RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Mohamed Sy and Doshaun Edwards (the Plaintiffs) brought this qui tam action against their former employer, Oakland Physicians Medical Center, LLC, d/b/a Pontiac General Hospital, and against Sanyam Sharma, the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Pontiac General Hospital (the Defendants). The Plaintiffs filed their complaint under seal pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730, giving the United States 60 days to investigate the claims and determine whether to intervene in the case. The government filed several ex parte motions to extend the investigation period, which ultimately spanned two-and-a-half years and ended when the government filed a notice electing not to intervene. The district court unsealed the complaint three days later and ordered the Plaintiffs to serve the Defendants, triggering the 90-day period during which the Plaintiffs were required to effectuate service of process pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the Plaintiffs did not serve the Defendants until approximately 50 days after the time to effect service had expired.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for insufficient service of process. The court granted the motion, concluding that the Plaintiffs had failed to establish good cause for their delay and declining to grant a discretionary extension of time. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. A physician group fired Rachel Post, a nurse, months after she suffered an accident. The group’s subsequent bankruptcy impeded Post’s efforts to hold it liable for employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). She instead sued the hospital at which she worked. Even though this hospital did not employ her, Post argues on appeal that two statutes give her the ability to enforce the ADA’s employment protections against non-employers. Her claim raises both a novel legal question and a settled one.

Starting with the novel question, an ADA catchall provision (which we will call the “interference” provision) makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of” an ADA-protected right. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). Congress wrote this text in the passive voice without identifying the subject of its prohibition (that is, the party who cannot engage in the unlawful interference). When ADA employment rights are at stake, then, does this provision allow plaintiffs with disabilities to sue any entity (even entities that are not their employers)? Our answer: No, a nearby subsection makes clear that the provision incorporates remedies that permit suits only against (as relevant here) employers. Id. § 12203(c).

Turning to the settled question, the civil-conspiracy provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1871 authorizes a damages suit when two or more parties “conspire” to “depriv[e]” “any person or class of persons” of “the equal protection of the laws” or the “equal privileges and immunities under the laws[.]” Id. § 1985(3). Does this provision permit a plaintiff to assert a conspiracy claim against an entity that is not the plaintiff’s employer for the deprivation of an ADA-protected employment right? Our answer: No, our precedent holds that disability discrimination does not fall within § 1985(3). See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550, 559 (6th Cir. 2000). These conclusions require us to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the hospital.

The Federal Tort Claims Act broadly waives sovereign immunity for tort claims against the United States, but also claws back that immunity in several instances by stating exceptions. We are called today to answer whether a federal employee’s use of false testimony and forged documents to secure an indictment from a state grand jury falls within one of those exceptions, the so-called discretionary-function exception. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2680(a). If so, the government would be entitled to sovereign immunity and a district court would not have subject-matter jurisdiction over such a claim. But because we hold that it does not, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. In this consolidated appeal, Defendants Rossen Iossifov and Dimitrious Brown challenge the district court’s judgments after they were convicted and sentenced on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO Act”) charges, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and, in Iossifov’s case, an additional charge for conspiring to launder money, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the Court AFFIRMS Defendant Iossifov’s convictions and sentence and AFFIRMS Defendant Brown’s sentence.