DAVIS, Circuit Judge. After serving seventeen years in prison for murder, Plaintiff Hattie Tanner gained her freedom when this court granted her habeas relief and set aside her conviction, finding that it lacked sufficient evidentiary support. Once released from custody, Tanner filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant David Walters, a since-retired police detective who she says violated her constitutional rights by falsifying investigation reports and testifying falsely to obtain her wrongful conviction. Walters moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the district court found that Tanner’s claims for fabrication of evidence and malicious prosecution should proceed to trial. Walters now appeals the district court’s partial denial of his motion. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Deputy Andrew Young and Officer Andrew Teichow arrested Kamel Chaney-Snell during a search of his girlfriend’s house. Chaney-Snell pleaded guilty to attempting to resist their arrest. But he now claims that, after he peacefully surrendered, Young punched him in the face and one of the officers kneed him in the back and dragged him across the floor. Chaney-Snell sued Young and Teichow under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims. The district court denied qualified immunity to both officers.

Their appeals raise three questions. Question One: Must we accept Chaney-Snell’s claim that Young gratuitously punched him despite Chaney-Snell’s guilty plea for attempting to resist arrest? Young answers “no” on the ground that Chaney-Snell’s claim conflicts with his conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994). At the least, Young argues, judicial estoppel bars Chaney-Snell’s claim because it also conflicts with his admissions at his plea hearing. But we lack jurisdiction over Young’s Heck claim, and his judicial-estoppel claim fails on the merits.

Question Two: Does the Fourth Amendment allow officers to use unnecessary force on arrestees if the force qualifies as “de minimis”? Young and Teichow concede that, under Chaney-Snell’s allegations, one of them gratuitously kneed him in the back and dragged him on the floor. They nevertheless argue that this force falls below the minimum level required for an excessive-force claim. But our cases have long held that gratuitous force violates the Fourth Amendment even if the force is minor and causes no serious injury. And these cases comport with the common-law backdrop against which the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted.

Question Three: Has Chaney-Snell established a “failure to intervene” theory of liability? Chaney-Snell seeks to hold the officer who did not employ the challenged force liable for failing to prevent it. Even under his allegations, however, this officer did not have a realistic opportunity to stop each of the quick and discrete actions. And while the district court decided to treat all of the actions as a single continuous use of force, our caselaw does not clearly establish that decision. Qualified immunity thus protects the officers from Chaney-Snell’s failure-to-intervene claims.

All told, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction.