the Appropriations Clause by permitting the Bureau to decide how much funding to draw up to a cap. Pp. 16–17.

  (2) The associations suggest that the Appropriations Clause requires both Chambers of Congress to periodically agree on an agency’s funding, which ensures that each Chamber reserves the power to unilaterally block those funding measures through inaction. While the Constitution expressly provides that “no Appropriation of Money” to support an army “shall be for a longer Term than two Years,” Art. I, §8, cl. 12, the Constitution does not explicitly limit the duration of appropriations for other purposes. The First Congress’ practice confirms this understanding, as appropriations that supplied funding to the Customs Service and the Post Office were not time limited. The associations resist the analogy to the Post Office and other fee-based agencies, arguing that such agencies do not enjoy the same level of fiscal independence as the Bureau. But, the associations fail to explain the relevance of that difference to the question whether a law complies with the constitutional imperative of an appropriation. Pp. 17–18.

  (3) Finally, the associations contend that if the Bureau’s funding mechanism is consistent with the Appropriations Clause, then Congress could do the same for any—or every—civilian agency, allowing the Executive to operate free of any meaningful fiscal check. But, the Appropriations Clause is simply a limitation on Congress’ power over the purse, and the associations err by reducing the power of the purse to only the principle expressed in the Appropriations Clause. They offer no defensible argument that the Appropriations Clause requires more than a law that authorizes the disbursement of specified funds for identified purposes. Pp. 18–19.

51 F. 4th 616, reversed and remanded.

 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Kagan, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined.

When the Department of Defense furloughed petitioner Stuart Harrow for six days, he challenged that decision before the Merit Systems Protection Board. After a five-year delay, the Board ruled against him. Harrow had the right to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, provided he did so “within 60 days” of the Board’s final order. 5 U. S. C. §7703(b)(1). But Harrow did not learn about the Board’s decision until the 60-day period to appeal had run, and filed his appeal late. Given the circumstances, Harrow asked the Federal Circuit to overlook his untimeliness and equitably toll the filing deadline. But the Circuit, believing that the deadline was an unalterable “jurisdictional requirement,” denied his request.

Held: Section 7703(b)(1)’s 60-day filing deadline is not jurisdictional. Although the procedural rules that govern the litigation process are often phrased in mandatory terms, they are generally subject to exceptions like waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling. But when Congress enacts a “jurisdictional” requirement, it “mark[s] the bounds” of a court’s power, and a litigant’s failure to follow the rule “deprives a court of all authority to hear a case,” with no exceptions. Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. 199, 203. Mindful of those repercussions, the Court will “treat a procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Ibid. Under that approach, “most time bars are nonjurisdictional,” even when “framed in mandatory” and “emphatic” terms. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410–411.

 No language in the provision Harrow violated suggests a different result. Section 7703(b)(1) states that an appeal “shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order.” Although the deadline is stated in mandatory terms, this fact is “of no consequence” to the jurisdictional issue. Id., at 411. “What matters instead” is whether the time bar speaks to the court’s jurisdiction. Ibid. And §7703(b)(1) does not.

 The Government rests its case on a different statute spelling out the Federal Circuit’s subject-matter jurisdiction, but that law provides it no better support. In 28 U. S. C. §1295(a)(9), Congress granted the Circuit jurisdiction “of an appeal from a final order or final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, pursuant to section[ ] 7703(b)(1).” The Government argues that an appeal is “pursuant to” §7703(b)(1)—and so within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction—only if it fully complies with §7703(b)(1)’s requirements, including the time bar. But that interpretation is more strained than clear. When a legal drafter writes that a filing has been made “pursuant to” a statutory provision, the phrase often functions as a synonym for “under,” identifying the provision that served as the basis for the filing but without addressing whether the latter conformed to the former’s every requirement. The Court has recently used the phrase this way, as has Congress. See BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. 230, 238. So to file an appeal “pursuant to” §7703(b)(1) likely just means to invoke that section as the basis for the appeal. At the very least, there is no clarity the other way. And the rest of §1295 confirms that conclusion. The law uses the phrase “pursuant to” to reference several other statutes, which in turn contain a bevy of procedural rules. The Government’s interpretation would suggest that all those rules are jurisdictional too. But the Court has almost never treated rules like these as absolute bars to judicial action.

 The Government cites one kind of time limit that counts as jurisdictional even without a clear statement—deadlines to appeal a district court decision in a civil case. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205. But this Bowles exception is for appeals from one Article III court to another. As to all other time bars, like the agency appeal here, the clear-statement rule applies. And for the reasons stated, the 60-day deadline to appeal Board decisions does not satisfy it. Pp. 3–9.

Vacated and remanded.

 Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) sets forth procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Section 3 of the FAA, entitled “Stay of proceedings where issue therein referable to arbitration,” provides that when a dispute is subject to arbitration, the court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U. S. C. §3. In this case, petitioners filed suit against respondents in state court alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. Respondents then removed to federal court and filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. Petitioners agreed their claims were arbitrable, but contended that §3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely. The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, §3 compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit. Statutory text, structure, and purpose all point to this conclusion. The plain text of §3 requires a court to stay the proceeding upon request. The statute’s use of the word “shall” “creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U. S. 26, 35. The obligation is to “stay” the proceeding. Respondents insist that “stay” “means only that the court must stop parallel in-court litigation, which a court may achieve by dismissing,” Brief for Respondents 15, but respondents’ reading disregards the long-established legal meaning of the word “stay” as a “temporary suspension” of legal proceedings. And respondents’ attempt to read “stay” to include “dismiss” cannot be squared with the surrounding statutory text, which anticipates that the parties can return to federal court if arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute. Notwithstanding §3’s text, respondents suggest that district courts retain the inherent authority to dismiss proceedings subject to arbitration. But even assuming such inherent authority, “the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or overridden by statute or rule,” Degen v. United States, 517 U. S. 820, 823, and §3 does exactly that.

  The FAA’s structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. Section 16(a)(1)(C) of the FAA authorizes an immediate interlocutory appeal of the denial of an arbitration request. By contrast, Congress made clear in §16(b) that, outside of a narrow exception not applicable here, an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable. If a district court could dismiss a suit subject to arbitration even when a party requests a stay, that dismissal would trigger the right to an immediate appeal where Congress sought to forbid such an appeal. Finally, staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts. Keeping the suit on the court’s docket makes good sense in light of the FAA’s mechanisms for courts with proper jurisdiction to assist parties in arbitration. Pp. 3–6.

62 F. 4th 1201, reversed and remanded.

 Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.