DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Yi Zhang Lin, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or “the Board”) final order affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under Article III of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The question before us is whether the BIA’s determinations are supported by substantial evidence. As will be explained below, the BIA’s rationale does not allow us to make that determination. So we grant Lin’s petition and remand for further proceedings.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Kentucky State Police officers searched Edward Lewis’s laptop, cell phone, and thumb drive and found evidence of child pornography. Lewis moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure of his electronic devices. The district court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied and denied Lewis’s motion, and Lewis pleaded guilty while reserving his right to bring this appeal. We REVERSE the district court’s order denying Lewis’s motion to suppress, VACATE Lewis’s conviction, and REMAND for further proceedings.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Legacy Medical Transport, a small family-owned business, provides nonemergency ambulance services in several Ohio counties that border Kentucky. After receiving many inquiries from Kentucky hospitals and nursing homes, Legacy sought to expand into the Commonwealth. But Kentucky required Legacy to show a “need” for its services and to apply for a “certificate of need” with the Kentucky Cabinet for Health and Family Services. Unsurprisingly, existing ambulance providers (Legacy’s potential competitors) objected to Legacy’s request. The Cabinet denied Legacy’s application partly on the ground that these providers offered an adequate supply. Legacy then sued various Cabinet officials, alleging that Kentucky’s certificate-of-need law violated the “dormant” or “negative” part of the Commerce Clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Cabinet officials. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

We affirm with respect to Legacy’s request to offer intrastate ambulance transportation in Kentucky. Under the modern approach to the dormant Commerce Clause, a law’s validity largely depends on whether it discriminates against out-of-state businesses in favor of in-state ones. See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 143 S. Ct. 1142, 1152–53 (2023). Yet Kentucky’s law treats in-state and out-of-state providers the same. Legacy responds that such a neutral law can still violate the dormant Commerce Clause if its interstate burdens exceed its local benefits under the “balancing” test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). And the company raises valid concerns about the wisdom of the law’s limits on market competition. For the most part, however, Legacy’s evidence suggests that these limits will harm Kentucky’s own “consumers”; it has not shown a “substantial harm” to interstate commerce. Nat’l Pork Producers, 143 S. Ct. at 1162–63 (plurality opinion).

That said, we reverse with respect to Legacy’s request to offer interstate ambulance transportation between Kentucky and Ohio. In Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925), the Court held that States may not deny a common carrier a license to provide interstate transportation on the ground that the interstate market contains an “adequate” supply. Id. at 316. This bright-line rule barring States from obstructing interstate “competition” does not turn on a finding that a State has discriminated against out-of-state entities. And while the district court thought that later cases had repudiated Buck, we find that claim debatable. Besides, the Court has told us that we must follow a directly controlling case even if later decisions call it into doubt. Buck controls here.