SUTTON, Chief Judge. Before us are two questions: Did the Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exceed his authority in moving for a remand of a ratemaking challenge without the support of any other members of the Commission? If not, did the Commission’s underlying ratemaking decisions sink to the level of arbitrary and capricious agency action? As to the first question, the Commissioner exceeded his administrative authority. We accordingly remand the matter to the agency in the first instance to determine what, if anything, can or should be done about this ultra vires action. Once the agency has had the opportunity to resolve that point, any interested party may renew the petition for review of the second question.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Christina Littler appeals the grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Ohio Association of Public School Employees (OAPSE) in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging the wrongful deduction and retention of union dues. Because the district court did not err in concluding that OAPSE was not a state actor under § 1983, we AFFIRM.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. As a cooperative federalism program, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act offers federal funds to participating States in return for providing a “free appropriate public education” to students with disabilities in preschool, elementary school, and secondary school. A high school student and his parents contend that the Act’s guarantees extend to students enrolled full time at Kentucky’s Craft Academy for Excellence in Science and Mathematics. Located on the campus of Morehead State University, Craft provides an education in a residential environment with undergraduates and offers classes eligible for high school and college credit. The district court concluded that the Act does not apply to Craft because the dualcredit classes amounted to a post-secondary rather than secondary school education. We affirm.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. In accordance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, the Kenton County School District developed an individualized education plan to meet the learning needs of high school student Jeremy Holland. Under the plan, special education teachers accompanied Jeremy to several of his classes and offered him behavioral instruction at the end of the school day. This approach worked until Jeremy’s senior year. At that point, the family enrolled him as a full-time student at the local community college and claimed that the Act required the school district to provide the same support and other special education services there. At issue is whether the Act imposes this obligation on the school district. We hold that it does not