SILER, Circuit Judge. In 2018, First Floor Living, LLC (“First Floor”) and Lush Designs, LLC (“Lush Designs”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) each purchased real estate parcels in Cleveland for the purpose of rehabilitating and redeveloping the properties. First Floor’s property was located at 4400 Warner Road, and Lush Designs’ property was located at 7410 Linwood Avenue. Prior to Plaintiffs’ purchases, the City of Cleveland (“Cleveland”) declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after Plaintiffs had invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them.

In 2021, following demolition of the buildings, Plaintiffs filed suit against Cleveland; Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation (“Land Bank”); Laster, LLC (Laster); and Baumann Enterprises, Inc. (“Baumann”) (collectively “Defendants”), arguing that the demolitions violated numerous state laws and federal constitutional provisions.¹ The district court denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion for discovery, granted summary judgment to Defendants on the constitutional claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by denying their Rule 56(d) motion for discovery and by granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We affirm.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Pest-control company Terminix faced a “super termite” crisis from 2018 to 2019 that predominately affected homeowners in the Mobile, Alabama area. Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund (the Fund) alleges that Terminix’s parent company, ServiceMaster Global Holdings, Inc. (ServiceMaster), its then-CEO Nikhil Varty, and its then-CFO Anthony DiLucente (collectively, the Defendants), violated the federal securities laws through a series of misrepresentations and omissions that understated ServiceMaster’s liability for the resulting termite-damage claims, concealed the risk of such claims from investors, and falsely touted the company’s customer-retention and growth efforts while strategically using price increases to cause affected customers to drop their service contracts in an attempt to limit its future liability. The Fund also claims that these actions and omissions constituted a scheme to defraud ServiceMaster’s investors by inflating the company’s reported financial results relative to its true financial condition. All of this allegedly caused a financial loss to the Fund as an investor in ServiceMaster’s stock.

In response, the Defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The district court concluded that, although the Fund had alleged two potentially actionable misstatements and omissions, it had failed to plead a strong inference that the Defendants had acted with the scienter required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 109 Stat. 737, Pub. L. No. 104-67. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. While L. C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington (“FMC”) in Lexington, Kentucky, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee Hosea Lee. L. C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women. She claims that the BOP failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. Accordingly, L. C. filed a negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Because a BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official, and because deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations, this type of negligence claim falls outside the scope of the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. But because L. C.’s specific allegations fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. At issue in these two cases is whether the United States Constitution prohibits Kentucky and Tennessee from limiting certain sex-transition treatments for minors experiencing gender dysphoria.

. . .

No one in these consolidated cases debates the existence of gender dysphoria or the distress caused by it. And no one doubts the value of providing psychological and related care to children facing it. The question is whether certain additional treatments—puberty blockers, hormone treatments, and surgeries—should be added to the mix of treatments available to those age 17 and under. As to that, we return to where we started. This is a relatively new diagnosis with ever-shifting approaches to care over the last decade or two. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for anyone to be sure about predicting the long-term consequences of abandoning age limits of any sort for these treatments. That is precisely the kind of situation in which life-tenured judges construing a difficult-to-amend Constitution should be humble and careful about announcing new substantive due process or equal protection rights that limit accountable elected officials from sorting out these medical, social, and policy challenges.

For these reasons, we reverse the preliminary injunctions issued in these cases and remand them for further proceedings consistent with this decision.