PER CURIAM. John W. Franklin, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, moves for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h). The government supports Franklin’s motion.

. . .

Accordingly, we GRANT Franklin’s motion for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and TRANSFER the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for further proceedings.

SILER, Circuit Judge. When Joseph and Melissa Siefert’s child started experiencing suicidal thoughts, anxiety, and depression, they sought help. After first trying medication, they took their teenage child—known here as “Minor Siefert”—to Children’s Hospital just outside of Cincinnati. Eventually, Minor Siefert ended up at a Children’s psychiatry facility, and after about a week, the Sieferts’ insurance company determined that Minor Siefert had no medical problems, so it denied further coverage.

Coverage terminated, the Sieferts decided to bring their child home. But they ran into a problem: doctors and social workers had none of it. Over the next four weeks, the Sieferts wrangled with the hospital and county about getting their child back. Only after the Sieferts signed a voluntary safety plan did the child leave the facility. The Sieferts sued the county and its employees, as well as the hospital and its doctors, alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s procedural and substantive components. The district court dismissed the hospital defendants because they were not state actors, and it dismissed the county defendants because it said the Sieferts failed to overcome qualified immunity.

But “[e]ven a temporary deprivation of physical custody requires a hearing within a reasonable time.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dept. of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007). And at litigation’s starting line, the Sieferts only had to plausibly allege a due process violation and that the hospital may be considered a state actor for purposes of this litigation. Today we decide only these narrow questions, and we side with the Sieferts on some and the defendants on others. Whether Defendants ultimately prevail on all claims—at summary judgment or at trial— is best left for another day. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Hennis Care Centre of Bolivar, Inc., MEGCO Management, Inc., and Hennis Care Centre of Dover, Inc. (collectively, “Hennis”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of Wellfount Corporation’s action. Wellfount filed its complaint in district court after first withdrawing an earlier suit involving the same claims in Indiana state court. Upon hearing from Hennis that the new complaint was likely filed in the wrong forum, Wellfount moved the district court for an order dismissing its action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Hennis, which had yet to file an answer, responded with its own motion asking the court to convert Wellfount’s motion into a notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1). The district court denied Hennis’s motion and granted Wellfount’s motion. On appeal, Hennis argues that, because Wellfount was eligible to file a self-effectuating notice of dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) and had previously withdrawn an action based on the same claims, the court was without discretion to dismiss Wellfount’s action under Rule 41(a)(2). We disagree and affirm.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. There is no dispute that Ohio is generous when it comes to absentee voting—especially when compared to other states. Any registered voter may cast their vote by absentee ballot, for any reason or no reason at all, starting about a month before election day. But there are limits. The State requires almost all registered voters to request an absentee ballot by noon, three days before Election Day. The lone exception is for unexpectedly hospitalized electors. Those electors may request an absentee ballot until 3 p.m. on Election Day.

Here, police arrested Plaintiffs Tommy Ray Mays, II and Quinton Nelson Sr. the weekend before Election Day 2018. Foreseeing their confinement lasting through the upcoming election, and with no other way to vote, they sued Ohio’s Secretary of State for access to absentee ballots. They brought this suit on behalf of themselves and a class of similar individuals. The suit alleges an Equal Protection claim, challenging the State’s disparate treatment of hospital-confined and jail-confined electors, and a First Amendment claim, challenging Ohio’s absentee ballot request deadline, both as applied to unexpectedly jailconfined electors. The trial court granted both plaintiffs a temporary restraining order that permitted them to vote in November 2018. But the court declined to extend that relief to the class.

Following the November 2018 election, Plaintiffs requested class certification and both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court certified the class and granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs and those similarly situated, holding that the burden Ohio’s disparate treatment of hospital-confined and jail-confined electors places on Plaintiffs’ right to vote is not justified by a strong enough State interest. We disagree and now REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs, REVERSE the district court’s denial of summary judgment to LaRose, and REVERSE the district court’s certification of a class.