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BRANDON YOUNG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KATHLEEN KENNEY, Commissioner, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
   No. 20-5027
Appeal from the United States District Court
or the Western District of Kentucky at Paducah.
No. 5:19-cv-00135—Thomas B. Russell, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: February 19, 2020
Before: MOORE, GILMAN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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PER CURIAM. “Every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction . . . .” Alston v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., 494 F.3d 562, 564 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 95 (1998)). Generally, in a civil case where neither the United States, a United States agency, nor a United States officer or employee is a party, a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after the judgment or order from which the party appeals is entered. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The timing requirements to file a notice of appeal are mandatory jurisdictional prerequisites that generally may not be waived. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).

. . .

Accordingly, we REMAND this case to the district court for a determination as to whether Young has shown excusable neglect or good cause to warrant an extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. While on limited remand, Young’s appeal is held in abeyance. Upon ruling, the district court shall return the case to this court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ERICK JAMAL HENDRICKS,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 19-3232
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:16-cr-00265-1—John R. Adams, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: February 19, 2020
Before: SILER, GIBBONS, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Erick Jamal Hendricks of attempting and conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. He raises three issues on appeal. First, Hendricks argues that the trial evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he attempted or conspired to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Second, Hendricks argues that, for substantially the same reason, the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. Finally, Hendricks argues that the district court abused its discretion by partially closing the courtroom during testimony from an undercover FBI agent. We find that the government presented sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. We also find that the district court properly denied Hendricks a new trial and adequately justified its partial closure of the courtroom. We therefore affirm Hendricks’s convictions.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ROBERT ANDREW FABER,
Defendant-Appellant.
   No. 19-1575
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Marquette.
No. 2:05-cr-00053-1—Janet T. Neff, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: February 19, 2020
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, COOK, and READLER, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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COOK, Circuit Judge. The district court sentenced Robert Faber on child pornography charges to a term in prison followed by supervised release. As a condition of supervised release, the district court ordered Faber to avoid contacting Tylyn Gieszer (Faber’s spouse according to their neo-pagan religion, Wicca), who interfered with a probation officer’s earlier supervision of Faber. Faber later moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) to eliminate the no-contact order, arguing that it unduly burdened his religious practices. The district court denied the motion on the merits. Because district courts lack jurisdiction to consider substantive legal challenges under § 3583(e)(2), we vacate the relevant portion of the district court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.