JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Dwan and Aaron Bray (collectively, “plaintiffs”) brought this medical malpractice suit in state court individually and on behalf of their minor child, N.B., against Dr. Timothy J. Thress and various medical entities and actors (collectively, “defendants”). Plaintiffs sought damages stemming from defendants’ negligence as to Dwan Bray’s pre-natal care and subsequent birth of baby N.B. But unbeknownst to plaintiffs, Thress was employed by a federally funded health center during his treatment of Bray. In line with the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”), 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)–(n), Thress removed the suit to federal court and the United States substituted itself for Thress, requiring plaintiffs to bring their claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).

The government then moved for dismissal, arguing that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. Plaintiffs, in turn, moved first to remand the action to state court, arguing that the FSHCAA did not apply, and later to amend their complaint to demonstrate compliance with the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement. The district court denied both of plaintiffs’ motions, finding the FSHCAA applicable and any attempt to amend plaintiffs’ complaint futile. Accordingly, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ FTCA claim without prejudice and remanded plaintiffs’ claims against the remaining defendants to state court. Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to remand and its dismissal of their FTCA claim. Because the district court was correct in both respects, we affirm.