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TANIKA PARKER and ANDREW FARRIER, individually and on behalf of the
DRiV 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
TENNECO, INC.; DRIV AUTOMOTIVE, INC.; TENNECO AUTOMOTIVE
OPERATING COMPANY, INC.; TENNECO BENEFITS COMMITTEE; FEDERALMOGUL CORPORATION; FEDERAL-MOGUL, LLC; FEDERAL-MOGUL
POWERTRAIN, LLC; TENNECO BENEFITS & PENSION INVESTMENT
COMMITTEE,
Defendants-Appellants. |
No. 23-1857 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:23-cv-10816—George Caram Steeh III, District Judge.
Argued: May 2, 2024
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Tanika Parker and Andrew Farrier, employees
of subsidiaries of Tenneco Inc., each participated in 401(k) plans covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Both plans (together, the “Plans”) had been amended
to include mandatory individual arbitration provisions. These provisions required plan
participants to bring suit in arbitration only in an individual capacity, not in a representative,
class, or collective capacity, and to seek remedies only for losses to the participant’s individual
plan account, not for monetary benefits that would accrue to any other participant’s account.
These provisions explicitly applied to actions under ERISA § 502(a)(2) for relief under ERISA
§ 409(a). Parker and Farrier alleged that the fiduciaries of their Plans (the “Fiduciaries”)
breached their fiduciary duties and sued under § 502(a)(2) on behalf of their Plans for all losses
accruing to the Plans, disgorgement of all profits, and other injunctive remedies under § 409(a).
The Fiduciaries moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the individual arbitration provisions
blocked such a representative suit for plan-wide monetary remedies. The question for this court
is whether the individual arbitration provisions are invalid as a prospective waiver of statutorily
guaranteed rights and remedies. We hold that they are and affirm the judgment of the district
court. |
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THOMAS MERCK, individually and as a representative
of the Class,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WALMART, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee. |
No. 23-3698 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:20-cv-02908—Sarah Daggett Morrison, District Judge.
Argued: July 18, 2024
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Before an employer can take any adverse action against a
prospective employee based on a negative consumer report, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
requires that the employer provide him with a copy of the report. When Thomas Merck applied
to work at Walmart, he forgot to disclose an old misdemeanor conviction. The conviction came
up on a consumer report. Walmart—through a third-party vendor—gave Merck an incomplete
version of the report that listed his misdemeanor and indicated he was “not competitive” for a job
at Walmart, even though it had already given him a conditional job offer. Then Walmart revoked
the offer.
The question is whether Merck has constitutional standing to sue Walmart under the Act
for the procedural injury he alleges he suffered when Walmart failed to give him the full
consumer report. Merck has failed to point to sufficient evidence of adverse effects to survive
summary judgment on his informational-injury theory of standing. And his other standing
theories fail as a matter of law. We AFFIRM the district court. |
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VON CLARK DAVIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CHARLOTTE JENKINS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee. |
No. 21-3404 |
On Petition for Rehearing En Banc
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:16-cv-00495—Susan J. Dlott, District Judge.
Argued En Banc: March 20, 2024
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MOORE, COLE, CLAY, GIBBONS, GRIFFIN,
KETHLEDGE, STRANCH, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN,
READLER, DAVIS and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.*
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In 1984, a Butler County, Ohio court tried and
convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder with a capital specification for a prior
conviction of purposeful killing of another. Forty years later, Davis is before us on habeas
review of the third death sentence for this conviction. Today, we accord the Ohio courts the
deference owed their adjudication of Davis’s various claims and deny his petition for habeas
relief. |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN JEROME O’HARA,
Defendant-Appellant. |
Nos. 23-5695/5720 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:18-cr-00176-1—Danny C. Reeves, Chief District Judge.
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: BOGGS, COOK, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to defrauding his own mother,
John O’Hara was ordered to pay over $300,000 in restitution to his mother’s estate. One
problem—O’Hara’s mother had passed away by the time of sentencing, leaving O’Hara the sole
beneficiary of her estate. Four years later, the district court amended the judgment and directed
O’Hara to pay the federal Crime Victims Fund instead of the estate. O’Hara appealed, claiming
the district court had no authority to modify the judgment. We agree, so we REVERSE and
REMAND. |
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