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CRAIG WILSON, ERIC BELLAMY, KENDAL NELSON, and MAXIMINO NIEVES, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Petitioners-Appellees,
v.
MARK WILLIAMS, in his official capacity as Warden of Elkton Federal Correctional Institution; MICHAEL CARVAJAL, in his official capacity as the Federal Bureau of Prisons Director,
Respondents-Appellants.
   No. 20-3447
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.
No. 4:20-cv-00794—James S. Gwin, District Judge.
Argued: June 5, 2020
Decided and Filed: June 9, 2020
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and COOK, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioners, four inmates housed in the low-security Elkton Federal Correctional Institution and its satellite facility FSL Elkton (collectively “Elkton”), on behalf of themselves and others housed or to be housed there, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to obtain release from custody to limit their exposure to the COVID-19 virus. They sought to represent all current and future inmates, including a subclass of inmates who—through age and/or certain medical conditions—were particularly vulnerable to complications, including death, if they contracted COVID-19. The district court entered a preliminary injunction on April 22, 2020, directing Respondents Mark Williams, Elkton’s warden, and Michael Carvajal, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) (together “BOP”), to (1) evaluate each subclass member’s eligibility for transfer out of Elkton by any means, including compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or non-transfer furlough within two weeks; (2) transfer those deemed ineligible for compassionate release to another BOP facility where testing is available and physical distancing is possible; and (3) not allow those transferred to return to Elkton until certain conditions were met.

On appeal, the BOP argues that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and that the suit must comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”); (2) petitioners have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction.

We hold that jurisdiction was proper under § 2241, although § 2241 does not permit some of the relief petitioners seek. However, because the district court erred in concluding that petitioners have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment claim, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. We thus vacate the injunction.



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STEPHEN COOK, Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OHIO NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; OHIO NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION; OHIO NATIONAL EQUITIES, INC.; OHIO NATIONAL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-3984
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:19-cv-00195—Susan J. Dlott, District Judge.
Argued: May 5, 2020
Decided and Filed: June 9, 2020
Before: MERRITT, SUHRHEINRICH, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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MERRITT, Circuit Judge. The sole issue in this diversity action is whether plaintiff has standing under Ohio law to assert claims based on an alleged breach of contract when he is not a party to the contract. Plaintiff Stephen Cook sold variable annuities on behalf of defendants, referred to herein collectively as Ohio National, pursuant to a contract between Ohio National and a broker-dealer, Triad Advisors. Under the agreement, Ohio National paid commissions on the previously sold annuities to Triad, who in turn paid commissions to plaintiff pursuant to a separate agreement between plaintiff and Triad that is not at issue in this appeal. Triad is not a party to this suit. After Ohio National terminated its agreement with Triad, Ohio National refused to pay further commissions on annuities sold during the term of the agreement. In an attempt to recover the commissions, plaintiff sued Ohio National for breach of its agreement with Triad. Plaintiff contends that as a “third-party beneficiary” to the agreement between Ohio National and Triad, he has standing to bring suit. Ohio National disagreed, and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The merits of the underlying claim concerning the alleged breach by Ohio National are not before us in this appeal.

The district court found that, under Ohio law, plaintiff is not an “intended” third-party beneficiary of the agreement between Ohio National and Triad, and he therefore cannot maintain an action against Ohio National. The district court also found that plaintiff could not maintain an alternative claim of unjust enrichment claim against Ohio National. Accordingly, it granted Ohio National’s motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KELI DUNNICAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 19-3092
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:18-cr-00144-1—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: June 9, 2020
Before: SUTTON, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Keli Dunnican appeals a judgment of conviction for the charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (Count I); possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D) (Count II); and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count III). Dunnican argues that the district court plainly erred in allowing the government to introduce under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(14) certain data extracted from his cellular telephone. He also contends that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the government to introduce under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) certain text messages from his cellular telephone, allowing Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agent Shaun Moses to offer expert opinion testimony that the marijuana found in Dunnican’s car appeared to be packaged for distribution, denying Dunnican’s motion for judgment of acquittal, denying his motion for a new trial following the dismissal of a jury member, and imposing a 21-month upward variance on Dunnican’s sentence.

Because we find no error in the district court’s rejection of Dunnican’s Rule 902(14) argument, and we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings related to his other arguments, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment in full.