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FIRST CHOICE CHIROPRACTIC, LLC; JAMES FONNER, D.C.; PRESTIGE CHIROPRACTIC & INJURY, LLC; RENNES BOWERS, D.C.; ALLIED HEALTH & CHIROPRACTIC, LLC; TY DAHODWALA, D.C.; SCHROEDER REFERRAL SYSTEMS, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MIKE DEWINE, Ohio Governor; DAVE YOST, Ohio Attorney General; OHIO STATE CHIROPRACTIC BOARD,
Defendants-Appellees
   Nos. 19-4092/20-3038
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:19-cv-02010—William H. Baughman, Magistrate Judge.
Argued: August 6, 2020
Decided and Filed: August 13, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Ohio law prohibits health care practitioners and their agents from directly soliciting business from victims of a motor vehicle accident or crime, by any means other than U.S. mail, until thirty days after the date of the incident. The plaintiffs in this case are various chiropractors and a referral service that appeal the district court’s denial of their request for injunctive and declaratory relief. They claim that the statute restricts commercial speech in violation of the First Amendment. They also contend that the restrictions’ focus on health care practitioners, but not other professional industries, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. Because our precedents squarely foreclose the plaintiffs’ challenges, we affirm.



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MELVIN WOFFORD,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY WOODS, Warden,
Respondent-Appellant.
   No. 18-2367
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:16-cv-13083—Laurie J. Michelson, District Judge.
Argued: October 17, 2019
Decided and Filed: August 13, 2020
Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. The right to “trial by an impartial jury” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contains certain substantive requirements. Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1395 (2020). One of these is the rule, established since the Middle Ages, that the trial judge cannot remove a juror based on that juror’s opinion of the merits of the case. Yet at the same time, trial judges have long-established power, consistent with the Constitution, to remove jurors for misconduct. This case concerns what happens when a trial judge removes a juror for misconduct when that juror is also a holdout against conviction.

Wofford was found guilty of murder in a Michigan court following the removal and replacement of a juror. While that juror was holding out against conviction at the time, the judge removed her because of her misconduct: she had violated his instructions not to discuss the case with anyone other than her fellow jurors by hiring a lawyer to address the court about the tensions in the jury room. The Michigan Court of Appeals (MCOA) affirmed Wofford’s conviction under a state precedent on juror removal. A federal district court then granted Wofford’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that the MCOA’s decision was not entitled to deference under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, because the Michigan court had overlooked Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims. Second, it held that the removal of the juror violated Wofford’s Sixth Amendment rights.

In assessing this appeal, we first review the factual determinations that the federal district court made in reviewing the factual findings of the MCOA. This review shows that, while the juror was a holdout, she was not removed for this reason, but instead because of her misconduct.

Then, we turn to review whether the district court was legally correct in granting a writ of habeas corpus on these facts. The recent Supreme Court decision in Ramos provides guidance on the Sixth Amendment right at the center of this case: the right not to have a juror removed due to the juror’s opinions on the merits of the case is contained in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a “trial by an impartial jury.” Cf. 140 S. Ct. at 1395. We review first the history and limits of this right and then the different ways in which Michigan courts and certain federal courts have attempted to protect it. This history makes it clear that Michigan did not overlook Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claims.



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BAY SHORE POWER COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OXBOW ENERGY SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 20-3119
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.
No. 3:17-cv-01982—Jeffrey James Helmick, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: August 13, 2020
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

CLAY, Circuit Judge. In 1998, Oxbow Energy Solutions (“Oxbow”) entered into a longterm supply contract to provide limestone to Bay Shore Power Company (“Bay Shore”). In 2014, Oxbow breached the agreement and Bay Shore initiated arbitration proceedings to vindicate its rights under the contract. After Bay Shore prevailed, it filed the instant action to confirm the arbitration award and recover its attorneys’ fees. The district court granted summary judgment for Oxbow, finding that the contract provides that both parties are to bear their own attorneys’ fees with no possibility of recovery by the prevailing party. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the district court’s reasoning and REVERSE its judgment.