JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. When the COVID-19 virus struck a nursing home in March 2020, the owner, Metro Man IV, LLC, facing staff shortages, took emergency measures to keep its residents safe. Namely, it implemented temporary hazard pay and hired non-certified nursing aides. The National Labor Relations Board determined that the exigent circumstances presented by COVID excused Metro Man from its initial obligations to bargain with SEIU Healthcare Michigan (the Union). However, the Board determined that Metro Man failed to bargain with the Union regarding the effects of its unilateral decisions and the decisions themselves when the emergency receded. For the reasons that follow, we grant in part and deny in part the Board’s petition to enforce its order.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Michael Harvel, a county official, sexually assaulted many women that he supervised. A jury convicted him of infringing the constitutional rights of seven victims in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. On appeal, Harvel raises timeliness, indictment, and evidentiary challenges. Two of his arguments deserve mention at the outset. Federal law sets a five-year statute of limitations for most crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). Yet it permits the government to charge crimes “punishable by death” at any time. See id. § 3281. Harvel contends that the government did not bring the most serious charges in this case (which involved kidnapping and sexual abuse) within § 3282’s five-year statute of limitations. He is mistaken. These counts were not subject to this limitations period because they were “punishable by death” under § 3281. Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence might bar the death penalty for kidnapping or rape crimes. But we hold that the phrase “punishable by death” in § 3281 looks to the penalty provisions in the charged offense (here, § 242), not to these constitutional standards.

Next, Harvel argues that the government violated the Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by introducing “other crimes” evidence (the testimony of five additional women who asserted that Harvel abused them in similar ways) to show his propensity to commit sexual assault. Harvel, however, has not identified a long history of courts uniformly excluding this type of evidence in sex-crime cases—as he must to establish a due-process violation. And the district court reasonably found that the evidence’s prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value under Rule 403. Because Harvel’s other arguments also lack merit, we affirm.