JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. This case arises at the intersection of two branches of Fourth Amendment law—one governing the traditional balancing of privacy and governmental interests and the other addressing searches of the digital content of cell phones. In short, the revolution in digital capacity of cell phones has shifted the balance between individual privacy and governmental interests. This case involves the decision of Jason Fletcher’s probation officer to conduct a phone search because he was carrying two cell phones. The search revealed child pornography. Fletcher appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found on his phone, as well as the resolution of several sentencing issues. Because the probation officer did not have reasonable suspicion to search Fletcher’s cell phone and Fletcher’s probation agreement did not authorize the search, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress, VACATE Fletcher’s conviction and sentence, and REMAND this case for further proceedings.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Keith Ruffin, a federal prisoner serving a lengthy prison term, suffers from many health conditions that he asserts increase his COVID-19 risks while in prison. > No. 20-5748 United States v. Ruffin Page 2 He thus seeks “compassionate release” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Traditionally, only the Bureau of Prisons could file compassionate-release motions, but the First Step Act of 2018 now permits defendants to file them too. This relief has always required the movant to identify “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” a phrase that the Sentencing Commission has defined in commentary accompanying its relevant policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)–(D) (2018). Ruffin makes no claim that he qualifies for relief under any of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” identified in the Commission’s commentary. He instead argues that, after the First Step Act, district courts may find extraordinary and compelling reasons beyond those listed in this commentary. Although Ruffin raises an important legal question that has divided the courts, we need not resolve it in this case. Even when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, the statute leaves district courts with discretion to deny relief under a balancing of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). And here, the district court denied relief to Ruffin not just because no extraordinary and compelling reasons existed, but also because the § 3553(a) factors weighed against his release. The district court did not abuse its discretion when balancing those factors, so we affirm on that alternative discretionary ground.