SHURTLEFF et al. v. CITY OF BOSTON et al.

Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The First Circuit

No. 20–1800. Argued January 18, 2022—Decided May 2, 2022

Just outside the entrance to Boston City Hall, on City Hall Plaza, stand three flagpoles. Boston flies the American flag from the first pole and the flag of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from the second. Boston usually flies the city’s own flag from the third pole. But Boston has, for years, allowed groups to hold ceremonies on the plaza during which participants may hoist a flag of their choosing on the third pole in place of the city’s flag. Between 2005 and 2017, Boston approved the raising of about 50 unique flags for 284 such ceremonies. Most of these flags were other countries’, but some were associated with groups or causes, such as the Pride Flag, a banner honoring emergency medical service workers, and others. In 2017, Harold Shurtleff, the director of an organization called Camp Constitution, asked to hold an event on the plaza to celebrate the civic and social contributions of the Christian community; as part of that ceremony, he wished to raise what he described as the “Christian flag.” The commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department worried that flying a religious flag at City Hall could violate the Establishment Clause and found no past instance of the city’s having raised such a flag. He therefore told Shurtleff that the group could hold an event on the plaza but could not raise their flag during it. Shurtleff and Camp Constitution (petitioners) sued, claiming that Boston’s refusal to let them raise their flag violated, among other things, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The District Court held that flying private groups’ flags from City Hall’s third flagpole amounted to government speech, so Boston could refuse petitioners’ request without running afoul of the First Amendment. The First Circuit affirmed. This Court granted certiorari to decide whether the flags Boston allows others to fly express government speech, and whether Boston could, consistent with the Free Speech Clause, deny petitioners’ flag-raising request.

Held: 1. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech. Pp. 5–12.

  (a) The Free Speech Clause does not prevent the government from declining to express a view. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467–469. The government must be able to decide what to say and what not to say when it states an opinion, speaks for the community, formulates policies, or implements programs. The boundary between government speech and private expression can blur when, as here, the government invites the people to participate in a program. In those situations, the Court conducts a holistic inquiry to determine whether the government intends to speak for itself or, rather, to regulate private expression. The Court’s cases have looked to several types of evidence to guide the analysis, including: the history of the expression at issue; the public’s likely perception as to who (the government or a private person) is speaking; and the extent to which the government has actively shaped or controlled the expression. See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U. S. 200, 209–213. Considering these indicia in Summum, the Court held that the messages of permanent monuments in a public park constituted government speech, even when the monuments were privately funded and donated. See 555 U. S., at 470–473. In Walker, the Court found that license plate designs proposed by private groups also amounted to government speech because, among other reasons, the State that issued the plates “maintain[ed] direct control over the messages conveyed” by “actively” reviewing designs and rejecting over a dozen proposals. 576 U. S., at 213. On the other hand, in Matal v. Tam, the Court concluded that trademarking words or symbols generated by private registrants did not amount to government speech because the Patent and Trademark Office did not exercise sufficient control over the nature and content of those marks to convey a governmental message. 582 U. S.___, ___. Pp. 5–6.

  (b) Applying this government-speech analysis here, the Court finds that some evidence favors Boston, and other evidence favors Shurtleff. The history of flag flying, particularly at the seat of government, supports Boston. Flags evolved as a way to symbolize communities and governments. Not just the content of a flag, but also its presence and position have long conveyed important messages about government. Flying a flag other than a government’s own can also convey a governmental message. For example, another country’s flag outside Blair House, across the street from the White House, signals that a foreign leader is visiting. Consistent with this history, flags on Boston’s City Hall Plaza usually convey the city’s messages. Boston’s flag symbolizes the city and, when flying at halfstaff, conveys a community message of sympathy or somber remembrance. The question remains whether, on the 20 or so times a year when Boston allowed private groups to raise their own flags, those flags, too, expressed the city’s message. The circumstantial evidence of the public’s perception does not resolve the issue. The most salient feature of this case is that Boston neither actively controlled these flag raisings nor shaped the messages the flags sent. To be sure, Boston maintained control over an event’s date and time to avoid conflicts, and it maintained control over the plaza’s physical premises, presumably to avoid chaos. But the key issue is whether Boston shaped or controlled the flags’ content and meaning; such evidence would tend to show that Boston intended to convey the flags’ messages as its own. And on that issue, Boston’s record is thin. Boston says that all (or at least most) of the 50 unique flags it approved reflect particular city-endorsed values or causes. That may well be true of flying other nations’ flags, or the Pride Flag raised annually to commemorate Boston Pride Week, but the connection to other flag-raising ceremonies, such as one held by a community bank, is more difficult to discern. Further, Boston told the public that it sought “to accommodate all applicants” who wished to hold events at Boston’s “public forums,” including on City Hall Plaza. App. to Pet. for Cert. 137a. The city’s application form asked only for contact information and a brief description of the event, with proposed dates and times. The city employee who handled applications testified that he did not request to see flags before the events. Indeed, the city’s practice was to approve flag raisings without exception—that is, until petitioners’ request. At the time, Boston had no written policies or clear internal guidance about what flags groups could fly and what those flags would communicate. Boston’s control is therefore not comparable to the degree of government involvement in the selection of park monuments in Summum, see 555 U. S., at 472–473, or license plate designs in Walker, see 576 U. S., at 213. Boston’s come-one-come-all practice—except, that is, for petitioners’ flag—is much closer to the Patent and Trademark Office’s policy of registering all manner of trademarks in Matal, see 582 U. S., at ___, ___. All told, Boston’s lack of meaningful involvement in the selection of flags or the crafting of their messages leads the Court to classify the third-party flag raisings as private, not government, speech. Pp. 6–12.

  2. Because the flag-raising program did not express government speech, Boston’s refusal to let petitioners fly their flag violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. When the government does not speak for itself, it may not exclude private speech based on “religious viewpoint”; doing so “constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 112. Boston concedes that it denied petitioners’ request out of Establishment Clause concerns, solely because the proposed flag “promot[ed] a specific religion.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 155a. In light of the Court’s government-speech holding, Boston’s refusal to allow petitioners to raise their flag because of its religious viewpoint violated the Free Speech Clause. Pp. 12–13.

986 F. 3d 78, reversed and remanded.

 Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Kavanaugh, J., filed a concurring opinion. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined.