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JANE DOE, a student, by her next friends and parents, K.M. and A.M.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KNOX COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 22-5317
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 3:22-cv-00063—Katherine A. Crytzer, District Judge.
Argued: October 25, 2022
Decided and Filed: January 4, 2023
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DONALD and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Jane Doe, a high-school student, suffers from a condition that makes her hypersensitive to the everyday sounds of eating food and chewing gum. Doe’s parents asked her school to ban students from eating or chewing in her classes. It refused. So they sought this ban by suing the Knox County Board of Education under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. While considering their preliminaryinjunction motion, the district court decided to dismiss the suit. It reasoned that Doe’s parents could obtain the requested relief in administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Until they exhaust this administrative process, the IDEA bars Doe’s parents from using the ADA or Rehabilitation Act to seek “relief that is also available” under that law. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Doe’s parents now argue both that they need not exhaust their claims under the IDEA and that we should grant Doe a preliminary injunction under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act on appeal.

We agree with their first argument but not their second. The IDEA provides relief only to students who need “specially designed instruction.” Because no ordinary English speaker would describe a ban on eating and chewing as “instruction,” her parents did not need to go through the IDEA’s review process to attempt to seek this ban under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. But just because Doe’s parents need not exhaust their claims does not mean that Doe is entitled to a preliminary injunction under those laws. Knox County has offered significant justification for its policy allowing students to eat in class at the magnet school that Doe chose to attend—a school designed to operate like a college. Ultimately, though, we leave this issue for the district court to consider in the first instance. We thus reverse the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, reject Doe’s request that we grant a preliminary injunction, and remand for further proceedings.