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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MERCEDES WILSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 19-3394
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:17-cr-00365-1—Solomon Oliver, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: February 6, 2020
Decided and Filed: October 23, 2020
Before: ROGERS, KETHLEDGE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Mercedes Wilson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government argued that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Wilson should be subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence because of three prior state aggravated robbery convictions. Relying on this court’s opinion in United States v. Burris, 912 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc), the district court concluded that one of Wilson’s prior aggravated robbery convictions, under Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) § 2911.01(A)(3), was not a violent felony under the ACCA, and so Wilson was not subject to the fifteen-year minimum. The government appeals. For the reasons stated, we VACATE Wilson’s sentence and REMAND for further proceedings.



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AMERICAN FREEDOM DEFENSE INITIATIVE; PAMELA GELLER; ROBERT SPENCER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION (SMART); JOHN HERTEL, individually and in his official capacity as General Manager of SMART; BETH GIBBONS, individually and in her official capacity as Marketing Program Manager of SMART,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-1311
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:10-cv-12134—Denise Page Hood, Chief District Judge.
Argued: December 13, 2019
Decided and Filed: October 23, 2020
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; SILER and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Free Speech Clause limits the government’s power to regulate speech on public property. The government has little leeway to restrict speech in “public forums”: properties like parks or streets that are open to speech by tradition or design. It has wider latitude to restrict speech in “nonpublic forums” that have not been opened to debate. Even there, however, speech restrictions must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. See Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 1885 (2018). In this case, we must consider how these rules apply to the restrictions that a public-transit authority imposes on parties who seek to display advertisements on its buses. The American Freedom Defense Initiative sought to run an ad that said: “Fatwa on your head? Is your family or community threatening you? Leaving Islam? Got Questions? Get Answers! RefugefromIslam.com.” Michigan’s Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) rejected this ad under two of its speech restrictions. The first prohibits “political” ads; the second prohibits ads that would hold up a group of people to “scorn or ridicule.”

Earlier in this case, we found, first, that the advertising space on SMART’s buses is a nonpublic forum and, second, that SMART likely could show that its restrictions were reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 698 F.3d 885, 890–96 (6th Cir. 2012). Since then, the Supreme Court has issued a pair of decisions that compel us to change course on our second conclusion. SMART’s ban on “political” ads is unreasonable for the same reason that a state’s ban on “political” apparel at polling places is unreasonable: SMART offers no “sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out.” Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1888. Likewise, SMART’s ban on ads that engage in “scorn or ridicule” is not viewpoint neutral for the same reason that a ban on trademarks that disparage people is not viewpoint neutral: For any group, “an applicant may [display] a positive or benign [ad] but not a derogatory one.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1763 (Alito, J., opinion). We thus reverse the district court’s decision rejecting the First Amendment challenge to these two restrictions.