THAPAR, Circuit Judge. A Michigan court rule forbids recording, photographing, or livestreaming judicial proceedings. Nicholas Somberg claims that rule violates the First Amendment. Because Somberg lacks Article III standing to pursue his claim, we remand with instructions to dismiss.

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Meng Huang, a former engineering student at The Ohio State University, alleges that her advisor, Professor Giorgio Rizzoni, sexually harassed and assaulted her while she pursued her Ph.D. She brought this action against OSU and Rizzoni. Relevant on appeal are the district court’s grant of summary judgment to OSU on Huang’s Title VII quid pro quo sexual harassment and retaliation claims, and a trial verdict in Rizzoni’s favor on Huang’s due process claim that he violated her right to bodily integrity.

The district court mishandled Huang’s claims against both defendants. First, with respect to the claims against OSU, Huang raised a material dispute of fact as to whether she was an “employee” of OSU for Title VII purposes, even though she was also a student. The two roles are not mutually exclusive, as the district court mistakenly held. So, Huang’s sexual harassment claim under Title VII must go to a jury. Additionally, when Huang physically resisted Rizzoni’s advances by pushing him away, she “opposed” his improper touching even if she did not vocalize her objection. That is enough for “protected activity” under Title VII, so her retaliation claim also should have survived.

Second, with respect to the claim against Rizzoni, the district court violated Huang’s substantial rights when it excluded multiple categories of evidence in service of a confusing trifurcation order. Deeming this evidence “irrelevant” to whether Rizzoni improperly touched Huang, the district court categorically excluded evidence of Rizzoni’s threats to her academic career after she refused his advances. It also prevented Huang from presenting evidence of her impeccable academic credentials and stellar performance during her Ph.D. program. She sought to introduce that evidence to rebut Rizzoni’s claims that she fabricated the sexual harassment allegations in revenge for his decision to eject her from the engineering program. Yet all this was relevant under basic rules of evidence. Given these errors, we reverse the grant of summary judgment, vacate the trial verdict, and remand the case to the district court.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs from twenty-six states seek class certification in their suit against General Motors, LLC (“GM”), for alleged defects present in the 8L45 and 8L90 transmissions of vehicles purchased from GM between 2015 and 2019. According to the Plaintiffs, they experienced “shudder” and shift quality issues when driving these vehicles that persisted even if and when they brought the car in to be repaired. GM claims that the putative class lacks standing and that there exist a number of individualized issues between both the Plaintiffs and state laws that would predominate over any common issues of law or fact in the Plaintiffs’ putative class-action suit. The district court determined that the Plaintiffs have standing and can satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and certified the class. GM appeals the decision and claims that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class. We hold that the Plaintiffs have standing and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class action and AFFIRM the class certification.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. This trademark action arises out of a dispute within the Libertarian Party of Michigan (referred to by name or as the “Michigan affiliate”). The Libertarian National Committee, Inc. (“LNC”) sued dissenting members of the Michigan affiliate—mainly former officers of the affiliate or board members of local parties—for using the LNC’s trademark to hold themselves out as the official Michigan affiliate after a turnover of power resulted in two factions claiming to hold power. The district court granted the LNC’s request to preliminarily enjoin the dissenting members’ use of the mark, and the dissenting members appealed. They argue that the district court’s application of the Lanham Act to the context of noncommercial speech both unduly expands the Act and violates the First Amendment. Even if the Lanham Act covers the dissenting members’ use of the trademark, they argue that their use was authorized and not likely to cause confusion. We affirm in part and vacate in part the preliminary injunction.