For nearly twenty years, our circuit has held that a drug-trafficking conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841 does not require proof that the defendant knew the type or quantity of controlled substance involved in the offense. See United States v. Hamm, 952 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550, 569–71 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Garcia, 252 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2001). In this appeal, the sole issue is whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), abrogated our precedent. We hold that it did not.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This is Defendant Michael Jerome Henry’s third time before the court. On this occasion, Henry appeals the district court’s order finding that First Step Act § 403 did not apply to his resentencing. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we REVERSE the district court’s order holding the First Step Act is not applicable to Henry and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with First Step Act § 403.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Lynne Donovan appeals from a judgment entered against her after the district court granted Defendant FirstCredit, Inc.’s (“FirstCredit”) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The central issue is whether Donovan’s allegations—concerning a letter that FirstCredit sent to Donovan regarding a purported medical debt—are sufficient to state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8), a provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) that limits the language and symbols that debt collectors may employ on an envelope when communicating with a consumer by mail. The district court determined that FirstCredit’s letter did not run afoul of § 1692f(8) and accordingly granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of FirstCredit. We disagree, and so we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.