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ANDREA BYERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 19-1893
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
No. 5:18-cv-13570—Judith E. Levy, District Judge.
Argued: June 10, 2020
Decided and Filed: June 26, 2020
Before: MOORE, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Andrea Byers1 appeals the district court’s order enforcing multiple IRS third-party summonses seeking her records and dismissing her petitions to quash these summonses. An IRS agent, seeking Byers’s records in furtherance of an investigation into whether she is liable for internal revenue violations, served the summonses on four financial institutions. When Byers moved to quash these summonses, the government moved to dismiss Byers’s petitions and to enforce the summonses, and the district court ruled in the government’s favor in an oral decision. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.



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JUAN RAMON VALADEZ-LARA,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
   No. 19-4013
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;
No. A079-012-369.
Decided and Filed: June 26, 2020
Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. In 2003, 15-year-old Juan Ramon Valadez Bonilla came to the United States illegally. When Valadez did not appear at his removal hearing, an immigration judge ordered him removed in his absence. In 2019, after the government charged him with illegal reentry, Valadez sought to rescind his earlier removal order on the ground that he had not received notice of his hearing. The Board of Immigration Appeals found that Valadez failed to prove the lack of notice, relying on his long delay in seeking to rescind the removal order after he learned of it. Because the Board did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion, we must deny Valadez’s petition for review.



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AUDIO TECHNICA U.S., INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 19-3469
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
No. 5:16-cv-02052—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Argued: June 9, 2020
Decided and Filed: June 26, 2020
Before: CLAY, ROGERS, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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CLAY, Circuit Judge. In this tax refund suit, Audio Technica U.S., Inc. contends that it was entitled to a tax credit for increasing research and development activities under 26 U.S.C. § 41 (the “R&D tax credit”). The R&D tax credit is available when taxpayers increase certain research expenses over time, with the increase measured in part against research costs from the five-year period from 1984 through 1988, taken as a percentage of the company’s gross receipts during those years. 26 U.S.C. § 41(c)(3)(A). This number is called the fixed-base percentage. Id.

The government attempted to challenge Audio Technica’s preferred fixed-base percentage, but Audio Technica moved to bar the government from making any such argument to the jury. The district court agreed with Audio Technica, finding that because the government had entered into tax court settlements with Audio Technica for other tax years using that same fixed-base percentage, it was judicially estopped from now arguing that the percentage was incorrect. Because judicial estoppel is not triggered by such a settlement, we vacate the district court’s judgment, reverse the order granting Audio Technica’s motion in limine, and remand for a determination of Audio Technica’s fixed-base percentage.



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FLETCHER DARNELL SMALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OFFICER BROCK,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 19-1841
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:19-cv-00348—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: June 26, 2020
Before: GILMAN, GIBBONS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Fletcher Darnell Small, a Michigan prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Small alleges that, without provocation, Officer Brock brandished a knife, threatened to kill Small, and motioned in a manner suggesting how Brock would use the knife to kill Small. This occurred on several occasions, causing Small to seek “treatment and counseling” for “paranoia, mental distress, [and] psychological stress.” DE 1, Compl., PageID 3.

On initial screening, the district court determined that Small had failed to state a claim and dismissed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Small then asked the district court to alter or amend its judgment based on Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1986). The district court denied that motion.

We review de novo an order dismissing a complaint under § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (holding that the “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under [§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)]”). To state a claim under § 1983, a complaint must allege that persons acting under color of state law caused the deprivation of a federal statutory or constitutional right. Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2007).