Petitioner Louis Ciminelli was convicted of federal wire fraud for his involvement in a scheme to rig the bid process for obtaining state-funded development projects associated with then-New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s Buffalo Billion initiative. The Buffalo Billion initiative was administered by the nonprofit Fort Schuyler Management Corporation. Investigations uncovered that Fort Schuyler board member Alain Kaloyeros paid lobbyist Todd Howe $25,000 in state funds each month to ensure that the Cuomo administration gave Kaloyeros a prominent role in administering projects for Buffalo Billion. Ciminelli’s construction company, LPCiminelli, paid Howe $100,000 to $180,000 each year to help it obtain state-funded jobs. In 2013, Howe and Kaloyeros devised a scheme whereby Kaloyeros would tailor Fort Schuyler’s bid process to smooth the way for LPCiminelli to receive major Buffalo Billion contracts by designating LPCiminelli as a “preferred developer” with priority status to negotiate for specific projects. Kaloyeros, Howe, and Ciminelli jointly developed a set of requests for proposal (RFPs) that effectively guaranteed LPCiminelli’s selection as a preferred developer by treating unique aspects of LPCiminelli as qualifications for preferred-developer status. With that status in hand, LPCiminelli secured the marquee $750 million “Riverbend project” in Buffalo. After the scheme was uncovered, Ciminelli, Kaloyeros, Howe, and others were indicted for, as relevant here, wire fraud in violation of 18 U. S. C. §1343 and conspiracy to commit the same under §1349.

  In the operative indictment and at trial, the Government relied solely on the Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory of wire fraud, under which the Government can establish wire fraud by showing that the defendant schemed to deprive a victim of potentially valuable economic information necessary to make discretionary economic decisions. Consistent with that theory, the District Court instructed the jury that the term “property” in §1343 “includes intangible interests such as the right to control the use of one’s assets,” which could be harmed by depriving Fort Schuyler of “potentially valuable economic information.” The jury convicted Ciminelli of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. On appeal, Ciminelli argued that the right to control one’s assets is not “property” for purposes of §1343. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions on the basis of its longstanding right-to-control precedents.

Held: Because the right to valuable economic information needed to make discretionary economic decisions is not a traditional property interest, the Second Circuit’s right-to-control theory cannot form the basis for a conviction under the federal fraud statutes. Pp. 4–10.

 (a) The federal wire fraud statute criminalizes the use of interstate wires for “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” 18 U. S. C. §1343. When the federal wire fraud statute was enacted, the “common understanding” of the words “to defraud” referred “to wronging one in his property rights.” Cleveland v. United States, 531 U. S. 12, 19. This Court has therefore consistently understood the statute’s “money or property” requirement as limiting the “scheme or artifice to defraud” element. Ibid. Even so, lower federal courts for decades interpreted the mail and wire fraud statutes to protect intangible interests unconnected to traditional property rights. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 400. This Court halted that trend in McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, which confined the statutes to the “protect[ion of] individual property rights.” Id., at 359, n. 8.

 The right-to-control theory cannot be squared with the text of the federal fraud statutes, which are “limited in scope to the protection of property rights.” Id., at 360. The so-called right to control is not an interest that had “long been recognized as property” when the wire fraud statute was enacted. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U. S. 19, 26. From the theory’s inception, the Second Circuit has not grounded the right to control in traditional property notions. The theory is also inconsistent with the structure and history of the federal fraud statutes. Congress responded to this Court’s decision in McNally by enacting §1346, which revived only the intangible right of honest services, one of many intangible rights protected by courts under the fraud statutes pre-McNally. Congress’ silence regarding other such intangible interests forecloses the judicial expansion of the wire fraud statute to cover the intangible right to control. Finally, by treating mere information as the protected interest, the right-to-control theory vastly expands federal jurisdiction to an almost limitless variety of deceptive actions traditionally left to State law. Pp. 4–9.

 (b) Despite relying exclusively on the right-to-control theory before the grand jury, District Court, and Second Circuit, the Government now concedes that the theory as articulated below is erroneous. Yet, the Government insists that the Court can affirm Ciminelli’s convictions by applying facts presented to the jury below to the elements of a different wire fraud theory. The Court declines the Government’s request, which would require the Court to assume not only the function of a court of first view, but also of a jury. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U. S. 257, 270–271, n. 8. Pp. 9–10.

13 F. 4th 158, reversed and remanded.

  Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion.

Petitioner Leon Santos-Zacaria (who goes by the name Estrella) is a noncitizen in removal proceedings. She sought protection from removal, which an Immigration Judge denied. Santos-Zacaria appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which upheld the Immigration Judge’s decision. She then filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit under 8 U. S. C. §1252, alleging that the Board had impermissibly engaged in factfinding that only the Immigration Judge could perform. The Fifth Circuit dismissed Santos-Zacaria’s petition in part, finding that she had not satisfied §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement. Section 1252(d)(1) provides that “[a] court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” The Fifth Circuit raised the exhaustion issue sua sponte based on its characterization of §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. And the Fifth Circuit concluded that Santos-Zacaria failed to exhaust because she failed to raise her impermissible-factfinding claim to the Board in a motion for reconsideration before filing her petition for judicial review.

Held:

 1. Section 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional. Pp. 3–11.

  (a) A “jurisdictional” prescription sets the bounds of the “court’s adjudicatory authority,” Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455, while nonjurisdictional rules govern how courts and litigants operate within those bounds. The “jurisdictional” tag carries potentially “[h]arsh consequences.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. ___, ___. For example, courts must enforce jurisdictional rules sua sponte, even in the face of a litigant’s forfeiture or waiver. Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. 17, ___–___. To ensure that courts impose such consequences only when Congress unmistakably has so instructed, a rule is treated as jurisdictional “only if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 3–4.

  (b) Section 1252(d)(1) lacks the clear statement necessary to qualify as jurisdictional. First, exhaustion requirements are quintessential claim-processing rules, designed to promote efficiency in litigation. Treating an exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional would disserve that very interest. Second, §1252(d)(1)’s language differs substantially from more clearly jurisdictional language in related statutory provisions. Elsewhere, including in provisions enacted at the same time and in the same section as §1252(d)(1), Congress specified that “no court shall have jurisdiction” to review certain matters. See, e.g., §§1252(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 1182(a)(9)(B)(v), (d)(3)(B)(i). Taken together, these two features of §1252(d)(1) establish that it is not clearly jurisdictional. Pp. 4–7.

  (c) Given the clear-statement rule, the Government offers no persuasive reason to treat §1252(d)(1) as jurisdictional. First, merely that a statute addresses the “court” and limits “review” does not necessarily mean the statute governs the court’s jurisdiction. Second, the Government fails to show that §1252(d)(1) clearly carried forward any understanding that a prior version of §1252(d)(1) (former §1105a(c)) was jurisdictional. Finally, §1252(d)(1)’s placement within §1252 is insufficient to establish that §1252(d)(1) is clearly jurisdictional. Pp. 7–11.

 2. Section 1252(d)(1) does not require noncitizens to request discretionary forms of review, like reconsideration of an unfavorable Board of Immigration Appeals determination. Pp. 11–18.

  (a) Section 1252(d)(1) requires exhausting only remedies “available . . . as of right.” In the context relevant here—review of a legal claim—that phrase means review that is guaranteed, not discretionary. Reconsideration by the Board, however, is discretionary. Board reconsideration is therefore not available “as of right,” and §1252(d)(1) does not require a noncitizen to pursue it. Pp. 11–13.

  (b) The Government cannot show that exhausting remedies “available . . . as of right” requires seeking Board reconsideration. The Government emphasizes a noncitizen’s right to file a motion to reconsider. But the right to request discretionary review does not make a remedy available as of right. Nor does §1252(d)(1) draw a distinction, suggested by the Government, between those remedies made discretionary by statute and those made so by regulation. In addition, although the decision whether to grant reconsideration is reviewable for abuse of discretion, it remains a matter of discretion all the same. Finally, if seeking reconsideration qualified as exhausting a remedy “available . . . as of right,” the statutory scheme would become incoherent. Noncitizens would need to seek reconsideration in every case. Yet the statute is designed around pursuing judicial review and agency reconsideration in parallel. The Board would be flooded with reconsideration motions that noncitizens would not otherwise file. And courts would be flooded with pre-reconsideration petitions for review that, under the Government’s interpretation, would be unexhausted and therefore pointless. Pp. 13–17.

  (c) Alert to the problems with requiring noncitizens to always seek reconsideration for exhaustion purposes, the Government instead would require seeking reconsideration only sometimes: when the noncitizen is raising an issue not previously presented to the agency. But seeking reconsideration does not qualify as a remedy “available . . . as of right” sometimes and not others. Instead, it does not qualify at all. The Government’s approach, moreover, would not fix the problem of producing pointless, unexhausted petitions for review. And it would introduce practical difficulties for courts, noncitizens, and the Board. Pp. 17–18.

22 F. 4th 570, vacated in part and remanded.

 Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.

In 2016, Congress passed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 48 U. S. C. §2101 et seq., to deal with a fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico brought about by soaring public debt. PROMESA establishes a system for overseeing Puerto Rico’s finances, while also enabling the Commonwealth to gain bankruptcy protections similar to those available under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. See Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 590 U. S. ___, ___. The statute creates the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico—petitioner in this case—as an “entity within the territorial government” of Puerto Rico. §2121(c)(1). Under PROMESA, the Board approves the Commonwealth’s fiscal plans and budgets, supervises its borrowing, and represents Puerto Rico in so-called Title III cases—judicial debt-restructuring proceedings modeled on federal bankruptcy proceedings. Beginning in 2016, respondent Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (CPI)—a nonprofit media organization that has reported on Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis—asked the Board to release various documents relating to its work. When CPI’s requests went unfulfilled, it sued the Board in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico, citing a provision of the Puerto Rican Constitution interpreted to guarantee a right of access to public records. The Board moved to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, but the District Court rejected that defense. The First Circuit affirmed. The court began by citing Circuit precedent that Puerto Rico enjoys sovereign immunity, and it assumed without deciding that the Board shares in that immunity. But it then held that PROMESA—particularly its jurisdictional provision, Section 2126(a)—clearly abrogates the Board’s immunity.

Held: Nothing in PROMESA—including its jurisdictional provision, Section 2126(a)—categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Board enjoys from legal claims. This Court assumes without deciding that Puerto Rico is immune from suit in United States district court, and that the Board partakes of that immunity. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7.

 This Court has often held that Congress must make its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73. The Court has applied that clear-statement rule in cases naming the federal government, States, and Indian tribes as defendants. And it has found that standard met in only two situations: when a statute says, in so many words, that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity, e.g., 35 U. S. C. §296(a), and when a statute creates a cause of action and authorizes suit against a government on that claim, see, e.g., Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73–74. PROMESA fits neither of these molds. Except by reference to the Bankruptcy Code in Title III debt-restructuring proceedings, see 11 U. S. C. §106(a); 48 U. S. C. §2161(a), PROMESA does not provide that the Board or Puerto Rico is subject to suit. Nor does PROMESA create any cause of action for use against the Board or Puerto Rico. Thus, Congress has not, through a means this Court has recognized, “ma[de] its intention” to abrogate immunity “unmistakably clear.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73.

 CPI claims to identify the required clear statement in PROMESA’s establishment of a judicial review scheme. Section 2126(a) provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise arising out of” PROMESA, “shall be brought” in the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico. In CPI’s view, that provision—especially when combined with Section 2126(c)’s allusion to “declaratory or injunctive relief against the Oversight Board”—contemplates that the Board would be subject to suit in federal court. But those provisions serve a function even absent a categorical abrogation of immunity, in cases where the Board’s immunity has been waived or abrogated by other statutes. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act abrogates the immunity of “governments” and “governmental agencies” from all actions it authorizes. 42 U. S. C. §§2000e(a)–(b). If a Board employee were fired because of race, Section 2126(a) would tell the employee where to bring the suit and Section 2126(c) would govern the timing of injunctive and declaratory relief. Nor do protections that PROMESA provides the Board from litigation fill the gap. Again, CPI is wrong to think those provisions “superfluous” unless PROMESA generally abrogates the Board’s immunity. Section 2125’s protection of Board members from monetary liability would do work whenever some other law abrogated or waived the Board’s immunity from specific claims. In such a case, the claim could go forward, but Section 2125 would stop the award of money damages. And Section 2126(e)’s bar on challenges to the Board’s fiscal and budgetary decisions would do work whenever a plaintiff sought to get around the Board’s sovereign immunity via an Ex parte Young action against an individual Board member. See Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 254–255.

 In short, nothing in PROMESA makes Congress’s intent to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity unmistakably clear. The statute does not explicitly strip the Board of immunity or expressly authorize the bringing of claims against the Board. And its judicial review provisions and liability protections are compatible with the Board’s generally retaining sovereign immunity. Pp. 5–11.

35 F. 4th 1, reversed and remanded.

 Kagan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

This case involves a challenge to a California law known as Proposition 12, which as relevant here forbids the in-state sale of whole pork meat that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are “confined in a cruel manner.” Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §25990(b)(2). Confinement is “cruel” if it prevents a pig from “lying down, standing up, fully extending [its] limbs, or turning around freely.” §25991(e)(1). Prior to the vote on Proposition 12, proponents suggested the law would benefit animal welfare and consumer health, and opponents claimed that existing farming practices did better than Proposition 12 protecting animal welfare (for example, by preventing pig-on-pig aggression) and ensuring consumer health (by avoiding contamination). Shortly after Proposition 12’s adoption, two organizations—the National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (petitioners)—filed this lawsuit on behalf of their members who raise and process pigs alleging that Proposition 12 violates the U. S. Constitution by impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. Petitioners estimated that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs and will fall on both California and out-of-state producers. But because California imports almost all the pork it consumes, most of Proposition 12’s compliance costs will be borne by out-of-state firms. The district court held that petitioners’ complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law and dismissed the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held: The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is affirmed.

6 4th 1021, affirmed.

 Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts IV–B, IV–C, and IV–D, rejecting petitioners’ theories that would place Proposition 12 in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause even though petitioners do not allege the law purposefully discriminates against out-of-state economic interests. Pp 5–17, 27–29.

 (a) The Constitution vests Congress with the power to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3. Although Congress may seek to exercise this power to regulate the interstate trade of pork, and many pork producers have urged Congress to do so, Congress has yet to adopt any statute that might displace Proposition 12 or laws regulating pork production in other States. Petitioners’ litigation theory thus rests on the dormant Commerce Clause theory, pursuant to which the Commerce Clause not only vests Congress with the power to regulate interstate trade, but also “contain[s] a further, negative command,” one effectively forbidding the enforcement of “certain state [economic regulations] even when Congress has failed to legislate on the subject.” Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179. This Court has held that state laws offend this dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause when they seek to “build up . . . domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and business of other States.” Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443. At the same time, though, the Court has reiterated that, absent purposeful discrimination, “a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to” the interests of its citizens. Ibid.

 The antidiscrimination principle lies at the “very core” of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 581. This Court has said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement of state laws “driven by . . . ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’ ” Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 337–338 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 273–274). Petitioners here disavow any discrimination-based claim, conceding that Proposition 12 imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers. Pp 5–8.

 (b) Given petitioners’ concession that Proposition 12 does not implicate the antidiscrimination principle, petitioners first invoke what they call the “extraterritoriality doctrine.” They contend that the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause cases suggest an additional and “almost per se” rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the “practical effect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even when those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state interests. Petitioners further insist that Proposition 12 offends this “almost per se” rule because the law will impose substantial new costs on out-of-state pork producers who wish to sell their products in California. Petitioners contend the rule they propose follows ineluctably from three cases: Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U. S. 324; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573; and Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511. But a close look at those cases reveals that each typifies the familiar concern with preventing purposeful discrimination against out-of-state economic interests. In Baldwin, a New York law that barred out-of-state dairy farmers from selling their milk in the State for less than the minimum price New York law guaranteed in-state producers “plainly discriminate[d]” against out-of-staters by “erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competition from without the State.” Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354 (discussing Baldwin). In Brown-Forman, a New York law that required liquor distillers to affirm that their in-state prices were no higher than their out-of-state prices impermissibly sought to force out-of-state distillers to “surrender” whatever cost advantages they enjoyed against their in-state rivals, which amounted to economic protectionism. 476 U. S., at 580.  The Court reached a similar conclusion in Healy, which involved a Connecticut law that required out-of-state beer merchants to affirm that their in-state prices were no higher than those they charged in neighboring States. 491 U. S., at 328–330. As the Court later explained, “[t]he essential vice in laws” like Connecticut’s is that they “hoard” commerce “for the benefit of ” in-state merchants and discourage consumers from crossing state lines to make their purchases from nearby out-of-state vendors. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U. S. 383, 391–392.

 Petitioners insist that Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy taken together suggest an “almost per se” rule against state laws with “extraterritorial effects.” While petitioners point to language in these cases pertaining to the “practical effect” of the challenged laws on out-of-state commerce and prices, “the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a statute.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341. The language highlighted by petitioners in Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy appeared in a particular context and did particular work. A close look at those cases reveals nothing like the “almost per se” rule against laws that have the “practical effect” of “controlling” extraterritorial commerce that petitioners posit, and indeed petitioners’ reading would cast a shadow over laws long understood to represent valid exercises of the States’ constitutionally reserved powers. Baldwin, Brown-Forman, and Healy did not mean to do so much. In rejecting petitioners’ “almost per se” theory the Court does not mean to trivialize the role territory and sovereign boundaries play in the federal system; the Constitution takes great care to provide rules for fixing and changing state borders. Art. IV, §3, cl. 1. Courts must sometimes referee disputes about where one State’s authority ends and another’s begins—both inside and outside the commercial context. Indeed, the antidiscrimination principle found in the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause cases may well represent one more effort to mediate competing claims of sovereign authority under our horizontal separation of powers. But none of this means, as petitioners suppose, that any question about the ability of a State to project its power extraterritorially must yield to an “almost per se” rule under the dormant Commerce Clause. This Court has never before claimed so much “ground for judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause.” United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S. 330, 346–347. Pp 8–14.

 (c) Petitioners next point to Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, which they assert requires a court to at least assess “ ‘the burden imposed on interstate commerce’ ” by a state law and prevent its enforcement if the law’s burdens are “ ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ ” Brief for Petitioners 44. Petitioners provide a litany of reasons why they believe the benefits Proposition 12 secures for Californians do not outweigh the costs it imposes on out-of-state economic interests.

 Petitioners overstate the extent to which Pike and its progeny depart from the antidiscrimination rule that lies at the core of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As this Court has previously explained, “no clear line” separates the Pike line of cases from core antidiscrimination precedents. General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U. S. 278, 298, n. 12. If some cases focus on whether a state law discriminates on its face, the Pike line serves as an important reminder that a law’s practical effects may also disclose the presence of a discriminatory purpose. Pike itself concerned an Arizona order requiring cantaloupes grown in state to be processed and packed in state. 397 U. S., at 138–140. The Court held that Arizona’s order violated the dormant Commerce Clause, stressing that even if that order could be fairly characterized as facially neutral, it “requir[ed] business operations to be performed in [state] that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.” Id., at 145. The “practical effect[s]” of the order in operation thus revealed a discriminatory purpose—an effort to insulate in-state processing and packaging businesses from out-of-state competition. Id., at 140. While this Court has left the “courtroom door open” to challenges premised on “even nondiscriminatory burdens,” Davis, 553 U. S., at 353, and while “a small number of our cases have invalidated state laws . . . that appear to have been genuinely nondiscriminatory,” Tracy, 519 U. S., at 298, n. 12, petitioners’ claim about Proposition 12 falls well outside Pike’s heartland. Pp 15–18.

 (d) The Framers equipped Congress with considerable power to regulate interstate commerce and preempt contrary state laws. See U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3; Art. IV, §2. While this Court has inferred an additional judicially enforceable rule against certain state laws adopted even against the backdrop of congressional silence, the Court’s cases also suggest extreme caution is warranted in its exercise. Disavowing reliance on this Court’s core dormant Commerce Clause teachings focused on discriminatory state legislation, petitioners invite the Court to endorse new theories of implied judicial power. They would have the Court recognize an “almost per se” rule against the enforcement of state laws that have “extraterritorial effects”—even though it has long recognized that virtually all state laws create ripple effects beyond their borders. Alternatively, they would have the Court prevent a State from regulating the sale of an ordinary consumer good within its own borders on nondiscriminatory terms—even though the Pike line of cases they invoke has never before yielded such a result. Like the courts that faced this case below, this Court declines both incautious invitations. Pp 27–29.

 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Barrett, concluded in Part IV–B that, accepting petitioners’ allegations, the Pike balancing task that they propose in this case is one no court is equipped to undertake. Some out-of-state producers who choose to comply with Proposition 12 may incur new costs, while the law serves moral and health interests of some magnitude for in-state residents. In a functioning democracy, those sorts of policy choices—balancing competing, incommensurable goods—belong to the people and their elected representatives. Pp 18–21.

 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Sotomayor, and Justice Kagan, concluded in Part IV–C that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate a substantial burden on interstate commerce, a showing Pike requires before a court may assess the law’s competing benefits or weigh the two sides against each other, and that the facts pleaded merely allege harm to some producers’ favored “methods of operation” which the Court found insufficient to state a claim in Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117, 127. Pp 21–25.

 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Barrett, concluded in Part IV–D that petitioners have not asked the Court to treat putative harms to out-of-state animal welfare or other noneconomic interests as freestanding harms cognizable under the dormant Commerce Clause, and in any event that the Court’s decisions authorizing claims alleging “burdens on commerce,” Davis, 553 U. S., at 353, do not provide judges “a roving license” to reassess the wisdom of state legislation in light of any conceivable out-of-state interest, economic or otherwise. United Haulers, 550 U. S., at 343. Pp 25–27.

 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, concluded that the judgment should be affirmed, not because courts are incapable of balancing economic burdens against noneconomic benefits as Pike requires or because of any other fundamental reworking of that doctrine, but because petitioners fail to plausibly allege a substantial burden on interstate commerce as required by Pike. Pp 1–3.

 Justice Barrett concluded that the judgment should be affirmed because Pike balancing requires both the benefits and burdens of a State law to be judicially cognizable and comparable, see Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U. S. 328, 354–355, but the benefits and burdens of Proposition 12 are incommensurable; that said, the complaint plausibly alleges a substantial burden on interstate commerce because Proposition 12’s costs are pervasive, burdensome, and will be felt primarily (but not exclusively) outside California. Pp 1–2.

 Gorsuch, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and V, in which Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Parts IV–B and IV–D, in which Thomas and Barrett, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C, in which Thomas, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Sotomayor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Kagan, J., joined. Barrett, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. Roberts, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Alito, Kavanaugh, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Petitioner Joseph Percoco served as the Executive Deputy Secretary to New York Governor Andrew Cuomo from 2011 to 2016, a position that gave him a wide range of influence over state decision-making, with one brief hiatus. During an eight-month period in 2014, Percoco resigned from government service to manage the Governor’s reelection campaign. During this hiatus, Percoco accepted payments totaling $35,000 to assist a real-estate development company owned by Steven Aiello in its dealings with Empire State Development, a state agency. After Percoco urged a senior official at ESD to drop a requirement that Aiello’s company enter into a “Labor Peace Agreement” with local unions as a precondition to receiving state funding for a lucrative project, ESD informed Aiello the following day that the agreement was not necessary. When Percoco’s dealings came to the attention of the U. S. Department of Justice, he was indicted and charged with, among other things, conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud in relation to the labor-peace requirement (count 10). See 18 U. S. C. §§1343, 1346, 1349. Throughout the proceedings, Percoco argued unsuccessfully that a private citizen cannot commit or conspire to commit honest-services wire fraud based on his own duty of honest services to the public. Over Percoco’s objection, the trial court instructed the jury that Percoco could be found to have had a duty to provide honest services to the public during the time when he was not serving as a public official if the jury concluded, first, that “he dominated and controlled any governmental business” and, second, that “people working in the government actually relied on him because of a special relationship he had with the government.” As relevant here, the jury convicted Percoco on count 10. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, explaining that the challenged jury instruction fit the Second Circuit’s understanding of honest-services fraud as adopted many years earlier in United States v. Margiotta, 688 F. 2d 108.

Held: Instructing the jury based on the Second Circuit’s 1982 decision in Margiotta on the legal standard for finding that a private citizen owes the government a duty of honest services was error. Pp. 5–12.

 (a) Prior to this Court’s 1987 decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U. S. 350, “all Courts of Appeals had embraced” the view that the federal wire fraud and mail fraud statutes proscribe what came to be known as “honest-services fraud.” Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 401. Most cases prosecuted under these statutes involved public employees accepting a bribe or kickback that did not necessarily result in a financial loss for the government employer but did deprive the government of the right to receive honest services. See id., at 400–401. The Second Circuit considered a different fact pattern in Margiotta, in which the government had charged an unelected individual with honest-services mail fraud for using his position as a political-party chair to exert substantial control over public officials. The court held that a private person could commit honest-services fraud if he or she “dominate[d] government.” 688 F. 2d, at 122. Shortly after Margiotta, however, this Court rejected the entire concept of honest-services fraud in McNally. But “Congress responded swiftly” to McNally, and enacted 18 U. S. C. §1346, which provides that “ ‘the term “scheme or artifice to defraud,” ’ ” which appears in both §1341 and §1343, “ ‘includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.’ ” Skilling, 561 U. S., at 402 (quoting §1346). Decades later in Skilling, this Court rejected the broad argument that §1346 is unconstitutionally vague and clarified that “the intangible right of honest services” in §1346 relates to “fraudulent schemes to deprive another of honest services through bribes or kickbacks supplied by a third party who had not been deceived.” 561 U. S., at 404.

 Skilling’s approach informs the Court’s decision in this case. The Second Circuit concluded that “Congress effectively reinstated the Margiotta-theory cases by adopting statutory language that covered the theory.” 13 F. 4th 180, 196. But Skilling took care to avoid giving §1346 an indeterminate breadth that would sweep in any conception of “intangible rights of honest services” recognized by some courts prior to McNally. By rejecting the Government’s argument that §1346 should apply to cases involving “ ‘undisclosed self-dealing by a public official or private employee,’ ” 561 U. S., at 409, the Skilling Court made clear that “the intangible right of honest services” must be defined with the clarity typical of criminal statutes and should not be held to reach an ill-defined category of circumstances simply because of a few pre-McNally decisions. Pp. 5–8.

 (b) Percoco’s arguments challenging the honest-services conspiracy count against him—that he was out of public office during part of the time period within the indictment and that a private citizen cannot be convicted of depriving the public of honest services—sweep too broadly. The Court rejects the idea that a person nominally outside public employment can never have the necessary fiduciary duty to the public. Through principles of agency, an individual who is not a formal employee of a government may become an actual agent of the government by agreement, and thereby have a fiduciary duty to the government and thus to the public it serves. While the Court rejects the absolute rule, “the intangible duty of honest services” codified in §1346 plainly does not extend a duty to the public to all private persons, and the Court therefore addresses if Margiotta states the correct test. Pp. 8–9.

 (c) The jury instructions based on the Margiotta theory in Percoco’s case were erroneous. Margiotta’s standard in the instructions—implying that the public has a right to a private person’s honest services whenever that private person’s clout exceeds some ill-defined threshold—is too vague. Without further constraint, the jury instructions did not define “the intangible right of honest services” “ ‘with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited’ ” or “ ‘in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576.

 The Government does not defend the jury instructions as an accurate statement of the law, but instead claims that the imprecision in the jury instructions was harmless error. The Government argues that a private individual owes a duty of honest services in the discrete circumstances (1) “when the person has been selected to work for the government” in the future and (2) “when the person exercises the functions of a government position with the acquiescence of relevant government personnel.” Brief for United States 25. These theories, however, differ substantially from the instructions given the jury in this case, and the Second Circuit did not affirm on the basis of either of them. Pp. 9–12.

13 F. 4th 180, reversed and remanded.

 Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined, and in which Jackson, J., joined as to all but Part II–C–2. Gorsuch, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.