MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Often described as an immigration “death sentence,” a finding that an immigrant “knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum” renders the immigrant “permanently ineligible for any benefits under” our immigration laws. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6); see, e.g., Yousif v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2015). Yet Congress understandably refused to impose this serious penalty on asylum seekers who file frivolous applications unless they receive adequate notice “of the consequences” of doing so. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4)(A), (d)(6). To fulfill this notice mandate, the government has placed the required warning about filing a frivolous asylum application in the standard application form itself.

Takhir Khaytekov received this written warning, but immigration judges also routinely give another verbal warning in court. The judge in Khaytekov’s case did not give this secondary warning, and Khaytekov argues that the failure to do so violated § 1158(d)’s notice requirement. In an earlier opinion, we opted to reject Khaytekov’s claims for relief on narrower grounds that avoided this statutory question. But the Supreme Court has since remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), and we now must confront it. We see nothing in § 1158(d)’s text that requires the additional warning that Khaytekov requests. And we agree with every other circuit court that has considered the issue by concluding that the warning in the application form itself satisfies the statute’s notice requirement. Because Khaytekov does not dispute that he filed a frivolous asylum application, he is permanently barred from obtaining any immigration “benefits.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). So our judgment remains the same after Niz-Chavez: we dismiss Khaytekov’s petition for review in part and deny it in part.