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XAVIER DEMETRIUS PORTER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
   No. 18-5091
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
Nos. 3:13-cr-00164-1; 3:16-cv-00813—Thomas B. Russell, District Judge.
Argued: May 8, 2020
Decided and Filed: May 20, 2020
Before: SILER, GIBBONS, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Xavier Porter has committed more than a few armed robberies during his lifetime. He now argues that those robberies don’t qualify as “violent felonies” or “crimes of violence” under federal law. The district court rejected his arguments. We affirm.



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DANNY HILL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CARL ANDERSON, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.
   Nos. 99-4317/14-3718
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown;
No. 4:96-cv-00795—Paul R. Matia, District Judge.
Reargued: December 5, 2019
Decided and Filed: May 20, 2020
Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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PER CURIAM. Danny Hill asserts in his habeas petition that the State of Ohio may not execute him because he is intellectually disabled. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Atkins, the case that bars the execution of intellectually disabled defendants, was decided and made retroactive after Hill was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Prior to Atkins, Hill had raised his intellectual disability as a mitigating factor in the penalty phase of his trial. See State v. Hill, Nos. 3720, 3745, 1989 WL 142761 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1989). Three psychological experts testified in that proceeding that Hill was intellectually disabled. The Ohio courts agreed, stating that Hill “suffers from some mental retardation” and is “mildly to moderately retarded.” See id. at *6; State v. Hill, 595 N.E.2d 884, 901 (Ohio 1992) (discussing the experts’ testimony). But ultimately, Hill was sentenced to death because all that his intellectual disability counted for at the time was a point in his favor in the sentencing calculation—not a bar to his execution. See Hill, 1989 WL 142761, at *4. When Atkins came down, our court issued a remand order directing the Ohio courts to formally assess Hill’s intellectual functioning under Atkins. Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 682 (6th Cir. 2002). Even though “Ohio courts reviewing his case have concluded that Danny Hill is retarded, and voluminous expert testimony supported this conclusion,” we issued a remand because Hill’s Atkins claim “ha[d] not been exhausted or conceded.” Id. (citations omitted). This time around, the Ohio courts decided that Hill was not intellectually disabled. See State v. Hill, 894 N.E.2d 108, 127 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).

We hold that Hill is intellectually disabled and that he cannot be sentenced to death. No person looking at this record could reasonably deny that Hill is intellectually disabled under Atkins. In holding otherwise, the Ohio courts avoided giving serious consideration to past evidence of Hill’s intellectual disability. Doing so amounted to an unreasonable determination of the facts and an unreasonable application of even the general Atkins standard. Accordingly, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case with instructions to grant the petition and to issue the writ of habeas corpus with respect to Hill’s death sentence.

In addition to his Atkins claim, Hill raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that attacks his trial counsel’s performance during his state Atkins hearing, a Miranda claim arguing that certain statements should have been suppressed during his trial, a prosecutorial-misconduct claim, and a due-process claim arguing that Hill was not competent to stand trial at the time of his convictions. For the reasons set forth below, and as explained in our prior opinion, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying Hill’s habeas petition with regard to the latter three claims, and pretermit the ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding Atkins because we are granting relief on the merits of the Atkins claim.