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CHAD THOMPSON; WILLIAM T. SCHMITT; DON
KEENEY,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
RICHARD MICHAEL DEWINE, in his capacity as the
Governor of Ohio; LANCE HIMES, in his official
capacity as the Interim Director of the Ohio
Department of Health; FRANK LAROSE, in his official
capacity as Ohio Secretary of State,
Defendants-Appellants. |
No. 20-3526 |
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:20-cv-02129—Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., District Judge.
Decided and Filed: September 16, 2020
Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
PER CURIAM. The COVID-19 pandemic has upended life in many ways. In response
to the unfolding public health crisis, states across the country imposed various orders in hopes of
containing the virus. Ohio, for its part, asked its citizens to stay at home and restricted the size of
gatherings.
This case, which we’ve seen before, involves the intersection of COVID-19, the state’s
responses to that pandemic, and some of Ohio’s conditions that must be met before a ballot
initiative can get on the ballot for Election Day. See Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804, 806
(6th Cir.) (per curiam), mot. to vacate stay denied, --- S. Ct. ----, No. 19A1054, 2020 WL
3456705 (2020).
Plaintiffs say that Ohio’s ballot initiative conditions are unconstitutional as applied
during this pandemic and request that the federal courts relax them, at least for the time being.
Plaintiffs’ challenge is a curious one. There is no question that Ohio’s ballot initiative conditions
are, standing alone, constitutional, there is no question that Ohio is not responsible for
COVID-19, and Plaintiffs are not challenging Ohio’s restrictions on public gatherings and the
like, which Ohio imposed to address the pandemic—so we assume those are constitutional as
well. And yet, Plaintiffs contend that when you put all of this together, in effect, two
constitutional rights plus one outside catalyst make one constitutional wrong. The district court
agreed and granted a preliminary injunction. We stayed that order because we disagreed. And
now, because we still disagree, we reverse the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction. |
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NIKOS KIDIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JEAN REID; JOHN MORAN,
Defendants-Appellants. |
No. 19-1673 |
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:16-cv-13070—Sean F. Cox, District Judge.
Argued: April 29, 2020
Decided and Filed: September 25, 2020
Before: BOGGS, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. A jury found that Officer John Moran used
excessive force in arresting Nikos Kidis, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The jury’s
conclusions regarding harm and compensatory damages, however, were difficult to square with
its conclusion on punitive damages. On the one hand, the jury found that Moran’s conduct did
not injure Kidis, and accordingly awarded Kidis $1 in nominal compensatory damages. But on
the other, the jury found Moran’s actions so unjustified as to warrant $200,000 in punitive
damages. When measured against the jury’s harm and compensatory damage findings, the
punitive damages award runs afoul of the due process principles articulated in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). We accordingly reverse
the punitive damages portion of the judgment, and remand that portion of the judgment to the
district court with instructions to enter an order of remittitur reducing the punitive damages
award to no more than $50,000. We affirm the remaining aspects of the judgment. |
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