CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Sherryl Darby underwent a double mastectomy following diagnosis of the growth of abnormal pre-cancerous cells along with a genetic mutation that contributes to abnormal cell growth. Invoking the Americans with Disabilities Act and Ohio law, Darby alleges she was discriminated against when her employer terminated her employment upon learning of her condition. The district court dismissed her claims, concluding that Darby’s genetic mutation had not yet manifested into a disability cognizable under the ADA. Because Darby has plausibly alleged a condition covered by the ADA, we REVERSE.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Ervine Lee Davenport was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury trial in Michigan state court. He challenges his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he was visibly shackled at the waist, wrist, and ankles during trial. The State of Michigan admits Davenport’s shackling was unconstitutional but argues that the habeas petition should be denied because this error was harmless. The district court agreed it was harmless error and denied the petition. Because “shackling is ‘inherently prejudicial,’” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986)), and the evidence of premeditation and deliberation necessary to a first-degree murder conviction was not overwhelming, the State has not met its burden to show the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court, GRANT Davenport a conditional writ of habeas corpus, and REMAND the case for further proceedings.

COLE, Chief Judge. Robert Ware was convicted in 1997 of several federal drug offenses and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. In 2019, Ware moved for a sentence reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. The district court concluded that Ware was eligible for relief under the Act but denied Ware’s motion as a matter of discretion. Ware now appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by 1) insufficiently considering the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 2) putting undue weight on the legislative purpose of the First Step Act, and 3) inadequately considering that Ware’s statutory sentencing range would be lower under current law. We affirm.