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EVAN ALEXANDER JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RAMIAH JEFFERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 20-2239






     No. 21-1617
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
Nos. 2:14-cr-20119; 2:19-cv-11270 (Johnson)—Nancy G. Edmunds, District Judge.
Argued: March 9, 2023
Decided and Filed: April 4, 2023
Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. In this consolidated appeal, two gangsters convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, challenge their convictions and sentences, raising an unprecedented legal theory—that district courts must apply the “categorical approach” to determine whether a state-law-based crime qualifies as a predicate for “racketeering activity” under § 1961(1)(A). Specifically, they contend that because Michigan’s robbery statute is categorically broader than generic robbery, the jury’s special verdict that found robbery as a predicate racketeering activity did not establish generic robbery, so it cannot satisfy § 1961(1)(A), and therefore their § 1962(d) convictions and § 1963(a) enhanced sentences are invalid. We hold that the categorial approach does not apply to § 1961(1)(A) and affirm.



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COTY LEWIS, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ACUITY REAL ESTATE SERVICES, LLC; KEVIN STUTEVILLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 22-1406
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City.
No. 1:21-cv-12319—Thomas L. Ludington, District Judge.
Argued: December 8, 2022
Decided and Filed: April 4, 2023
Before: MOORE, STRANCH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Acuity Real Estate Services operates a website that connects people looking to buy or sell homes with a local real-estate agent in their area. Acuity offers its services for free to home buyers and sellers but requires realtors to pay a fee for referrals. The real-estate broker that employed Coty Lewis, a real-estate agent, signed up to receive Acuity’s referrals. The broker required its agents (including Lewis) to pay Acuity’s fee out of their commissions from home sales. In this suit, Lewis alleges that Acuity makes false claims to home buyers and sellers on its website and that this false advertising violates the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). But the Lanham Act provides a cause of action only for businesses that suffer commercial injuries (such as lost product sales) from the challenged false advertising. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131–32 (2014). The Act does not provide a cause of action for customers who suffer consumer injuries (such as the cost of a defective product) from the false advertising. See id. And here, Lewis alleges this type of consumer harm as his injury from Acuity’s allegedly false advertising: He seeks to recover the referral fee (that is, the price) he paid for Acuity’s services. Because Lewis may not bring this claim under the Lanham Act, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his complaint.