JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Roy Christopher West is serving a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a conviction that the district judge who oversaw his prosecution has now attributed to a sentencing error. In the district court’s words, “Errors on the part of competent people – prosecutors, defense counsel, probation officers and, ultimately, this judge at the time of sentencing – resulted in the imposition of a sentence in violation of the law on West. Even skilled appellate counsel failed to raise the sentencing error.” United States v. West, No. 06-20185, 2022 WL 16743864, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2022), rev’d and remanded, 70 F.4th 341 (6th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-5698, 2024 WL 759833 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2024). The consequence is that West “is in year 17 of a life without parole sentence” when the “indictment and case submitted to the jury should have netted West not more than ten years in prison.” Id.

. . .

For these reasons, the district court’s order construing West’s motion as a second or successive § 2255 motion is VACATED and the motion is REMANDED to the district court to consider under Rule 60(b).

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Police officers shot and killed John H. Crawford, III inside an Ohio Wal-Mart store. The incident prompted Crawford’s estate to sue the retailer under several theories, including wrongful death. The district court granted Wal-Mart summary judgment on the wrongful death count, but denied the company summary judgment as to the others. The district court then certified its dismissal of the wrongful death cause of action for immediate appellate review under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Concluding that certification was improper, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Higuchi International Corporation and Higuchi Manufacturing Mexico S. de R.L. de C.V. (collectively, “Higuchi”) appeal the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to Defendant Autoliv ASP, Inc. (“Autoliv”). Higuchi, an automotive parts supplier, brought this declaratory judgment action against Autoliv, seeking a declaration that it was not obligated to supply automotive parts to Autoliv because the parties lacked an enforceable requirements contract. Autoliv thereafter filed a breach of contract counterclaim and moved for a preliminary injunction to direct Higuchi to supply automotive parts pending the resolution of the parties’ suit. The district court granted Autoliv’s motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court’s order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. To get a proposed constitutional amendment on the Ohio ballot, petitioners must submit their amendment, a summary of their amendment, and one thousand qualified supporting signatures to the Ohio Attorney General. The Ohio Attorney General must then determine if the summary is a fair and truthful statement of the proposed amendment and, if so, certify the summary. Only once the Attorney General certifies the summary may petitioners begin collecting the approximately 400,000 signatures necessary to put the proposed amendment on the ballot.

Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) are Ohio voters who, together, seek to amend the Ohio Constitution through a ballot initiative. Pursuant to Ohio law, Plaintiffs drafted their amendment and summary, collected their one thousand qualified supporting signatures, and filed it with the Ohio Attorney General, David Yost. On at least six occasions, Yost declined to certify Plaintiffs’ summary. After Yost’s most recent decision denying certification, Plaintiffs turned to the Supreme Court of Ohio for review. When the state supreme court declined to grant expedited review, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court seeking injunctive relief. In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Yost’s enforcement of Ohio Revised Code § 3519.01 functions as an unconstitutional obstacle to their ballot access and their ability to speak about and advocate for their proposed amendment as they wish, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. For the reasons that follow, we REVERSE the district court’s order and GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. We also DENY as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal.