Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville.
No. 3:22-cv-00063—Katherine A. Crytzer, District Judge.
Argued: October 25, 2022
Decided and Filed: January 4, 2023
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; DONALD and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
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OPINION
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MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Jane Doe, a high-school student, suffers from a condition
that makes her hypersensitive to the everyday sounds of eating food and chewing gum.
Doe’s parents asked her school to ban students from eating or chewing in her classes. It refused.
So they sought this ban by suing the Knox County Board of Education under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. While considering their preliminaryinjunction motion, the district court decided to dismiss the suit. It reasoned that Doe’s parents
could obtain the requested relief in administrative proceedings under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Until they exhaust this administrative process, the IDEA
bars Doe’s parents from using the ADA or Rehabilitation Act to seek “relief that is also
available” under that law. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Doe’s parents now argue both that they need not
exhaust their claims under the IDEA and that we should grant Doe a preliminary injunction
under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act on appeal.
We agree with their first argument but not their second. The IDEA provides relief only
to students who need “specially designed instruction.” Because no ordinary English speaker
would describe a ban on eating and chewing as “instruction,” her parents did not need to go
through the IDEA’s review process to attempt to seek this ban under the ADA and Rehabilitation
Act. But just because Doe’s parents need not exhaust their claims does not mean that Doe is
entitled to a preliminary injunction under those laws. Knox County has offered significant
justification for its policy allowing students to eat in class at the magnet school that Doe chose to
attend—a school designed to operate like a college. Ultimately, though, we leave this issue for
the district court to consider in the first instance. We thus reverse the district court’s dismissal of
the complaint, reject Doe’s request that we grant a preliminary injunction, and remand for further
proceedings. |