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IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION.
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VIP, INC.; PERFORMANCE INTERNET PARTS, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
KYB CORPORATION; KYB AMERICAS CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellants.
   No. 19-1150
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
Nos. 2:12-md-02311; 2:15-cv-03301; 2:16-cv-13616—Marianne O. Battani, District Judge.
Argued: December 5, 2019
Decided and Filed: February 24, 2020
Before: DAUGHTREY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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The Supreme Court recently emphasized that “before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court determines whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. But if a valid agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may not decide the arbitrability issue.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 530 (2019) (internal citation omitted). The district court concluded the first “if” did not apply to the present dispute, finding the parties did not form an agreement to arbitrate and therefore denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. We agree and affirm.



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CYNTHIA MADEJ; ROBERT MADEJ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
JEFF MAIDEN, Athens County Engineer,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 18-4132
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.
No. 2:16-cv-00658—Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., District Judge.
Argued: October 22, 2019
Decided and Filed: February 24, 2020
Before: GUY, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Cynthia Madej is very ill. On top of her other ailments, her doctors say she has “multiple chemical sensitivity.” She thus goes to great lengths to avoid everyday materials that she believes will trigger harmful reactions like burning eyes and throat, dizziness, or nausea. This suit arose because Ms. Madej fears that the use of asphalt on a road near her home will cause more harm still. She and her husband sued the county engineer to stop the roadwork, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Applying the well-known rules from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the district court excluded the opinions of the Madejs’ experts that the asphalt would injure Ms. Madej. Without expert causation evidence, the court added, the Madejs could not withstand summary judgment. As far as we are aware, “no district court has ever found a diagnosis of multiple chemical sensitivity . . . to be sufficiently reliable to pass muster under Daubert.” Gabbard v. Linn-Benton Hous. Auth., 219 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1134 (D. Ore. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Wroncy v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 94 F. App’x 559 (9th Cir. 2004). We thus see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary ruling and affirm its judgment for the county engineer.



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SARAH R. LEE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
OHIO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; AVON LAKE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 19-3250
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:18-cv-01420—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Argued: December 6, 2019
Decided and Filed: February 24, 2020
Before: DAUGHTREY, CLAY, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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Plaintiff-Appellant Sarah Lee seeks a refund of “fair-share” fees she was required to pay to her public-sector union. Shortly after Lee filed suit, the Supreme Court held that such fees violate the First Amendment as a form of compelled speech. Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). Nevertheless, the district court granted the union’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the union, as a private actor sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was entitled to rely on its good faith in following existing Ohio law and prior Supreme Court precedent, which had expressly permitted fair-share fees.

We now affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s federal cause of action because the union’s good-faith defense bars the claim. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s state-law conversion claim because she failed to state a plausible claim for relief.