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MARIO BANUELOS-JIMENEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent. |
No. 22-3331 |
On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals;
No. A 200 684 221.
Decided and Filed: May 10, 2023
Before: GILMAN, McKEAGUE, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
Petitioner Mario Banuelos-Jimenez petitions for review of the Immigration Judge’s and
Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA’s) decisions denying cancellation of removal. The
immigration judge concluded, and the BIA affirmed, that his state conviction for third-degree
assault on a family member was a crime of violence and, therefore, he was statutorily ineligible
for cancellation of removal. We agree and deny the petition for review. |
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JAMES KNIGHT; JASON MAYES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE &
DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE,
Defendant-Appellee. |
No. 21-6179 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:20-cv-00922—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: July 21, 2022
Decided and Filed: May 10, 2023
Before: BATCHELDER, WHITE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson
County (“Nashville”) passed a “sidewalk ordinance” that imposes sidewalk-related conditions on
landowners who seek building permits. To obtain a permit, owners must grant an easement
across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that
Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere. This ordinance implicates a question about the
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause that has divided state courts. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v.
City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).
In particular, the parties here disagree over the “test” that we should use to judge whether
the sidewalk ordinance commits a taking. The landowner plaintiffs ask us to apply the
“unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted to assess conditions on
building permits in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nashville
responds that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that
zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative
conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions,
Nashville says, we should turn to the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess
zoning restrictions in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
We side with the landowner plaintiffs. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text,
history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative
conditions. Nollan’s test thus should apply to both types, including those imposed by the
sidewalk ordinance. Because the district court reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse its
grant of summary judgment to Nashville and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. |
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