MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Automobile insurance policies commonly insure both a covered vehicle and a “temporary substitute” if the covered vehicle is in the shop for repairs. See 8A Jordan R. Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 117:61 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated June 2024). This case requires us to interpret the phrase “temporary substitute” in an insurance policy governed by Kentucky law. Donna Vanek worked for a construction company that had insured two trucks, including a Ford F-250, through Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Vanek would occasionally drive the F-250, but she typically used her own Kia Optima for much of this work. She was driving her Kia with her young nephew to pick up paint for a job when a semitruck recklessly struck her car and killed both occupants. At the time of this tragic accident, the company’s Ford F-250 was in a repair shop. The estates of Vanek and her nephew thus sued Ohio Casualty, claiming that the Kia qualified as a covered “temporary substitute” for the F-250.

The district court rejected this reading and granted summary judgment to Ohio Casualty. Yet a reasonable jury could find for the estates under the policy’s plain language. The jury could conclude that the Kia qualified as a “substitute” (that is, a replacement) because several witnesses testified that Vanek would have driven the F-250 to the paint store if it had been available. And the jury could view the Kia as a “temporary” substitute (that is, one for a limited time) because the company got the F-250 back a short time later. To reach the contrary conclusion, the district court accepted Ohio Casualty’s claim that a noncovered car cannot qualify as a “temporary substitute” unless all covered vehicles are in the shop. But Ohio Casualty did not base this interpretation on the policy’s text. It instead based the interpretation on a misreading of a state appellate court decision. So we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Alvin Moore (“Moore”) held various positions at Coca-Cola Bottling Company (“CCBC”) from 2015 to 2018. In March 2017, Moore was involved in an accident at work and underwent drug testing, pursuant to CCBC’s drug and alcohol policy. Moore tested positive for marijuana, although the amount in his sample was less than the amount that CCBC’s drug policy prohibits. CCBC nevertheless negotiated a Second Chance Agreement (“SCA”) with its employees’ union and Moore, which stated that Moore would be subject to twenty-four months of random drug testing. Later, in June 2017, Moore was cited as being insubordinate for swearing and inciting a work slowdown during a pre-shift meeting. Moore was terminated, but his union negotiated a Last Chance Agreement (“LCA”) with CCBC. In a meeting with his supervisor, David Boland (“Boland”), and the union vice president, Frank Arrington (“Arrington”), Moore signed the LCA, which stated that he discharged CCBC from any and all liability relating to his employment. In 2018, while Moore was still under the SCA and the LCA, he tested positive for marijuana. He was terminated from CCBC on July 31, 2018, when he was still subject to the SCA, but at which point Moore’s LCA had expired. He sued CCBC for racial discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII and Ohio law, and CCBC moved for summary judgment. The district court granted CCBC’s motion for summary judgment, and Moore timely appealed. For the reasons explained below, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.