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INTERNATIONAL OUTDOOR, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF TROY, MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
   Nos. 19-1151/1399
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:17-cv-10335—George Caram Steeh III, District Judge.
Argued: October 16, 2019
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: BOGGS, SUHRHEINRICH, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. International Outdoor, Inc. (“International Outdoor”) sought to erect billboards in the City of Troy, Michigan. After the City of Troy denied International Outdoor’s application for a permit and then for a variance from the limitations imposed by the City’s sign ordinance, International Outdoor brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the City’s ordinance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleging that the sign ordinance violated International Outdoor’s First Amendment rights.

For the reasons stated below, we affirm the district court’s grant of the City of Troy’s motion for summary judgment on International Outdoor’s claim that the City’s sign ordinance constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint. However, we vacate the district court’s grant of the City of Troy’s motion to dismiss International Outdoor’s claim that the City’s sign ordinance imposes content-based restrictions without a compelling government interest, and we remand for reconsideration under the Reed standard. We also vacate and remand the district court’s denial of International Outdoor’s motion for attorney’s fees, pending reconsideration of the City of Troy’s motion to dismiss.



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JOE CLARK MITCHELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
KEVIN GENOVESE, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 19-6070
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Columbia.
No. 1:93-cv-00073—William Lynn Campbell, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: May 7, 2020
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: MERRITT, GUY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. This is an unusually postured pre-AEDPA habeas case that turns on the Supreme Court’s modern procedural default jurisprudence. In 1986, Joe Clark Mitchell—a black man—was convicted by an all-white jury of raping two white women in Tennessee. The Warden no longer disputes the assertion that the prosecution’s decision to strike a black prospective juror violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The district court granted relief on Batson grounds in 1995, but we reversed, holding that Mitchell had to first establish “cause and prejudice” for failing to develop the claim before the state court. Mitchell v. Rees, 114 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Mitchell I”). We have acknowledged that our holding was error. See Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2005). Because Supreme Court precedent now enables Mitchell to show the necessary “cause,” and authorizes him to raise his underlying ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim and to seek redress through a Rule 60(b) motion, we REVERSE the district court’s decision, GRANT Mitchell a conditional writ of habeas corpus, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.



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KEVIN LIPMAN, Administrator of the Estate of Ta’Naejah McCloud, Deceased; SHABRINA MCCLOUD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ARMOND D. BUDISH, in his official capacity as Cuyahoga County Executive; CUYAHOGA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES; KRISTINA QUINT; ADA JACKSON; MARQUETESE BETTS,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-3914
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:18-cv-02985—Patricia A. Gaughan, Chief District Judge.
Argued: April 30, 2020
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; CLAY and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs in this case are the legal custodian and estate representative of Ta’Naejah McCloud, who was born in 2011. Ta’Naejah was in the custody of her biological mother, Tequila Crump, who severely abused her, including through repeated burnings and beatings. Ta’Naejah was hospitalized and interviewed by Cuyahoga County caseworkers, but ultimately was returned to Crump’s custody. Throughout the next year, the county received further reports of abuse and interviewed Ta’Naejah several more times, but never acted to remove her from the household. The abuse eventually resulted in Ta’Naejah’s death.

Plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting claims based on Ta’Naejah’s due process rights as well as several state-law causes of action. In response, Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs’ federal claims could not succeed because the Constitution does not create a right to state protection from private harm. The district court agreed and also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, dismissing the case in its entirety.

On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge this ruling as well as the district court’s decision to strike their motion to alter and amend the judgment, a decision based on Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with a protective order governing confidential information obtained through discovery. Defendants in turn moved to seal Plaintiffs’ brief, saying that they again violated the same protective order by including information in their brief that they learned through depositions. But Defendants do not explain why the information in question should be kept from the public, other than because it is covered by the protective order.

While several of Plaintiffs’ federal claims are foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s and this Court’s case law, Plaintiffs also allege that the state affirmatively increased Ta’Naejah’s risk of harm by repeatedly interviewing her about her abuse in the presence of her alleged abusers, in violation of state regulations. Because these allegations plausibly allege a claim under the state-created danger doctrine, the district court erred by dismissing Plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiffs’ federal claims, vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, vacate the order striking Plaintiffs’ post-judgment motion, and remand this case for further proceedings. We also deny Defendants’ motion to seal.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MAURICE DUNCAN BURKS,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 19-6010
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:17-cr-00124-2—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: July 30, 2020
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: BOGGS, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Maurice Burks for murdering Malcolm Wright. Burks moved for an acquittal and a new trial, pointing to inconsistencies in witness testimony and a lack of physical evidence. The district court denied Burks’s motion for an acquittal but ordered a new trial on the murder charges. The government appeals, and we reverse.



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CHERRYL KIRILENKO-ISON; SUSAN BAUDER-SMITH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DANVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 19-5767
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:18-cv-00435—Danny C. Reeves, Chief District Judge.
Argued: June 9, 2020
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: CLAY, ROGERS, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Cherryl Kirilenko-Ison and Susan Bauder-Smith appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of their former employer, Defendant Board of Education of Danville Independent Schools (“School Board”). Plaintiffs assert that the School Board illegally retaliated against them for their advocacy on behalf of two disabled students, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”), Ky. Rev. Stat. § 344. Plaintiffs also claim that the School Board violated the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 61.102, by retaliating against them for reporting a parent’s suspected child neglect to Kentucky’s Cabinet for Families and Children. Plaintiff Kirilenko-Ison further asserts that the School Board failed to accommodate her disability and constructively discharged her, in violation of the ADA and the KCRA. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment.



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TIMOTHY L. COLEMAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
MARGARET BRADSHAW, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 15-3442
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.
No. 3:03-cv-00299—Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: January 29, 2020
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. An Ohio prisoner, sentenced to death, appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We AFFIRM.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MANNDRELL EVANN LEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 18-2391
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:18-cr-00115-1—Robert J. Jonker, Chief District Judge.
Argued: October 25, 2019
Decided and Filed: September 4, 2020
Before: CLAY, STRANCH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Manndrell Lee appeals his sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment for possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), a sentence which reflects an upward variance of almost two years from the high end of Lee’s 30 to 37 months guidelines range. The district court imposed this extreme variance purportedly due to Lee’s criminal history. A district court is certainly able to vary upward from a defendant’s advisory guidelines range based on his criminal history and a specific need for deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But where, as here, nothing uniquely problematic about the defendant’s criminal history demonstrates a specific need for deterrence beyond that already captured in the guidelines range, our case law has recognized that some meaningful relationship between the offense of conviction and a defendant’s alleged likelihood of reoffending is needed. Because Lee’s criminal history has little bearing on the instant offense, it does not justify the two-year upward variance that the district court imposed, which nearly doubled Lee’s recommended sentence under the guidelines. We therefore vacate Lee’s sentence and remand for resentencing.