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IN RE: CAMILLE T. DAVIS,
Debtor.
___________________________________________

CAMILLE T. DAVIS,
Appellant,
v.
LAUREN A. HELBLING, Chapter 13 Trustee,
Appellee.
   No. 19-3117
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:17-bk-12965—Arthur I. Harris, Judge.
Argued: August 8, 2019
Decided and Filed: June 1, 2020
Before: CLAY, LARSEN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Camille Davis filed for bankruptcy. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code allows her to satisfy her unsecured debts by paying all of her “projected disposable income” to her unsecured creditors over a five-year period. Davis believes that the wages she contributes to her employer-sponsored retirement plan are not considered disposable income under the Code. The bankruptcy court disagreed. Because we conclude that the statutory text is best read to exclude voluntary retirement contributions from disposable income, we VACATE the bankruptcy court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
WALTER G. BOULDING,
Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
   Nos. 19-1590/1706
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:08-cr-00065-1—Robert J. Jonker, District Judge.
Argued: May 8, 2020
Decided and Filed: June 1, 2020
Before: MERRITT, GUY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. This First Step Act appeal raises two issues of first impression in the Sixth Circuit: (1) whether eligibility for resentencing under the Act turns on the statute of conviction as opposed to a defendant’s specific conduct, and (2) whether the process a district court must afford an eligible defendant includes an opportunity to present objections. Because the Act’s definition of a “covered offense” ties eligibility to the statute of conviction, we join all of our sister circuits that have reached the issue and hold that eligibility for resentencing under the First Step Act is a categorical inquiry governed by the statute of conviction. On resentencing process, we follow our recent cases holding that eligible defendants are not entitled to plenary resentencing, United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2019), but that a district court’s discretion to deny resentencing under the Act is not unfettered, United States v. Foreman, No. 19-1827, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 2204261, at *3 (6th Cir. May 7, 2020); United States v. Smith, No. 19-5281, --- F.3d ---, 2020 WL 2503261, at *2 (6th Cir. May 15, 2020). Because an eligible defendant is entitled to an accurate amended guideline calculation and renewed consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, a defendant seeking to raise objections must be afforded an opportunity to do so. We AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that Boulding is eligible for resentencing under the Act, VACATE the sentence imposed, and REMAND for resentencing.