Respondent Helaman Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path to U. S. citizenship through “adult adoption.” But that was a scam. Though there is no path to citizenship through “adult adoption,” Hansen earned nearly $2 million from his scheme. The United States charged Hansen with, inter alia, violating 8 U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.” Hansen was convicted and moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on First Amendment overbreadth grounds. The District Court rejected Hansen’s argument, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that clause (iv) was unconstitutionally overbroad.

Held: Because §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Pp. 4–20.

  (a) Hansen’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge rests on the claim that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that it cannot be applied to anyone, including him. A court will hold a statute facially invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if the law “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292. In such a circumstance, society’s interest in free expression outweighs its interest in the statute’s lawful applications. Otherwise, courts must handle unconstitutional applications as they usually do—case-by-case. Pp. 4–5.

 (b) The issue here is whether Congress used “encourage” and “induce” in clause (iv) as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and facilitation (thus capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead as those terms are used in ordinary conversation (thus encompassing a broader swath). Pp. 5–9.

  (1) Criminal solicitation is the intentional encouragement of an unlawful act, and facilitation—i.e., aiding and abetting—is the provision of assistance to a wrongdoer with the intent to further an offense’s commission. Neither requires lending physical aid; for both, words may be enough. And both require an intent to bring about a particular unlawful act. The terms “encourage” and “induce,” found in clause (iv), are among the “most common” verbs used to denote solicitation and facilitation. 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §13.2(a). Their specialized usage is displayed in the federal criminal code as well as the criminal laws of every State. If the challenged statute uses those terms as they are typically understood in the criminal law, an overbreadth challenge would be hard to sustain. Pp. 6–8.

  (2) Hansen, like the Ninth Circuit, insists that clause (iv) uses “encourages” and “induces” in their ordinary rather than specialized sense. In ordinary parlance, “induce” means “[to] lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence,” Webster’s New International Dictionary 1269, and “encourage” means to “inspire with courage, spirit, or hope,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 747. If clause (iv) conveys these ordinary meanings, it arguably reaches abstract advocacy or general encouragement, and its applications to protected speech might render it vulnerable to an overbreadth challenge. P. 9.

 (c) The Court holds that clause (iv) uses “encourages or induces” in its specialized, criminal-law sense—that is, as incorporating common-law liability for solicitation and facilitation. Pp. 9–13.

  (1) Context indicates that Congress used those words as terms of art. “Encourage” and “induce” have well-established legal meanings—and when Congress “borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263. That inference is even stronger here, because clause (iv) prohibits “encouraging” and “inducing” a violation of law, which is the object of solicitation and facilitation too. The Ninth Circuit stacked the deck in favor of ordinary meaning, but it should have given specialized meaning a fair shake. When words have several plausible definitions, context differentiates among them. Here, the context of these words indicates that Congress used them as terms of art. Pp. 9–11.

  (2) Statutory history is an important part of the relevant context. When Congress enacted in 1885 what would become the template for clause (iv), it criminalized “knowingly assisting, encouraging or soliciting” immigration under a contract to perform labor. 23 Stat. 333. Then, as now, “encourage” had a specialized meaning that channeled accomplice liability. And the words “assisting” and “soliciting,” which appeared alongside “encouraging,” reinforce the narrower criminal-law meaning. When Congress amended that provision in 1917, it added “induce,” which also carried solicitation and facilitation overtones. 39 Stat. 879. In 1952, Congress enacted the immediate predecessor for clause (iv) and also simplified the language from the 1917 Act, dropping the words “assist” and “solicit,” and making it a crime to “willfully or knowingly encourag[e] or induc[e], or attemp[t] to encourage or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United States of . . . any alien . . . not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within the United States.” 66 Stat. 229. Hansen believes these changes dramatically broadened the scope of clause (iv)’s prohibition on encouragement, but accepting that argument would require the Court to assume that Congress took a circuitous route to convey a sweeping—and constitutionally dubious—message. The better understanding is that Congress simply streamlined the previous statutory language. Critically, the terms Congress retained (“encourage” and “induce”) substantially overlap in meaning with the terms it omitted (“assist” and “solicit”). Clause (iv) is thus best understood as a continuation of the past. Pp. 11–13.

 (d) Hansen argues that the absence of an express mens rea requirement in clause (iv) means that the statute is not limited to solicitation and facilitation. But when Congress placed “encourages” and “induces” in clause (iv), the traditional intent associated with solicitation and facilitation was part of the package. The federal aiding and abetting statute works the same way: It contains no express mens rea requirement but implicitly incorporates the traditional state of mind required for aiding and abetting. Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. 65, 70–71. Clause (iv) is situated among other provisions that function in the same manner. See, e.g., §§1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (II). Since “encourages or induces” draws on the same common-law principles, clause (iv) also incorporates a mens rea requirement implicitly. Pp. 13–16.

 (e) Finally, it bears emphasis that the canon of constitutional avoidance counsels the Court to adopt the Government’s reading if it is at least “ ‘fairly possible.’ ” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 16–17.

 (f) Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law. So understood, it does not “prohibi[t] a substantial amount of protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.” Williams, 553 U. S., at 292. It is undisputed that clause (iv) encompasses a great deal of nonexpressive conduct, which does not implicate the First Amendment at all, e.g., smuggling noncitizens into the country. Because these types of cases are heartland clause (iv) prosecutions, the “plainly legitimate sweep” of the provision is extensive. To the extent clause (iv) reaches any speech, it stretches no further than speech integral to unlawful conduct, which is unprotected. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502. Hansen, on the other hand, fails to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly protected expression in the 70 years since Congress enacted clause (iv)’s immediate predecessor. Instead, he offers a string of hypotheticals, all premised on the expansive ordinary meanings of “encourage” and “induce.” None of these examples are filtered through the traditional elements of solicitation and facilitation—most importantly, the requirement that a defendant intend to bring about a specific result. Because clause (iv) does not have the scope Hansen claims, it does not produce the horribles he parades. Hansen also resists the idea that Congress can criminalize speech that solicits or facilitates a civil violation, and some immigration violations are only civil. But even assuming that clause (iv) reaches some protected speech, and even assuming that its application to all of that speech is unconstitutional, the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful applications is not lopsided enough to justify facial invalidation for overbreadth. Pp. 17–20.

25 F. 4th 1103, reversed and remanded.

 Barrett, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a concurring opinion. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor, J., joined.

Petitioner Adam Samia, along with Joseph Hunter and Carl Stillwell, were arrested by the U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration and charged with a variety of offenses related to the murder-for-hire of Catherine Lee, a real-estate broker. The Government tried all three defendants jointly in the Southern District of New York. Prior to trial, the Government moved to admit Stillwell’s postarrest confession in which he admitted that he had been in the van in which Lee was killed, but he claimed that Samia had shot Lee. Since Stillwell would not be testifying on his own behalf and the full confession implicated Samia, the Government proposed that the confession be introduced through the testimony of a DEA agent, who would testify to the content of Stillwell’s confession in a way that eliminated Samia’s name while avoiding any obvious indications of redaction. The District Court granted the Government’s motion with additional alterations to conform to its understanding of this Court’s Confrontation Clause precedents.

  At trial, the Government’s theory of the case was that Hunter had hired Samia and Stillwell to pose as real-estate buyers and visit properties with Lee and that Samia, Stillwell, and Lee were in a van driven by Stillwell when Samia shot Lee. As part of the Government’s case in chief, a DEA agent testified that Stillwell had confessed to “a time when the other person he was with pulled the trigger on that woman in a van that he and Mr. Stillwell was driving.” (Emphasis added.) Other portions of the agent’s testimony recounting Stillwell’s confession used the “other person” descriptor to refer to someone with whom Stillwell had traveled and lived and who carried a particular firearm. Both before the agent’s testimony and again prior to deliberations, the District Court instructed the jury that the agent’s testimony about Stillwell’s confession was admissible only as to Stillwell and should not be considered as to Samia or Hunter. Samia and his codefendants were convicted on all counts. On appeal, Samia argued that the admission of Stillwell’s confession was constitutional error because other evidence and statements at trial enabled the jury to immediately infer that the “other person” described in the confession was Samia himself. The Second Circuit, pointing to the established practice of replacing a defendant’s name with a neutral noun or pronoun in a nontestifying codefendant’s confession, held that the admission of Stillwell’s confession did not violate Samia’s Confrontation Clause rights.

Held: The Confrontation Clause was not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant’s confession that did not directly inculpate the defendant and was subject to a proper limiting instruction. Pp. 5–17.

 (a) Stillwell’s formal, Mirandized confession to authorities is testimonial and thus falls within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which forbids the introduction of out-of-court “testimonial” statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 52–54. The Clause, however, applies only to witnesses “against the accused.” Id., at 50. And “[o]rdinarily, a witness whose testimony is introduced at a joint trial is not considered to be a witness ‘against’ a defendant if the jury is instructed to consider that testimony only against a codefendant.” Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206. This general rule is consistent with the Clause’s text, historical practice, and the law’s reliance on limiting instructions in other contexts. Pp. 5–9.

  (1) Longstanding practice permitted a nontestifying codefendant’s confession to be admitted in a joint trial so long as the jury was properly instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing defendant. This practice is identified in early treatises, see, e.g., S. Phillipps, Law of Evidence 82; in the early cases of this Court, see, e.g., Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 58; United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 672; and in many States with a similar constitutional right of confrontation, see, e.g., State v. Workman, 15 S. C. 540, 545. Notably, none of these treatises or cases suggests that a confession naming a codefendant must in all cases be altered to refer to “another person” (or something similar). Thus, while it is unclear that any alteration to Stillwell’s confession was necessary, historical practice suggests that altering a nontestifying codefendant’s confession not to name the defendant, coupled with a limiting instruction, was enough to permit the introduction of such confessions at least as an evidentiary matter. Pp. 6–8.

  (2) This historical practice is in accord with the law’s broader assumption that jurors will “ ‘attend closely the particular language of [limiting] instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow’ ” them. United States v. Olano, 507 U. S. 725, 740. And the presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions applies to statements that are substantially more credible and inculpatory than a codefendant’s confession. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 223–225. To disregard or to make unnecessary exceptions to this principle “would make inroads into th[e] entire complex code of . . . criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 562. Pp. 8–9.

 (b) The Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, “recognized a narrow exception to” the presumption that juries follow their instructions, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. Richardson, 481 U. S., at 207. In Bruton, the prosecution introduced a confession by Bruton’s codefendant that implicated Bruton by name. The Court held that the confession’s introduction substantially threatened Bruton’s right to confront the witnesses against him, reasoning that “there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” 391 U. S., at 135.

 In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court “decline[d] to extend [Bruton] further” to “confessions that do not name the defendant.” 481 U. S., at 211. Richardson involved a redacted confession that “was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.” Id., at 208. In such cases of inferential incrimination, the Court posited that “the judge’s instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from entering onto the path of inference.” Ibid.

 The Court in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 194, later qualified Richardson by holding that certain obviously redacted confessions might be “directly accusatory,” and thus fall within Bruton’s rule, even if they did not specifically use a defendant’s name. Gray involved whether admission of a co-defendant’s confession altered “by substituting for the defendant’s name in the confession a blank space or the word ‘deleted’ ” violated the Confrontation Clause. Id., at 188. The Court in Gray concluded that, when a redacted confession “simply replace[s] a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as ‘deleted’ or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration,” the evidence “so closely resemble[s] Bruton’s unredacted statements that . . . the law must require the same result.” Id., at 192. Pp. 9–14.

 (c) The Court’s precedents in this area distinguish between confessions that directly implicate a defendant and those that do so indirectly. Accordingly, neither Bruton, Richardson, nor Gray provides license to flyspeck trial transcripts in search of evidence that could give rise to a collateral inference that a defendant was named in an altered confession. Here, the District Court’s admission of Stillwell’s confession, accompanied by a limiting instruction, did not run afoul of this Court’s precedents. Stillwell’s confession was redacted to avoid naming Samia, satisfying Bruton’s rule. And, it was not obviously redacted in a manner resembling the confession in Gray; the neutral references to some “other person” were not akin to an obvious blank or the word “deleted.” Pp. 14–16.

 (d) Expanding Bruton in the way Samia proposes would be inconsistent with longstanding practice and this Court’s precedents, would work an unnecessary and imprudent change in law, and would require federal and state trial courts to conduct extensive pretrial hearings. Because it would be impractical to fully police juror inferences, the likely practical consequence of extending Bruton here would be to mandate severance whenever the prosecution wishes to introduce the confession of a nontestifying codefendant in a joint trial. But, as the Court has observed, that is “too high” a price to pay. Richardson, 481 U. S., at 210. Samia’s proposal is not compelled by the Confrontation Clause, and it ignores both the “vital role” joint trials play in the criminal justice system, and the fact that confessions are “ ‘essential to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.’ ” Id., at 209–210. Pp. 16–17.

Affirmed.

 Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh, JJ., joined, and in which Barrett, J., joined as to all but Part II–A. Barrett, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Kagan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Jackson, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

In 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security promulgated new immigration-enforcement guidelines (Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law) that prioritize the arrest and removal from the United States of noncitizens who are suspected terrorists or dangerous criminals or who have unlawfully entered the country only recently, for example. The States of Texas and Louisiana claim that the Guidelines contravene two federal statutes that they read to require the arrest of certain noncitizens upon their release from prison (8 U. S. C. §1226(c)) or entry of a final order of removal (§1231(a)(2)). The District Court found that the States would incur costs due to the Executive’s failure to comply with those alleged statutory mandates, and that the States had standing to sue based on those costs. On the merits, the District Court found the Guidelines unlawful and vacated them. The Fifth Circuit declined to stay the District Court’s judgment, and this Court granted certiorari before judgment.

Held: Texas and Louisiana lack Article III standing to challenge the Guidelines. Pp. 3–14.

 (a) Under Article III, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. This bedrock constitutional requirement has its roots in the separation of powers. So the threshold question here is whether the States have standing to maintain this suit. Based on this Court’s precedents and longstanding historical practice, the answer is no.

 To establish standing, a plaintiff must show an injury in fact caused by the defendant and redressable by a court order. The District Court found that the States would incur additional costs due to the challenged arrest policy. And monetary costs are an injury. But this Court has stressed that the alleged injury must also “be legally and judicially cognizable.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819. That requires that the dispute is “traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Ibid. Here, the States cite no precedent, history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind. On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.” See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 619. The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical practice holding otherwise. Pp. 3–6.

 (b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally entertained lawsuits of this kind. For one, when the Executive Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property, and thus does not infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect. Moreover, such lawsuits run up against the Executive’s Article II authority to decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate the law.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___. The principle of Executive Branch enforcement discretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration context. Courts also generally lack meaningful standards for assessing the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety and public-welfare needs. That is why this Court has recognized that federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims that the Executive Branch should make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. Pp. 6–9.

 (c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make more arrests or bring more prosecutions. First, the Court has adjudicated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecution. Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress elevates de facto injuries to the status of legally cognizable injuries redressable by a federal court. Third, the standing calculus might change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory responsibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions. Fourth, a challenge to an Executive Branch policy that involves both arrest or prosecution priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead to a different standing analysis. Fifth, policies governing the continued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably might raise a different standing question than arrest or prosecution policies. But this case presents none of those scenarios. Pp. 9–12.

 (d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch to make arrests or bring prosecutions are rare. This case is different from those in which the Federal Judiciary decides justiciable cases involving statutory requirements or prohibitions on the Executive, because it implicates the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion and raises the distinct question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in effect order the Executive Branch to take enforcement actions. The Court’s decision does not indicate any view on whether the Executive is complying with its statutory obligations. Nor does the Court’s narrow holding signal any change in the balance of powers between Congress and the Executive. Pp. 12–14.

606 F. Supp. 3d 437, reversed.

 Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas and Barrett, JJ., joined. Barrett, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Gorsuch, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Abraham Bielski filed a putative class action on behalf of Coinbase users alleging that Coinbase, an online currency platform, failed to replace funds fraudulently taken from the users’ accounts. Because Coinbase’s User Agreement provides for dispute resolution through binding arbitration, Coinbase filed a motion to compel arbitration. The District Court denied the motion. Coinbase then filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U. S. C. §16(a), which authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Coinbase also moved the District Court to stay its proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The District Court denied Coinbase’s stay motion, and the Ninth Circuit likewise declined to stay the District Court’s proceedings pending appeal.

Held: A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Pp. 2–10.

  (a) Section 16(a) does not say whether district court proceedings must be stayed pending resolution of an interlocutory appeal. But Congress enacted the provision against a clear background principle prescribed by this Court’s precedents: An appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U. S. 56, 58. The Griggs principle resolves this case. Because the question on appeal is whether the case belongs in arbitration or instead in the district court, the entire case is essentially “involved in the appeal,” id., at 58, and Griggs dictates that the district court stay its proceedings while the interlocutory appeal on arbitrability is ongoing. Most courts of appeals to address this question, as well as leading treatises, agree with that conclusion.

  The common practice of staying district court proceedings during the pendency of an interlocutory appeal taken under §16(a) reflects common sense. If the district court could move forward with pre-trial and trial proceedings while the appeal on arbitrability was ongoing, then many of the asserted benefits of arbitration (efficiency, less expense, less intrusive discovery, and the like) would be irretrievably lost—even if the court of appeals later concluded that the case actually had belonged in arbitration all along. Absent a stay, parties also could be forced to settle to avoid the district court proceedings (including discovery and trial) that they contracted to avoid through arbitration. The Griggs rule avoids these detrimental results.

  Congress’s longstanding practice reflects the Griggs rule. Given Griggs, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal and to automatically stay the district court proceedings during that appeal, Congress ordinarily need not say anything about a stay. By contrast, when Congress wants to authorize an interlocutory appeal, but not to automatically stay district court proceedings pending that appeal, Congress typically says so. Since the creation of the modern courts of appeals system in 1891, Congress has enacted multiple statutory “non-stay” provisions. Pp. 2–7.

  (b) Bielski’s arguments to overcome the Griggs principle are unpersuasive. First, the courts of appeals possess robust tools to prevent unwarranted delay and deter frivolous interlocutory appeals that an automatic stay might otherwise encourage. Second, Congress included explicit stay requirements in two other statutory provisions for reasons particular to those statutes, not because Congress thought that an interlocutory appeal did not ordinarily stay district court proceedings. Third, the result here does not create a special, arbitration-preferring procedural rule, but simply subjects arbitrability appeals to the same stay principles that courts apply in other analogous contexts where an interlocutory appeal is authorized. Fourth, experience shows that ordinary discretionary stay factors would not adequately protect parties’ rights to an interlocutory appellate determination of arbitrability. In any event, the background Griggs rule applies regardless of how often courts might otherwise grant stays under the ordinary discretionary stay factors. Fifth, while the Court has recognized that questions of arbitrability are severable from merits questions, the sole issue here is whether the district court’s authority to consider a case is “involved in the appeal” when an appellate court considers the threshold question of arbitrability, Griggs, 459 U. S., at 58. The answer is yes. Pp. 7–10.

Reversed and remanded.

 Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Jackson, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., joined in full, and in which Thomas, J., joined as to Parts II, III and IV.