MATHIS, Circuit Judge. In 2012, an Ohio jury convicted Kayla Ayers of aggravated arson and child endangerment in a case arising from a fire in Ayers’s basement. In 2019, Ayers obtained an expert report that suggests the prosecution’s star expert witness, a fire inspector, was not qualified to provide the testimony that helped convict Ayers. Ayers petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that her trial counsel’s failure to investigate the fire inspector’s qualifications or retain an arson expert to challenge the inspector’s testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding that Ayers failed to exercise due diligence to acquire her expert report sooner. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Ayers appeals that decision, arguing that no amount of due diligence on her part would have revealed the expert evidence underpinning her ineffective-assistance claim sooner. We reverse and remand

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Cases often depend on the contents of legal instruments, such as trusts or contracts. And under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, these documents are part of the pleadings if attached to the complaint. If a plaintiff doesn’t attach them to the complaint, an alert defendant can provide the relevant records at the motion-to-dismiss stage to defeat the plaintiffs’ claims. But defendants must take care. If there are factual questions about whether the defendant has provided a complete set of the controlling documents, discovery is appropriate—not dismissal.

GEICO classified James Moyer and other captive insurance agents¹ as independent contractors and did not let them receive the full slate of benefits it provided its corporate employees. The agents sued. They claim that GEICO was violating the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) by misclassifying them and denying them benefits. The benefits-plan documents are integral to the plaintiffs’ claims but were not attached to the complaint. So the district court ordered the parties to provide the relevant plan documents. GEICO submitted documents that, according to one of its executives, governed the dispute. The agents resisted and argued that the district court could not rely on them in deciding GEICO’s motion to dismiss. The court disagreed, relied on the documents, and dismissed the complaint. Because there are legitimate questions about whether the documents that GEICO provided are a full set of the relevant, governing plan documents, we REVERSE and REMAND.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. After a four-day trial and multiple days of deliberations, a jury found that Plaintiff Ariel Schlosser proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her former employer, VRHabilis, LLC (“VRH”), subjected her to a hostile work environment on the basis of her sex or gender, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. Following the jury’s verdict, VRH filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the evidence could not support the jury’s verdict in favor of Schlosser. The district court denied the motion, and VRH timely appealed. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. In 2021, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) promulgated a rule requiring Title X grant recipients to provide neutral, nondirective counseling and referrals for abortions to patients who request it. Tennessee, which has been a Title X recipient for over 50 years, recently outlawed most abortions in the state. After doing so, Tennessee would commit only to conducting counseling and referrals for options deemed legal in the state. HHS considered Tennessee’s commitment to be out of compliance with its regulatory requirements. So it opted to discontinue the grant. Tennessee filed suit to challenge HHS’s action and enjoin it from closing the grant. The district court denied Tennessee’s request for preliminary injunction because it held that Tennessee does not have a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim and that the balance of the remaining preliminary injunction factors weigh in HHS’s favor. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.