Great Lakes Insurance and Raiders Retreat Realty Co. entered a maritime insurance contract. Great Lakes was organized in Germany and headquartered in the United Kingdom, and Raiders was headquartered in Pennsylvania. The parties’ contract selected New York law to govern any future disputes. Raiders’ boat subsequently ran aground in Florida. Great Lakes denied coverage for the accident and filed a related declaratory judgment action in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Raiders responded by advancing contract claims against Great Lakes under Pennsylvania law. The District Court enforced the choice-of-law provision in the parties’ contract and rejected Raiders’ Pennsylvania-law contract claims. The Third Circuit recognized the presumptive validity and enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts, but held that presumption must yield to a strong public policy of the State where a suit is brought. The Third Circuit remanded for the District Court to consider whether applying New York law would violate Pennsylvania’s public policy regarding insurance.

Held: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable here. Pp. 3–13.

 (a) Article III’s grant of federal jurisdiction to “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” §2, cl. 1, contemplates a uniform system of maritime law across the country, see Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U. S. 14, 28, to promote interests of navigation, commerce, and diplomatic relations. To maintain uniformity, federal courts “make decisional law” for maritime cases, id., at 23, based on sources including “judicial opinions, legislation, treatises, and scholarly writings,” Air & Liquid Systems Corp. v. DeVries, 586 U. S. 446, 452. Federal courts follow previously “established” maritime rules, see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U. S. 310, 314, and may create uniform maritime rules if no established rule exists. See, e.g., Norfolk Southern, 543 U. S., at 23. Pp. 3–10.

  (1) Longstanding precedent in both this Court and the Courts of Appeals establishes a federal maritime rule that choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable. In an analogous context, the Court has pronounced that forum-selection clauses in maritime contracts are “prima facie valid” under federal maritime law and “should be enforced unless” doing so would be unreasonable. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U. S. 1, 10. Like choice-of-law provisions, forum-selection clauses have “the salutary effect of dispelling any confusion” on the manner for resolving future disputes, thereby slashing the “time and expense of pretrial motions.” Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U. S. 585, 593–594. The Court’s decisions on the enforceability of forum-selection clauses dictate the same conclusion for choice-of-law provisions. Pp. 4–6.

  (2) This Court’s decision in Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 348 U. S. 310, does not hold otherwise. Wilburn Boat did not involve a choice-of-law provision, and held only that state law applied as a gap-filler in the absence of a uniform federal maritime rule on a warranty issue. Id., at 314–316. Where, as here, a uniform federal rule governs the enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts, no gap exists to be filled by state law. And while Wilburn Boat referenced States’ traditional responsibility for regulating insurance, see id., at 316–319, preserving that responsibility does not speak to the concern addressed by a choice-of-law provision, namely, which state law applies in a given case. Nothing in Wilburn Boat prevented this Court in The Bremen and Carnival Cruise from concluding as a matter of federal maritime law that forum-selection clauses are presumptively enforceable. And contrary to Raiders’ suggestion, nothing in Wilburn Boat purports to override parties’ choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts generally, or in the subset of marine insurance contracts specifically. Pp. 7–10.

 (b) Raiders does not claim any recognized exception to the presumptive enforceability of choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts. Raiders seeks an additional exception for situations where enforcing the law of the State designated by the contract would contravene the public policy of the State with the greatest interest in the dispute. But Raiders’ proposal lacks support in case law, and its application would undermine the fundamental purpose of choice-of-law clauses. Further, Raiders’ position would merely allow the substitution of one body of state law (the law of the State with the purported greatest interest in the matter) for another (the law of the State designated by a choice-of-law provision), a substitution no federal maritime interest supports. Finally, the Court rejects the suggestion to adopt the choice-of-law approach set forth in §187(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, as that rule arose out of interstate cases and does not deal directly with federal-state conflicts, including those that arise in federal enclaves like maritime law. Pp. 10–13.

47 F. 4th 225, reversed.

 Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion.

After petitioner Damian McElrath killed his mother, the State of Georgia charged him with three crimes related to her death: malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At trial, the jury returned a split verdict against McElrath: “not guilty by reason of insanity” with respect to malice-murder, and “guilty but mentally ill” as to the other counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the jury’s “guilty but mentally ill” verdict for felony murder was “repugnant” to the jury’s “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict for malice murder under Georgia law, because the verdicts “required affirmative findings of different mental states that could not exist at the same time.” See 308 Ga. 104, 112, 839 S. E. 2d 573, 579. The court vacated both the malice-murder and felony-murder verdicts pursuant to Georgia’s so-called repugnancy doctrine, and authorized retrial. Ibid., 839 S. E. 2d, at 580. On remand, McElrath argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited Georgia from retrying him for malice murder given the jury’s prior “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict on that charge. The Georgia courts rejected that argument.

Held: The jury’s verdict that McElrath was not guilty of malice murder by reason of insanity constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury’s other verdicts. Pp. 5–10.

 (a) The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. “[I]t has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 188 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s “cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313, 318. Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate. The principle “that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,’ ” is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571. Whatever the basis for a jury’s verdict, see Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U. S. 5, 10, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. Pp. 5–7.

 (b) Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who establishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of [the] crime.” Ga. Code Ann. §§16–3–2, 16–3–3. Here, the jury concluded that McElrath was not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the malice-murder charge. That verdict was unquestionably a “ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense,” Evans, 568 U. S., at 318, and thus an acquittal.

 Georgia argues that there was no valid verdict pursuant to Georgia law, and thus no acquittal. But whether an acquittal has occurred for double jeopardy purposes is a question of federal law, and a State’s characterization of a ruling is not binding on the Court. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U. S. 140, 144 n. 5. While States have the power “to regulate procedures under which [their] laws are carried out,” Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197, 201, the ultimate question remains whether the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes an event as an acquittal. The jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity here constituted such a determination, and it is of no moment that the verdict was accompanied by other verdicts appearing to rest on inconsistent findings. An acquittal is an acquittal, even when a jury returns inconsistent verdicts. Bravo-Fernandez, 580 U. S., at 8. Georgia argues that the bar to second-guessing an acquittal applies only to general verdicts, but the Court’s cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a jury’s verdict of acquittal—even when, as here, specific jury findings provide a factual basis for such speculation. To do otherwise “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Smith v. United States, 599 U. S. 236, 252. Pp. 7–10.

315 Ga. 126, 880 S.E. 2d 518, reversed and remanded.

 Jackson, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion.