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JOHNNY E. GATEWOOD,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 19-6297
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis;
Nos. 2:95-cr-20183-1; 2:03-cv-02748; 2:17-cv-02040—Jon Phipps McCalla, District Judge.
Argued: October 9, 2020
Decided and Filed: October 29, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, LARSEN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Johnny Gatewood filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his life sentence. The district court denied the motion as untimely. On appeal, the government now concedes that Gatewood’s motion was timely but maintains that his claim is nevertheless barred by procedural default. We agree and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court



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STEPHANIE TROUTMAN, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles R. Troutman, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LOUISVILLE METRO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
Defendants,

LOUISVILLE-JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT; MARK E. BOLTON, individually and in his official capacity as Director, Louisville Metro Department of Corrections; JAMES COX, Prison Classification Interviewer, individually and in his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 20-5290
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:16-cv-00742—David J. Hale, District Judge.
Argued: October 6, 2020
Decided and Filed: October 29, 2020
Before: DAUGHTERY, DONALD, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. In this case, Charles Troutman, a pretrial detainee at the Louisville Metro Department of Corrections (“LMDC”), committed suicide after jail officials placed him in solitary confinement despite a recent suicide attempt. Plaintiff Stephanie Troutman (“Stephanie”), Charles’ daughter and administrator of his estate, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the various defendants—(1) the classification officer, James Cox (“Cox”); (2) the LMDC Director, Mark Bolton (“Bolton”); and (3) the municipality itself, Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government (“Louisville Metro”)—were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of her father. Stephanie appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of all three defendants. For the reasons explained below, we REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Cox. We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of Bolton and LouisvilleJefferson County Metro Government.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARK HAZELWOOD (18-6023); HEATHER JONES (18-6101); SCOTT WOMBOLD (18-6102),
Defendants-Appellants.
   Nos. 18-6023/6101/6102
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 3:16-cr-00020—Curtis L. Collier, District Judge.
Argued: February 6, 2020
Decided and Filed: October 29, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, DONALD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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AMENDED OPINION
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SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge. In this wire fraud and mail fraud conspiracy case against employees of a multibillion-dollar gas company, Pilot Flying J (Pilot), the district court allowed the government to play audio recordings in which one of the defendants, Pilot President Mark Hazelwood, is heard using deeply offensive racist and misogynistic language. The district court admitted the recordings on the theory that if the defendant was reckless enough to use language that could risk public outrage against the company, he was a “bad businessman,” and as a bad businessman, he was also reckless enough to commit fraud. This is vintage bad character evidence—and precisely the type of reasoning the Federal Rules of Evidence forbid.

The use of the audio recordings in this case jumped the rails of those rules. First, none of the Rules of Evidence support the recordings’ admissibility. Second, and more importantly, even if somehow otherwise admissible, the recordings are a textbook violation of Rule 403, because the risk of unfair prejudice eviscerates any purported probative value. For these reasons, we reverse the convictions of all three defendants.



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DEREK WASKUL, by his guardian, Cynthia Waskul; CORY SCHNEIDER, by his guardians, Martha and Wendy Schneider; KEVIN WIESNER, by his guardian, Kerry Kafafian; WASHTENAW ASSOCIATION FOR COMMUNITY ADVOCACY; LINDSAY TRABUE, by her guardian, Kristin Kill; HANNAH ERNST, by her guardians, Susan and Robert Ernst,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
WASHTENAW COUNTY COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH; TRISH CORTES, in her official capacity as Director of Washtenaw County Community Mental Health; COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH PARTNERSHIP OF SOUTHEAST MICHIGAN; JANE TERWILLIGER, in her official capacity as director of Community Mental Health Partnership of Southeast Michigan; MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; ROBERT GORDON, in his official capacity as Director of Michigan Department of Health and Human Services,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-1400
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:16-cv-10936—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge.
Argued: June 11, 2020
Decided and Filed: October 29, 2020
Before: CLAY, WHITE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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CLAY, Circuit Judge. In 2015, a predecessor to Defendant Washtenaw County Community Mental Health modified the methodology through which it allocated funding to individuals with disabilities receiving community living support services pursuant to a Medicaid waiver received by the State of Michigan. Plaintiffs, five individuals receiving those services, together with the Washtenaw Association for Community Advocacy, challenge that methodology in this case against Defendants the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, Community Mental Health Partnership of Southeast Michigan, Washtenaw County Community Mental Health, and the directors of these organizations. In particular, Plaintiffs assert that by implementing or allowing implementation of this new methodology, Defendants violated provisions of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(8), (a)(10)(A), (a)(10)(B), 1396n(c)(2)(A) and (C); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Michigan Mental Health Code, Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1722; and the terms of Michigan’s Medicaid Habilitation Supports Waiver and the contracts implementing it. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims in full.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we REVERSE the district court’s decision and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



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BORROR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ORO KARRIC NORTH, LLC; ORO KARRIC SOUTH, LLC; ORO SILVERTREE, LLC; ORO SPRINGBURNE, LLC,
Defendants-Appellants.
   No. 20-3146
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:19-cv-04375—Algenon L. Marbley, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: October 29, 2020
Before: DAUGHTREY, DONALD, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. It is the rare federal complaint that is not preceded by an exchange of letters between the parties. Sometimes the letters identify common ground, more often they eschew it. Sometimes they are conciliatory, more often they are accusatory. Either way, their purpose is to help frame the parties’ dispute, posturing it either for settlement or litigation. But those correspondence are not equivalent to formal litigation. They are neither pleadings nor representations in court. And free of those burdens, parties often posture their claims with loose rhetorical flair better utilized outside the courtroom.

Yet today, one party seeks to raise the stakes for this familiar practice. Although the parties agree that their underlying contract affords each of them the opportunity to invoke arbitration, Plaintiff believes Defendants waived that right through their pre-trial “posturing” correspondence. The district court agreed and denied Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Because Defendants’ pre-trial communications were neither inconsistent with its arbitration right nor prejudicial to Plaintiff, they did not waive that right. We accordingly reverse the decision of the district court and remand the case for further proceedings.