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JAMES M. PERNA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HEALTH ONE CREDIT UNION; NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION; NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION BOARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-1965
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:19-cv-10001—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
Argued: February 6, 2020
Decided and Filed: December 21, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, DONALD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. In recent decades the Supreme Court has cautioned courts not to mistake a forfeitable claims-processing rule (such as a rule that a party assert a claim within a specific time) for a nonforfeitable jurisdictional limit that deprives the court of the power to adjudicate the claim. Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1848–50 (2019). Yet this cautionary note must not be overread: It does not permit us to ignore a clear jurisdictional limit that Congress has, in fact, imposed. Id. at 1850. And here, James Perna seeks to litigate a claim that Congress has “clearly” deprived us of jurisdiction to entertain. Id. (citation omitted).

Perna worked for Health One Credit Union, a federally insured but state-chartered credit union. A state regulator found that Health One had become financially unsound and appointed the National Credit Union Administration Board, a federal entity, as Health One’s liquidator. The Board terminated Perna’s employment. Perna has since sought damages in many ways, from filing a complaint with a state agency, to asserting a claim with the Board, to conducting an arbitration with an arbitration agency. In this suit, Perna seeks to modify the arbitration award by making the Board liable on it. But the Federal Credit Union Act provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction over” claims against covered credit unions asserted outside its exclusive framework. 12 U.S.C. § 1787(b)(13)(D). The district court thus held that it lacked jurisdiction over Perna’s suit. We agree, although we clarify that the court should have dismissed this suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, not granted summary judgment to the defendants.