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TANIKA PARKER and ANDREW FARRIER, individually and on behalf of the DRiV 401(k) Retirement Savings Plan, and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
TENNECO, INC.; DRIV AUTOMOTIVE, INC.; TENNECO AUTOMOTIVE OPERATING COMPANY, INC.; TENNECO BENEFITS COMMITTEE; FEDERALMOGUL CORPORATION; FEDERAL-MOGUL, LLC; FEDERAL-MOGUL POWERTRAIN, LLC; TENNECO BENEFITS & PENSION INVESTMENT COMMITTEE,
Defendants-Appellants.
   No. 23-1857
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:23-cv-10816—George Caram Steeh III, District Judge.
Argued: May 2, 2024
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Tanika Parker and Andrew Farrier, employees of subsidiaries of Tenneco Inc., each participated in 401(k) plans covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Both plans (together, the “Plans”) had been amended to include mandatory individual arbitration provisions. These provisions required plan participants to bring suit in arbitration only in an individual capacity, not in a representative, class, or collective capacity, and to seek remedies only for losses to the participant’s individual plan account, not for monetary benefits that would accrue to any other participant’s account. These provisions explicitly applied to actions under ERISA § 502(a)(2) for relief under ERISA § 409(a). Parker and Farrier alleged that the fiduciaries of their Plans (the “Fiduciaries”) breached their fiduciary duties and sued under § 502(a)(2) on behalf of their Plans for all losses accruing to the Plans, disgorgement of all profits, and other injunctive remedies under § 409(a). The Fiduciaries moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the individual arbitration provisions blocked such a representative suit for plan-wide monetary remedies. The question for this court is whether the individual arbitration provisions are invalid as a prospective waiver of statutorily guaranteed rights and remedies. We hold that they are and affirm the judgment of the district court.



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THOMAS MERCK, individually and as a representative of the Class,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WALMART, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 23-3698
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:20-cv-02908—Sarah Daggett Morrison, District Judge.
Argued: July 18, 2024
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Before an employer can take any adverse action against a prospective employee based on a negative consumer report, the Fair Credit Reporting Act requires that the employer provide him with a copy of the report. When Thomas Merck applied to work at Walmart, he forgot to disclose an old misdemeanor conviction. The conviction came up on a consumer report. Walmart—through a third-party vendor—gave Merck an incomplete version of the report that listed his misdemeanor and indicated he was “not competitive” for a job at Walmart, even though it had already given him a conditional job offer. Then Walmart revoked the offer.

The question is whether Merck has constitutional standing to sue Walmart under the Act for the procedural injury he alleges he suffered when Walmart failed to give him the full consumer report. Merck has failed to point to sufficient evidence of adverse effects to survive summary judgment on his informational-injury theory of standing. And his other standing theories fail as a matter of law. We AFFIRM the district court.



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VON CLARK DAVIS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CHARLOTTE JENKINS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 21-3404
On Petition for Rehearing En Banc
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:16-cv-00495—Susan J. Dlott, District Judge.
Argued En Banc: March 20, 2024
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MOORE, COLE, CLAY, GIBBONS, GRIFFIN,
KETHLEDGE, STRANCH, THAPAR, BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN,
READLER, DAVIS and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.*


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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. In 1984, a Butler County, Ohio court tried and convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder with a capital specification for a prior conviction of purposeful killing of another. Forty years later, Davis is before us on habeas review of the third death sentence for this conviction. Today, we accord the Ohio courts the deference owed their adjudication of Davis’s various claims and deny his petition for habeas relief.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JOHN JEROME O’HARA,
Defendant-Appellant.
   Nos. 23-5695/5720
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:18-cr-00176-1—Danny C. Reeves, Chief District Judge.
Decided and Filed: August 20, 2024
Before: BOGGS, COOK, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. After pleading guilty to defrauding his own mother, John O’Hara was ordered to pay over $300,000 in restitution to his mother’s estate. One problem—O’Hara’s mother had passed away by the time of sentencing, leaving O’Hara the sole beneficiary of her estate. Four years later, the district court amended the judgment and directed O’Hara to pay the federal Crime Victims Fund instead of the estate. O’Hara appealed, claiming the district court had no authority to modify the judgment. We agree, so we REVERSE and REMAND.