MURPHY, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, we must address how Article III’s “standing” requirements apply to class-action lawsuits. In individual litigation, a plaintiff lacks standing to sue a defendant if the plaintiff’s injuries are not “fairly traceable” to that defendant. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (citation omitted). Yet some courts have relied on the “juridical link” doctrine to jettison this standing element in the class setting. See, e.g., Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2002). According to these courts, that doctrine allows a named plaintiff in a putative class action to sue defendants who have not injured the plaintiff if these defendants have injured absent class members.

This case shows how the doctrine is supposed to work. When a Michigan county forecloses on a property because its owner has failed to pay property taxes, Michigan law permits the county to obtain ownership of the property outright—even if its value exceeds the taxes owed. That fate befell Thomas Fox. After he racked up some $3,000 in unpaid taxes, Gratiot County took his land. He valued the property at over $50,000, and the county treasurer sold it for over $25,000. But Fox did not see any of the surplus. We have held that similar conduct amounted to an unconstitutional “taking.” Hall v. Meisner, 51 F.4th 185, 187–88 (6th Cir. 2022). Fox thus filed a class action against Gratiot County on behalf of himself and similar landowners. But Fox did not stop there. He also sued 26 other counties that did not injure him, arguing that they engaged in the same conduct against other delinquent taxpayers. The district court certified a class, holding that Fox had standing to sue these other counties under the juridical link doctrine.

We cannot agree. This oddly named doctrine conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent holding that a class-action request “adds nothing to the question of standing[.]” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976). And Fox lacks standing to sue the 26 other counties under normal rules. Nor has he justified the doctrine with historical evidence. Although the English Court of Chancery permitted parties to file class-like “bills of peace,” Fox cites no case in which a plaintiff pursued litigation on behalf of absent parties against a defendant Nos. 22-1265/1272 Fox v. Saginaw County, Mich., et al. Page 3 who had not harmed the plaintiff. The juridical link doctrine instead originates from dicta in a 1973 case that expressed a desire for the “expeditious” resolution of disputes. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973). But expediency concerns cannot supplant Article III’s separation-of-powers protections. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704–05 (2013). We thus vacate the certified class and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.