PER CURIAM. Tennessee law permits many convicted felons to vote, but it prohibits many others from exercising the franchise. When processing registration forms submitted by felons, then, state election officials must distinguish applicants who are eligible from those who are not. To facilitate this review, these officials require some felon applicants to submit records with their registration forms to confirm their eligibility. In this suit, the Tennessee Conference of the NAACP alleged that this so-called “Documentation Policy” for felon applicants violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). A district court recently agreed and permanently enjoined the policy in the middle of the 2024 election cycle. Tennessee’s Secretary of State and Coordinator of Elections seek a stay of this injunction pending appeal.

We grant the stay for two reasons. First, the injunction triggers the Supreme Court’s “Purcell principle,” which instructs federal courts not to disrupt state election rules close to an election. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). And here, the district court issued its injunction less than a month before the looming July 2 registration deadline for an August election. Second, the NAACP likely did not present enough evidence to prove its standing to challenge the Documentation Policy. The NAACP claimed that the policy forced it to divert its resources to help those convicted of felonies track down the records that they need to register. But the conclusory declaration that the NAACP used to support this theory appears to lack the “specific facts” that the NAACP needed to show its entitlement to summary judgment on this standing question. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citation omitted).

BOGGS, Circuit Judge. This case arises from a 2016 catastrophic wildfire in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Eastern Tennessee that spread into the City of Gatlinburg and Sevier County, Tennessee, resulting in the destruction of over 2,500 structures and the death of 14 people. Appellant insurance companies paid claims to policy holders and then filed claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), against the National Park Service (NPS), alleging negligence for failure to follow multiple mandatory fire-management protocols in three major respects and for the failure to issue mandatory warnings to the public.

The government filed a motion, under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, on grounds that it was immune from suit under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The district court granted the motion on all three claims relating to fire-management protocols, but denied the motion on claims relating to the duty to warn. The insurance companies appealed, and the government cross-appealed.

. . .

For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the district court’s order granting the government’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellants’ incident-command claim. We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the fire-monitoring claim and the WFDSS claim as part of the discretionary fire-suppression decision-making process. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the government’s facial challenge to Plaintiffs-Appellants’ duty-to-warn claims, and REMAND these claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. In 1987, a Michigan state court sentenced seventeen-year-old Michael Kitchen to forty-two to sixty years in prison. Under Michigan law, Kitchen is not eligible for parole until he completes his minimum sentence. Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.234(1). This means he will not be considered for parole until he is nearly sixty. Kitchen brought a pro se § 1983 suit challenging the statute against Michigan’s governor, the Department of Corrections Director, and the chair of the Parole Board. He alleges that Michigan’s parole statute violates his Eighth Amendment rights because it effectively keeps him in prison for life without parole. Defendants’ chief response is that Kitchen’s case must be brought through habeas corpus, not § 1983. Or they argue that Kitchen’s sentence satisfies the Constitution because he is not serving a life sentence. The district court sided with Kitchen. But for the reasons laid out below, we disagree with the district court and REVERSE and REMAND.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. A confidential informant notified officers that Antwone Sanders was dealing drugs from a nearby apartment. The informant then engaged in two controlled drug buys with Sanders. On both occasions, officers observed Sanders drive from the buy location to the apartment in question. The officers detailed this information in an affidavit submitted to a judge and secured a warrant to search the apartment. The search unearthed contraband sufficient to support several federal gun and drug possession charges. Sanders moved to suppress the discovered items. When his motion was denied, Sanders pleaded guilty, preserving in part his right to appeal, which he then exercised.

Longstanding Fourth Amendment principles guide our review of the search warrant’s propriety. One, we examine the underlying officer affidavit with the understanding that demonstrating probable cause to justify a search does not require mathematical certainty. Two, we owe deference to the judge who found sufficient cause to issue the warrant. Viewing Sanders’s appeal in this way, we see no error in the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. Nor did the district court err by denying Sanders’s discovery requests. Accordingly, we affirm.