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UNIVERSAL LIFE CHURCH MONASTERY STOREHOUSE, a Washington
non-profit corporation; ERIN PATTERSON and GABRIEL BISER,
individuals,
Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants,
Plaintiffs-Appellants (21-5100),
v.
WAYNE NABORS, in his official capacity as County Clerk of Putnam
County, Tennessee (21-5059/5100); LISA DUKE CROWELL, in her
official capacity as County Clerk of Rutherford County, Tennessee
(21-5057/5100); WILLIAM F. KNOWLES, in his official capacity as
County Clerk of Hamilton County, Tennessee (21-5058/5100); ELAINE
ANDERSON, in her official capacity as County Clerk of Williamson
County, Tennessee (21-5055/5100); HERBERT H. SLATERY III, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Tennessee,
JENNINGS H. JONES, in his official capacity as District Attorney General
of Rutherford County, Tennessee, NEAL PINKSTON, in his official
capacity as District Attorney General of Hamilton County, Tennessee,
BRYANT C. DUNAWAY, in his official capacity as District Attorney
General of Putnam County, Tennessee, and KIM R. HELPER, in her
official capacity as District Attorney General of Williamson County,
Tennessee (21-5048/5100),
Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
BILL LEE, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of
Tennessee,
Defendant-Appellee (21-5100). |
Nos. 21-5048
/5055 /5057 /5058
/5059 /5100 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Cookeville.
No. 2:19-cv-00049—Waverly D. Crenshaw Jr., District Judge.
Argued: December 9, 2021
Decided and Filed: May 27, 2022
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; STRANCH and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Universal Life Church Monastery (“ULC”) permits
anyone who feels so called to become ordained as a minister—over the Internet, free of charge,
and in a matter of minutes. Should the newly minted minister wish to solemnize a marriage in
Tennessee, however, she will encounter a problem. Tennessee law permits only those “regular”
ministers—ministers whose ordination occurred “by a considered, deliberate, and responsible
act”—“to solemnize the rite of matrimony.” Tenn. Code Ann. (“TCA”) § 36-3-301(a)(1)–(2).
And since 2019, the law has explicitly clarified that “[p]ersons receiving online ordinations may
not solemnize the rite.” Id. § 36-3-301(a)(2).
Asserting that those restrictions violate the federal and Tennessee constitutions, ULC and
various of its members sued several Tennessee officials to pursue an injunction and declaratory
judgment. Yet the officials contend that they have sovereign immunity from suit and that, in any
event, plaintiffs lack standing to sue. The district court rejected those contentions by and large,
entering a preliminary injunction against several defendants. We are now asked to take up the
same questions and reverse the district court. And, indeed, we hold that many of plaintiffs’
claims must be dismissed for lack of standing. But we also hold that as to the remaining claims
presenting a live case or controversy, the district court properly denied sovereign immunity. We
will thus remand a narrow portion of plaintiffs’ suit for further proceedings below.
. . .
Recognizing the procedural complexity of this dispute, we will take a moment in closing
to summarize today’s decision. No plaintiff has standing to seek relief against Governor Lee,
Attorney General Slatery, District Attorney General Helper, or County Clerks Crowell,
Anderson, and Knowles. We thus AFFIRM the district court as to its dismissal of Governor Lee
but REVERSE as to Attorney General Slatery, District Attorney General Helper, and County
Clerks Crowell, Anderson, and Knowles. As a result, those portions of the district court’s
preliminary injunction that purport to bind Slatery, Helper, Crowell, Anderson, and Knowles are
VACATED. By contrast, however, we AFFIRM the district court’s determination that
plaintiffs have standing to sue District Attorneys General Dunaway, Pinkston, and Jones, along
with County Clerk Nabors. We also AFFIRM the district court’s denial of these officials’
sovereign immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage, and so we do not disturb those portions of
the preliminary injunction binding Dunaway, Pinkston, Jones, and Nabors. Last, we REMAND
what remains of this suit to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
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