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IN RE: AARON K. HILL,
Debtor.
___________________________________________

CMCO MORTGAGE, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AARON K. HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 19-5861
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
3:16-cv-00246—Claria Horn Boom, District Judge.
Nos. 3:14-bk-33623; 3:15-ap-03001—Alan C. Stout, Judge;
Argued: March 12, 2020
Decided and Filed: May 4, 2020
Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Aaron Hill, whether on his own accord or due to poor legal advice, decided not to attend a state court damages trial after being admonished by the state court judge that, if he failed to appear, “adverse things [were] likely [to] happen.” The judge was right. The court entered a final judgment against Hill in the amount of $3,417,477 and a finding that Hill’s actions “caused a willful and malicious injury.” Hill now seeks relief from the bankruptcy court’s holding that the debt is nondischargeable in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding because he is collaterally estopped from contending that the debt was not the result of “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court was correct to find that the state court damages judgment provides preclusive effect to the determination of the nondischargeability of Hill’s debt. We AFFIRM.



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ISAAC DONALD EVERLY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PATRICE Y. EVERLY; PHILLIP J. EVERLY; CHRISTOPHER EVERLY; PHILLIP EVERLY FAMILY TRUST; EVERLY AND SONS MUSIC, (BMI),
Defendants-Appellants.
   No. 19-5150
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:17-cv-01440—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: October 23, 2019
Decided and Filed: May 4, 2020
Before: GUY, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. The Everly Brothers are one of the most famous duos in popular American music history. When Dick Clark introduced them to sing Cathy’s Clown on his American Bandstand television show, he said the song “has a sound all its own”—one he called a “little unusual, [a] little strange, but very, very successful, and it’s done in the inimitable style of the fellas who have done so many other hits.” This dispute over the authorship of Cathy’s Clown is likewise a little unusual and a little strange. And, as we discuss, it is the jury’s obligation to sort it all out.

Each side to this appeal—Don Everly, on the one hand, and the successors-in-interest of his brother, the late Phil Everly, on the other—claims to have a copyright interest in Cathy’s Clown. Don maintains he authored the song by himself, but Phil’s successors contend the brothers wrote it together. Don sued Phil’s successors, seeking a declaration that Don was the sole author, while Phil’s successors counterclaimed for declaratory relief that both brothers were authors. The district court granted summary judgment to Don, finding that the claim of Phil’s co-authorship was barred by the statute of limitations because Don expressly repudiated Phil’s co-authorship, and thus triggered the statute of limitations, no later than 2011. Because there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether Don made such an express repudiation, we REVERSE.



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TODD A. BATES; MARCIA C. BATES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GREEN FARMS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION; THE HIGHLANDER GROUP MMC, INC.; MAKOWER ABBATE GUERRA WEGNER VOLLMER, PLLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-2127
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:18-cv-13533—Avern Cohn, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 4, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act regulates “debt collectors.” The Act defines “debt collector” generally to cover parties who operate a “business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts” or who “regularly collect[] or attempt[] to collect” debts owed another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). But the Act adds a separate debt-collector definition “[f]or the purpose of section 1692f(6),” a subsection regulating the repossession of property. Id. This separate definition also covers parties who operate a “business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” Id. The distinction between these two definitions matters greatly: General debt collectors must comply with all of the Act’s protections; security-interest enforcers need only comply with § 1692f(6). The Supreme Court recently held that parties who assist creditors with the nonjudicial foreclosure of a home fall within the separate definition, not the general one. Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP, 139 S. Ct. 1029, 1038 (2019). Yet Obduskey left open the possibility that these parties might engage in “other conduct” that would transform them from securityinterest enforcers into general debt collectors (and subject them to all of the Act’s regulations). Id. at 1040.

In this case, Todd and Marcia Bates lost their condominium through a nonjudicial foreclosure after they fell behind on their condo-association dues. During the foreclosure process, the Bateses claim, the condo complex’s management company and its law firm violated various provisions of the Act. But the Bateses do not assert a violation of § 1692f(6), so their complaint needed to allege that the law firm and condo management company acted as general debt collectors, not security-interest enforcers, in the course of this foreclosure. We consider on appeal whether the complaint has identified enough “other conduct” to trigger Obduskey’s reservation and potentially transform these defendants into general debt collectors. Id. The district court thought not and granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. We affirm.



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JACOB ANDREWS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Angela White, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 19-1992
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:17-cv-11684—Paul D. Borman, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 4, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
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In Gray v. City of Detroit, we observed that “[s]uicide is a difficult event to predict and prevent and often occurs without warning.” 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005). That is the sad reality in this case. Angela White overdosed on blood pressure medication while a pretrial detainee at Defendant-Appellee Wayne County’s Jail (“County” or “Jail”) and died. White had been permitted to keep 45 pills on her person pursuant to Wayne County Jail’s “Keep on Person” (“KOP”) program, which allows inmates to keep with them certain drugs for self-administration. In this § 1983 action White’s former fiancé, Jacob Andrews, alleges that the Jail’s KOP policy and inmate intake policy violate the constitutional rights of inmates and pretrial detainees like White who are emotionally unstable and potentially suicidal. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, holding that the facts did not establish municipal liability or deliberate indifference toward White. This appeal follows.

. . .

For these reasons, as well as those articulated in its detailed opinion, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court



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MARYVILLE BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.; DR. JACK ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ANDY BESHEAR, in his official capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 20-5427
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:20-cv-00278—David J. Hale, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 2, 2020
Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.


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ORDER
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PER CURIAM. Maryville Baptist Church and its pastor, Dr. Jack Roberts, appeal the district court’s order denying their emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. The Church claims that the district court’s order effectively denied their motion for a preliminary injunction to stop Governor Andy Beshear and other Commonwealth officials from enforcing and applying two COVID-19 orders. The orders, according to the Church, prohibit its members from gathering for drive-in and in-person worship services regardless of whether they meet or exceed the social distancing and hygiene guidelines in place for permitted commercial and other non-religious activities. The Church moves for an injunction pending appeal, which the Attorney General supports as amicus curiae. The Governor opposes the motion.

. . .

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction pending appeal, and their motion to expedite briefing, oral argument and submission on the briefs, is GRANTED IN PART. The Governor and all other Commonwealth officials are hereby enjoined, during the pendency of this appeal, from enforcing orders prohibiting drive-in services at the Maryville Baptist Church if the Church, its ministers, and its congregants adhere to the public health requirements mandated for “life-sustaining” entities.