MURPHY, Circuit Judge. This case pits a party that potentially committed negligence (by sitting on its rights) against a party that potentially committed fraud (by making false statements to a court). An affiliate of Cambrian Holding Company held a lease to mine coal on land owned by Hazard Coal Corporation. During its bankruptcy, Cambrian proposed to sell its interest in the lease to American Resources Corporation. American Resources falsely warranted that it could obtain a mining permit. The bankruptcy court approved the lease assignment on this mistaken understanding. Hazard Coal learned later that American Resources could not lawfully mine coal. It has repeatedly tried to unwind this assignment ever since. The bankruptcy court has rebuffed every attempt. This appeal grows out of Hazard Coal’s challenge to the assignment in a separate suit. In response to that challenge, American Resources returned to Cambrian’s bankruptcy case and asked for a “declaration” that the court’s prior orders had already rejected Hazard Coal’s claims. The bankruptcy court issued this declaration clarifying its orders, and Hazard Coal asks us to review its declaration order on appeal. Although we find American Resources’ conduct troubling, we must evaluate the bankruptcy court’s order under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Given that court’s closer proximity to the events, we see no such abuse. We thus affirm.

The Great Writ of Habeas Corpus is an extraordinary remedy that “guard[s] against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). This case is the epitome of such an extreme judicial malfunction.

Petitioner Nathaniel Jackson was convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death. But Jackson’s sentencing proceeding was blatantly unconstitutional at its core due to the trial-court judge’s bias and misconduct, as well as his exclusion at sentencing of relevant mitigating evidence. The prejudicial judicial bias and misconduct included numerous ex parte communications between the judge and prosecutor regarding substantive sentencing issues and the ghost writing by the prosecutor of the judge’s opinion sentencing Jackson to death. In state court, when this unethical conduct came to light, the Ohio appellate courts publicly reprimanded the trial judge and ordered him to conduct new sentencing proceedings: the judge was to “personally review and evaluate the appropriateness of the death penalty” and “prepare an entirely new sentencing entry.”

On remand, Jackson moved to present three additional volumes of mitigating evidence. The trial judge denied the motion, and he orally resentenced Jackson based on the stale, ten-year-old mitigation record. A few hours after the resentencing hearing concluded, the judge issued a second opinion sentencing Jackson to death that was functionally identical to the original, corrupted opinion and contrary to the Ohio Court of Appeals’ specific instructions on remand. Nevertheless, the Ohio appellate courts affirmed Jackson’s sentence.

Jackson then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court granted Jackson’s petition on his claim that he was unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to present relevant mitigating evidence at his resentencing proceedings, but it denied Jackson’s other claims, including that the trial judge was unconstitutionally biased. The warden appeals the district court’s habeas grant, and Jackson cross appeals regarding his judicial-bias and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

We affirm the district court in part and reverse in part. We first hold that Ohio’s standard for assessing the potential for judicial bias is contrary to clearly established federal law as defined by the Supreme Court. And on de novo review, Jackson has demonstrated that the trial judge was unconstitutionally biased. Second, the Supreme Court has clearly established that when a trial court is determining whether to impose the death penalty, capital defendants have a right to present any and all relevant mitigating evidence supporting a sentence less than death, including at resentencing proceedings, and Ohio’s failure to provide Jackson that right violated the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus on Jackson’s mitigating-evidence claim, reverse the district court’s denial of Jackson’s habeas petition on his judicial-bias claim, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendants Berlin Township Board of Trustees and Berlin Township, Ohio (collectively, the “Township”) appeal the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining the Township from preventing Plaintiff TowerCo 2013, LLC’s (“TowerCo”) completion and deployment of a Verizon cell tower. TowerCo cross-appeals the district court’s order, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the Township did not violate certain sections of the Telecommunications Act (“TCA”), including 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), (iii). The district court’s injunction has been stayed by this Court, pending the resolution of this appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.