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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TRE RESHAWN TATE,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 20-5071
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 3:19-cr-00026-1—Thomas A. Varlan, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 28, 2021
Before: CLAY, READLER, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. For the crime of bank robbery, the Sentencing Guidelines establish a tiered structure of sentencing enhancements based upon how an individual effectuates the robbery. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2). When a defendant discharges a firearm while robbing a bank, the Guidelines prescribe a seven-level increase to his base offense level. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A). Less serious conduct results in a smaller boost to one’s offense level. For instance, a defendant who merely brandishes or possesses (but does not discharge) a firearm receives an increase of five offense levels. See id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C).

Near the lower end of this sentencing hierarchy is the setting in which a defendant brandishes or possesses a “dangerous weapon” while committing a robbery. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). Doing so subjects the defendant to a three-level increase to his base offense level. Id. Tre Reshawn Tate received this three-level enhancement for concealing his hand in a bag to suggest the existence of a dangerous weapon while robbing a bank. Given the text and context of § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E), the district court correctly included the enhancement in Tate’s sentence. We thus affirm.



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LATANYA L. WYATT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 20-5021
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:17-cv-01545—Eli J. Richardson, District Judge.
Argued: December 4, 2020
Decided and Filed: May 28, 2021
Before: MOORE, COOK, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff LaTanya Wyatt, a Project Manager in Defendant Nissan’s Information Systems Application Department (“IS Department”), appeals the district court’s grant of Nissan’s motion for summary judgment as to Wyatt’s various employment discrimination and retaliation claims, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Wyatt argues that she has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Nissan subjected Wyatt to a hostile work environment due to unabated sexual harassment from a senior manager, discriminated against Wyatt because of her disabilities, and retaliated against Wyatt after she engaged in protected activity. The district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to Wyatt, leading it to conclude erroneously that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to Wyatt’s hostile-work-environment claim brought under Title VII and retaliation claims brought under Title VII, the ADA, and the FMLA. Therefore, for the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nissan with respect to Wyatt’s discrimination claim under the ADA and Wyatt’s retaliation claims, insofar as they are based on retaliatory harassment. We REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nissan with respect to Wyatt’s hostile-work-environment claim and Wyatt’s retaliation claims based on adverse employment actions and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.



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FREDDIE GARLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ORLANS, PC; LINDA M. ORLANS; ALISON ORLANS,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 20-1527
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:18-cv-11561—Denise Page Hood, Chief District Judge.
Argued: March 10, 2021
Decided and Filed: May 28, 2021
Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Orlans, PC, a law firm acting on behalf of Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc., sent a letter on law-firm letterhead to Freddie and Linda Garland. The letter said Wells Fargo had referred the Garlands’ loan to Orlans for foreclosure. But the letter also said that “[w]hile the foreclosure process ha[d] begun,” “foreclosure prevention alternatives” might still be available if the Garlands reached out to Wells Fargo. (R. 1, Letter, PageID 28.) It informed the Garlands that Wells Fargo might have already sent a letter about possible alternatives, and it explained how the Garlands could contact Wells Fargo “to attempt to be reviewed for possible alternatives to foreclosure.” (Id.) The letter’s signature was typed and said, “Orlans PC.” (Id.)

Freddie Garland says that the letter confused him because he was unsure if it was from an attorney. And he says that the letter “raised [his] anxiety” by suggesting “that an attorney may have conducted an independent investigation and substantive legal review of the circumstances of his account, such that his prospects for avoiding foreclosure were diminished.” (R. 1, Complaint, PageID 9.)

Garland alleges that Orlans sent a form of this letter to tens of thousands of homeowners and that it did so without having any attorney provide a meaningful review of the homeowners’ foreclosure files, so the communications deceptively implied they were from an attorney. Both the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Michigan’s Regulation of Collections Practices Act (RCPA) prohibit misleading debt-collection communications that falsely represent or imply they are from an attorney. Garland brought class-action claims under both acts against Orlans and its principals.1

The district court dismissed Garland’s FDCPA claim and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his RCPA claim. We AFFIRM, but on grounds that differ from those articulated by the district court. Simply put, Garland lacks standing to assert either of his claims, so we lack jurisdiction.



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PATRICK BAKER,
Plaintiff,

JAMES BUZZIE; CHRIS VLK; RICHARD J. SAWHILL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
IRON WORKERS LOCAL 25 VACATION PAY FUND, et al.,
Defendants,

MICHAEL RANDICK; DENNIS AGUIRRE; WAYNE COFFELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 20-1946
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:19-cv-12963—Terrence George Berg, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 28, 2021
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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SUTTON, Chief Judge. Several construction companies and one union established a trust fund to subsidize employee vacations. Six trustees oversaw the fund. A disagreement arose over whether the trust needed to amend one of its tax returns. Three of the trustees (the ones selected by the companies) filed a lawsuit in federal district court, seeking to obtain authority to amend the tax return. The three union-appointed trustees intervened, arguing that the dispute belongs in arbitration. The court agreed and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.