BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. In this matter, we ask whether Plaintiff Jane Doe (hereinafter “Doe”) can bring a Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, claim against a university based on that university’s alleged deliberate indifference to a sexual assault by a university student (i.e., a Title IX Davis claim, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 (1999)). Although not technically enrolled at Defendant University of Kentucky (hereinafter “the University”), Doe lived, dined, and participated in student activities on the University’s campus. She also hoped to attend the University and was enrolled at a Kentucky community college that allows its students to transfer credits to the University and enroll in the University through a simpler application process. The district court held that Doe could not bring such a claim, finding that Doe was not a student of the University or a participant in any of the University’s educational programs or activities. Because we find that Doe has sufficiently shown that there remain genuine disputes as to whether the University denied her the benefit of an “education program or activity,” she has standing to bring her Davis claim, and we REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for further consideration of the merits of Doe’s claim in light of this Court’s recent opinion in Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of Trustees, 944 F.3d 613, 619-24 (6th Cir. 2019).

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. While employed as a captain in the Cleveland Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Jamie Marquardt allegedly made incendiary comments on his private Facebook page regarding the death of twelve-year-old Tamir Rice, a tragic incident that gripped Cleveland and the nation. Following his dismissal from the EMS, Marquardt brought suit alleging he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights. Because Marquardt’s social media posts addressed a matter of public concern, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment below and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.