Richard DeVillier and more than 120 other petitioners own property north of U. S. Interstate Highway 10 between Houston and Beaumont, Texas. The dispute here arose after the State of Texas took action to use portions of I–10 as a flood evacuation route, installing a roughly 3-foot-tall barrier along the highway median to act as a dam. When subsequent hurricanes and storms brought heavy rainfall, the median barrier performed as intended, keeping the south side of the highway open. But it also flooded petitioners’ land to the north, causing significant damage to their property. DeVillier filed suit in Texas state court. He alleged that by building the median barrier and using his property to store stormwater, Texas had effected a taking of his property for which the State must pay just compensation. Other property owners filed similar suits. Texas removed the cases to federal court, where they were consolidated into a single proceeding with one operative complaint. The operative complaint includes inverse- condemnation claims under both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As relevant, Texas moved to dismiss the federal inverse-condemnation claim, arguing that a plaintiff has no cause of action arising directly under the Takings Clause. The District Court denied Texas’ motion, concluding that a property owner may sue a State directly under the Takings Clause. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding “that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against a state.” 53 F. 4th 904 (per curiam).

Held: DeVillier and the other property owners should be permitted to pursue their claims under the Takings Clause through the cause of action available under Texas law. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Court has explained that “a property owner acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation immediately upon a taking” “[b]ecause of ‘the self-executing character’ of the Takings Clause ‘with respect to compensation.’ ” Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U. S. 180, 192 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S. 304, 315). The question here concerns the procedural vehicle by which a property owner may seek to vindicate that right. Constitutional rights do not typically come with a built-in cause of action to allow for private enforcement in courts, see Egbert v. Boule, 596 U. S. 482, 490–491, and so they are asserted offensively pursuant to an independent cause of action designed for that purpose, see, e.g., 42 U. S. C. §1983. DeVillier relies on First English and other cases to argue that the Takings Clause creates by its own force a cause of action authorizing suits for just compensation. But those cases do not directly confront whether the Takings Clause provides a cause of action. It would be imprudent to decide that question without first establishing the premise in the question presented that no other cause of action exists to vindicate the property owner’s rights under the Takings Clause. Texas state law does provide an inverse-condemnation cause of action by which property owners may seek just compensation against the State based on both the Texas Constitution and the Takings Clause. This case therefore does not present the circumstance in which a property owner has no cause of action to seek just compensation. The Court therefore remands so that DeVillier and the other property owners may proceed through the cause of action available under Texas law. Pp. 4–7.

53 F. 4th 904, vacated and remanded.

 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Since World War II, the Federal Government has provided educational assistance to servicemembers with qualifying service through various GI bills. Typically, GI bills provide 36 months of educational benefits each up to a cap of 48 months in cases where servicemembers become eligible for benefits under more than one GI bill. See 38 U. S. C. §3695(a). This case concerns two GI bills with overlapping service periods—the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984 (covering service between 1985 and 2030) and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (covering service on or after September 11, 2001).

  Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in 2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefits as a result of his first period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefits to finance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service, Rudisill also became entitled to more generous educational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits to finance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such benefits would be limited to 22 months and 16 days under §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. But the Government informed Rudisill that he was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits (the length of his unused Montgomery benefits) due to §3327, a provision in the Post-9/11 Bill designed to coordinate benefits for those servicemembers meeting the criteria for both Montgomery benefits and Post-9/11 benefits. Section 3327 provides that a servicemember meeting the criteria for both GI bills can elect to swap Montgomery benefits for the more generous Post-9/11 benefits, up to a total of 36 months of benefits. §3327(d)(2)(A). Ultimately, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, sided with the Government, explaining that when Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an “election” under §3327(a)(1) to swap his Montgomery benefits for Post 9/11 benefits, making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month limit.

Held: Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to §3695(a)’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. Pp. 8–18.

 (a) The Government claims that someone in Rudisill’s position is subject to §3322(d)’s mandatory coordination clause, so, to receive any Post-9/11 benefits, he must make an election under §3327(a), which in turn subjects him to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month benefit limit. Rudisill counters that §3322(d) does not apply to him because he has earned two separate entitlements to benefits. Rudisill further maintains that §3327(a)’s election mechanism is optional in any event, and that he does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make a §3327(a) election.

 The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill’s favor. Rudisill earned two separate entitlements to educational benefits, one per the Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Focusing on these two separate benefits entitlements—rather than on his periods of service—leads to two relevant observations about the statute. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA “shall pay” a veteran’s benefits. §§3014(a), 3313(a). Second, Congress has plainly delineated certain durational limits on these benefits entitlements; i.e., each program entitles the recipient to up to 36 months of benefits, and both are subject to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. §§3013(a)(1), 3312(a). Rudisill is thus separately entitled to each of two educational benefits, and absent specified limits, the VA is statutorily obligated to pay him 48 months of benefits. Pp. 8–10.

 (b) Section 3322(d), which creates a mechanism for certain servicemembers to “coordinate” their benefits, does not limit Rudisill’s entitlement. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefits. Section 3322(d) does not mention the receipt of benefits but addresses instead the “coordination of entitlement.” Because Rudisill is already entitled to two separate benefits, he has no need to coordinate any entitlement under §3327. As used in the statute, the word “coordination” denotes a swap. Section 3327, to which §3322(d) points, describes coordination as making an election that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefits “instead of” Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1).

 There are two additional clues that §3322(d) does not address a veteran who just wants to use one of his two separate entitlements. First, §3322—titled “Bar to duplication” of benefits—does not speak to someone who has earned each benefit separately and is asking to receive each benefit separately. Second, §3322(d) applies to individuals with Montgomery entitlements “as of August 1, 2009,” the effective date of the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Before that date, individuals could have been accruing Post-9/11 benefits (ever since September 11, 2001) but would have had no way to opt into a benefits program that was not enacted until 2008. The swap Congress devised in §3327 gives such individuals a mechanism for accessing these benefits. Pp. 10–13.

 (c) The contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking §3327 is contradicted by that provision’s text. Pp. 13–18.

  (1) To start, an election under §3327(a) is optional, i.e., an individual “may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefits. And a decision not to make a §3327(a) election does not purport to alter one’s entitlement. To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11 benefits only by making a §3327(a) election is to misread §3322(a) as imposing a substantive requirement to elect benefits via §3327(a). The two elections are different. While §3322(a) requires Rudisill to elect which benefit to receive at any particular time, it does not follow that he must also make an election under §3327(a) to swap out his benefits. And it is noteworthy that §3322(a) does not mention, much less cross-reference, either §3322(d) or §3327. Other parts of the statute confirm that not all elections are the same. Compare §3322(a) with §3322(h); §3327(a) with §3327(c)(1). In the context of a statute that establishes multiple distinct elections, attempts to equate a §3322(a) election with a §3327(a) election are unpersuasive. Pp. 13–15.

  (2) The plain text of §3327(d) makes clear that §3327(d)—which details the consequences of making an election under §3327(a)—does not limit a servicemember in Rudisill’s situation. One such consequence is that a §3327 election entitles an individual to Post-9/11 benefits instead of basic Montgomery benefits. But Rudisill was entitled to both benefits, and he had no need to swap one set of benefits for another. A second consequence of a §3327 election is that “the number of months of [Post-9/11 benefits] shall be . . . the number of months of unused [Montgomery benefits], as of the date of the election.” §3327(d)(2)(A). Like subsection (d)(1), this provision only relates to an individual making a §3327(a) election. This makes perfect sense under Rudisill’s reading of the statute, but would be nonsensical under the Government’s view, as it would impose an exhaust-or-forfeit requirement for veterans with two separate entitlements. The more sensible view is that §3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one’s entitlement through the swapping mechanism §3327 creates. Pp. 16–18.

55 F. 4th 879, reversed and remanded.

 Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Barrett, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined.