CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mia Bennett appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Hurley Medical Center (“Hurley”). Plaintiff claims that Hurley violated her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq., when it stopped permitting her service dog, Pistol, to accompany her while working as a student nurse. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Mustafa Reynolds of selling a fentanyl-heroin mixture that killed two young men. Investigators connected Reynolds to these fatal drugs in part through cellphone records, including records showing the general locations of several phones. Reynolds now raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues that the government introduced insufficient evidence to convict him. Second, he argues that a government expert identified the phones’ general locations using a software program that flunks the reliability standards from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Third, he argues that the district court violated the Constitution by excluding text messages that allegedly supported his innocence. And lastly, he argues that the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for a key government witness during closing arguments. Disagreeing on all fronts, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Michael Davis and David Allen pleaded guilty to using a facility of interstate commerce (their cellphones) in a murder-for-hire scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). But they reserved the right to raise two constitutional issues on appeal, one involving the Commerce Clause and the other involving the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Davis and Allen first argue that the government could not constitutionally apply the federal murder-for-hire statute to their conduct. Although the statute rests on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, Davis and Allen never left Michigan or even made calls outside the State when committing the murder. At most, some of their intrastate calls required the telephone company to use out-of-state switches. This interstate connection, they say, does not suffice to give Congress the power to regulate their crime. Our binding precedent requires us to reject this claim. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may regulate the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” even when used only within a State, and we have long treated an ordinary telephone as one such “instrumentality” within Congress’s control. See United States v. Windham, 53 F.4th 1006, 1013 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341–42 (6th Cir. 1999).

So Davis and Allen turn to their speedy-trial claims. Before they pleaded guilty, the district court had postponed their trial for nearly four years. Davis and Allen allege that this lengthy delay violated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and Allen also claims that it violated the Speedy Trial Act. But the delay arose in part from their own repeated requests for more time and in part from the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the district court found that both reasons justified the delay, it saw no speedy-trial problem. We agree and affirm.